From: Mike Kelly on

Tony Orlow wrote:
> Dik T. Winter wrote:
> > In article <44ef3b88(a)news2.lightlink.com> Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> writes:
> > > Dik T. Winter wrote:
> > ...
> > > > > > There is no such specific natural number. It is when we have them
> > > > > > all, but as there is no largest number, this can not be achieved by
> > > > > > taking them one by one.
> > > > >
> > > > > The set of all naturals numbers consists of only natural numbers. There
> > > > > is NO natural number where the count becomes infinite. So there is no
> > > > > point in the set, even if you COULD get to the "last" one, where any
> > > > > infinite set has been achieved.
> > > >
> > > > And there is no point in the set where you have the complete set. Yes.
> > > > Indeed. So what?
> > >
> > > So, if there is no point in the set which can even remotely be
> > > considered infinitely far from the beginning, what makes it actually
> > > infinite?
> >
> > What the set of all finite numbers makes infinite? The axiom of infinitys
> > states that the set of all finite (natural) numbers does exist. From that
> > is is easy to prove that that set is not finite, hence infinite.
>
> Yes, according to the Dedekind definition of an infinite set, but that
> definition leads to some conclusions that offend some people's
> sensibilities.
>
> >
> > > If no element of the set can be an infinite number of steps
> > > from the start, you may not be able to find an end.
> >
> > And indeed, when you go step by step you will not get at the end.
>
> Right, you will always have gone a finite number of steps and have
> arrived at a finite natural.
>
> >
> > > But does that mean
> > > it's "greater than" every finite, or only "greater than or equal"?
> >
> > What is the difference? Assuming you mean "aleph-0" when you write "it",
> > it is easily proven that:
> > aleph-0 is greater than or equal to each natural
> > gives the theorem:
> > aleph-0 is greater than each natural.
> >
> > Because: suppose aleph-0 >= each n in N. Now suppose in addition that it
> > is equal to some particular n. Well, n + 1 is in N, and so aleph-0
> > should also be larger or equal to n + 1. Hence it can not be equal to n.
> > So it is not equal to any n at all. And so aleph-0 > each n in N.
>
> Only assuming that you have identified some largest natural. This is the
> form of most proofs in this theory: assume a largest finite, find a
> contradiction, and blame it something else. Of course you cannot find a
> largest natural such that this is the size of the set. You also cannot
> take an infinite number of increments without achieving an infinite value.
>
> >
> > > > Indeed. The set of all natural numbers is just sufficient.
> > >
> > > No, it is far too great. If you have a countably infinite number of bit
> > > positions, then you have an uncountably infinite set of strings. Where
> > > bit positions are indexed by the naturals, the naturals are the power
> > > set of the number of bit positions,
> >
> > Wrong. This is plain nonsense. Suppose there are three bit positions.
> > The set of naturals {1, 2, 3} is sufficent to index them. In what way
> > is {1, 2, 3} the power set of the number of bit positions (3)?
>
> Let me explain, using your example. We have the first three bit
> positions 0, 1 and 2, representing 1, 2 and 4, the fist three powers of
> 2. With those bit positions we can produce eight unique binary strings,
> as follows:
>
> 0 1 2
>
> 0 0 0 0
> 1 1 0 0
> 2 0 1 0
> 3 1 1 0
> 4 0 0 1
> 5 1 0 1
> 6 0 1 1
> 7 1 1 1
>
> The set of binary naturals which can be represented by this set of bit
> positions is the power set of the bit positions, each being a unique
> combination, in the form of a sum, of those powers of 2. Given n bit
> positions, we can produce 2^n unique strings. Given n unique powers of
> 2, we can produce 2^n unique sums. Thus the set of binary strings is the
> power set of the number of bit positions.
> >
> > > > No one is obligated to accept the theory at all. Whether it is proven
> > > > to be "correct" or not, as I have no idea what "correct" in this context
> > > > means. Is Euclidean geometry "correct"? Is hyperbolic geometry "correct"?
> > > > Is elliptic geometry "correct"?
> > >
> > > Ah, now you bring up a prime example. Euclid set down laws for flat 2D
> > > geometry, and questioning those axioms led to new shapes for space.
> > > Accrdingly, the axioms of set theory might work together to describe a
> > > system, but it is not impossible that entirely other systems might arise
> > > from different starting assumptions.
> >
> > And indeed, I never did state the opposite. But if you want to get at a
> > new system, provide axioms, definitions, and whatever. Tell us what
> > axioms to retain and what axioms to reject. And if there are axioms to
> > be rejected, come up with alternatives.
>
> Well, that's what I'm trying to do, to provide an alternative
> perspective and system. I certainly reject the Dedekind definition of an
> infinite set as being inconsistent with notions of infinite measure when
> it comes to the finite naturals. By viewing the situation in terms of
> density and range, the conclusion can be quite different. Since no two
> naturals are infinitely distant, and since each natural occupies a unit
> of measure on the real line, there cannot be an infinite number of them,
> because you cannot fit an infinite number of unit segments in a finite
> range.
>
> >
> > > > But what is the case is that if you accept the axioms, you also have
> > > > to accept what follows from the axioms.
> > >
> > > Yes, I understand that, and much to the consternation of some, I don't.
> >
> > Yes, much consternation, I can understand that. So apparently you are
> > accepting the axioms, but not what follows from the axioms. What kind
> > of logic are you using?
>
> I am NOT accepting the axioms. The axioms are artificial statements
> which can be made to work together, but which do not follow from
> elementary logic the way they should. Every axiom should be justifiable
> based on fundamental concepts. I don't see that here.

Which axiom of ZFC set theory do you find objectionable?

Can you give an example of an axiom "justified by fundamental
concepts
From: Mike Kelly on

Tony Orlow wrote:
> Dik T. Winter wrote:
> > In article <44ef3da9(a)news2.lightlink.com> Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> writes:
> > > Dik T. Winter wrote:
> > ....
> > > > > Why do you need an axiom for that? Why is it
> > > > > not derivable logically?
> > > >
> > > > Because without the axiom of infinity the set of naturals need not exist,
> > > > and indeed, you can build a completely logical system with the negation
> > > > of the axiom of infinity and with all other axioms remaining. It is
> > > > similar to the parallel axiom in geometry.
> > >
> > > But without an axiom of infinity, it is demonstrable that, given the
> > > axiom of internal infinity (continuity), x<z -> x<y<z, that any finite
> > > interval includes an infinite number of points. Start with the line, and
> > > identify points. There's infinity.
> >
> > Your axiom uses things that are not defined. What is the *meaning* of
> > "x<z"?
>
> Geometrically it means that x is left of z on the number line.

And what does this mean? What is "the number line"? What is "left"?

--
mike.

From: Mike Kelly on

Tony Orlow wrote:
> MoeBlee wrote:
> > Tony Orlow wrote:
> >> And yet, you are saying it's not technically correct. So, 1 is a natural
> >> but not a rational or real? If rigorous formulations come to that
> >> conclusion, then rigor does not ensure correctness.
> >
> > You're hopeless. You didn't understand a thing I said, which may be my
> > fault for not providing adequate explanation in the context of your
> > ignorance of the subject; but it is no my fault that you won't even
> > look at a book on mathematics, such as even a introductory text in real
> > analysis.
> >
> > MoeBlee
> >
>
> Your whole point here is ludicrous. You are arguing that the naturals
> are not a subset of the rationals, which are not a subset of the reals.
> While each superset may require a more complex construction than the
> subset, all elements of the subset are covered by the superconstruction.
> As points on the real line, they are all real numbers. What you're
> saying amounts to what I said above, which is indeed absurd. So, no, I
> don't understand a thing you're saying, when you say naturals aren't
> reals. Sorry.

All natural numbers are finite ordinals. All real numbers are infinite
sets of rationals. Obviously a set which contains only finite ordinals
is not a subset of a set that contains only infinite sets of rationals.

--
mike.

From: Mike Kelly on

MoeBlee wrote:
> Tony Orlow wrote:
> > MoeBlee wrote:
> > > Tony Orlow wrote:
> > >> And yet, you are saying it's not technically correct. So, 1 is a natural
> > >> but not a rational or real? If rigorous formulations come to that
> > >> conclusion, then rigor does not ensure correctness.
> > >
> > > You're hopeless. You didn't understand a thing I said, which may be my
> > > fault for not providing adequate explanation in the context of your
> > > ignorance of the subject; but it is no my fault that you won't even
> > > look at a book on mathematics, such as even a introductory text in real
> > > analysis.
> > >
> > > MoeBlee
> > >
> >
> > Your whole point here is ludicrous.
>
> No, my whole point just happens to conflict with the oversimplification
> we were all taught in the fifth grade.
>
> > You are arguing that the naturals
> > are not a subset of the rationals, which are not a subset of the reals.
>
> That is correct, given, as I said, that we're working with either the
> Dedekind cut or equivalence class of Cauchy sequences method.
>
> A natural number is a finite ordinal. An integer is a certain kind of
> equivalence class of naturals. A rational is certain kind of
> equivalence class of integers. A Dedekind cut is a certain kind of
> infinite proper subset of the set of rationals. An equivalence class of
> Cauchy sequences is a certain kind of infinite set of infinite
> sequences of rationals.

Don't be abusrd. As any schoolchild knows, numbers are points on the
number line.

--
mike.

From: Mike Kelly on

Tony Orlow wrote:
> Dik T. Winter wrote:
> > In article <44fdcaf1(a)news2.lightlink.com> Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> writes:
> > > Dik T. Winter wrote:
> > > > In article <1157367096.604428.36330(a)i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com> mueckenh(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de writes:
> > ...
> > > > > A number has only one of the following properties: It is larger than or
> > > > > smaller than or equal to any natural number.
> > > >
> > > > So omega and aleph-0 are numbers. They satisfy the definition. Thanks.
> > >
> > > So, they are numbers which are larger than any finite number? Why then
> > > do we not consider an inductive proof of the form E y e N A x>y P(x) not
> > > to prove P(aleph_0) or P(omega)?
> >
> > That would be a new axiom, and you may consider it, but it leads to
> > contradictions when you retain the current definitions of aleph_0 and
> > omega.
>
> Yes, I am well aware of that. That's why I have chosen to reject those
> concepts in favor of finding something better, based on this
> infinite-case induction. Noting personal.
>
> :)

Better in what sense? What mathematics are you hoping to be able to do
with your new foundation that cannot be done with ZFC?

--
mike.