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From: Greg KH on 10 May 2010 19:30 2.6.32-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know. ------------------ From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm(a)suse.com> commit cac36f707119b792b2396aed371d6b5cdc194890 upstream. Commit 677c9b2e393a0cd203bd54e9c18b012b2c73305a ("reiserfs: remove privroot hiding in lookup") removed the magic from the lookup code to hide the .reiserfs_priv directory since it was getting loaded at mount-time instead. The intent was that the entry would be hidden from the user via a poisoned d_compare, but this was faulty. This introduced a security issue where unprivileged users could access and modify extended attributes or ACLs belonging to other users, including root. This patch resolves the issue by properly hiding .reiserfs_priv. This was the intent of the xattr poisoning code, but it appears to have never worked as expected. This is fixed by using d_revalidate instead of d_compare. This patch makes -oexpose_privroot a no-op. I'm fine leaving it this way. The effort involved in working out the corner cases wrt permissions and caching outweigh the benefit of the feature. Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm(a)suse.com> Acked-by: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Matt McCutchen <matt(a)mattmccutchen.net> Tested-by: Matt McCutchen <matt(a)mattmccutchen.net> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec(a)gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)suse.de> --- fs/reiserfs/dir.c | 2 -- fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 17 ++++------------- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) --- a/fs/reiserfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/dir.c @@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ static inline bool is_privroot_deh(struc struct reiserfs_de_head *deh) { struct dentry *privroot = REISERFS_SB(dir->d_sb)->priv_root; - if (reiserfs_expose_privroot(dir->d_sb)) - return 0; return (dir == dir->d_parent && privroot->d_inode && deh->deh_objectid == INODE_PKEY(privroot->d_inode)->k_objectid); } --- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c @@ -952,21 +952,13 @@ int reiserfs_permission(struct inode *in return generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL); } -/* This will catch lookups from the fs root to .reiserfs_priv */ -static int -xattr_lookup_poison(struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *q1, struct qstr *name) +static int xattr_hide_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd) { - struct dentry *priv_root = REISERFS_SB(dentry->d_sb)->priv_root; - if (container_of(q1, struct dentry, d_name) == priv_root) - return -ENOENT; - if (q1->len == name->len && - !memcmp(q1->name, name->name, name->len)) - return 0; - return 1; + return -EPERM; } static const struct dentry_operations xattr_lookup_poison_ops = { - .d_compare = xattr_lookup_poison, + .d_revalidate = xattr_hide_revalidate, }; int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct super_block *s) @@ -980,8 +972,7 @@ int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct supe strlen(PRIVROOT_NAME)); if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { REISERFS_SB(s)->priv_root = dentry; - if (!reiserfs_expose_privroot(s)) - s->s_root->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops; + dentry->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops; if (dentry->d_inode) dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE; } else -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ |