From: Virgil on
In article <c7f7b$4520c367$82a1e228$22987(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:

> Virgil wrote:
>
> > In article <c87e0$451cc5b4$82a1e228$4275(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
> > Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
> >
> >>MoeBlee wrote:
> >>
> >>>Han de Bruijn wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>It's a priorities issue. Do axioms have to dictate what constructivism
> >>>>should be like? Should constructivism be tailored to the objectives of
> >>>>axiomatics? I think not.
> >>>
> >>>Fine, but if you don't give a formal system, then your mathematical
> >>>arguments are not subject to the objectivity of evaluation that
> >>>arguments backed up by formal systems are subject to.
> >>
> >>Exactly! Constructivism is not Formalism.
> >
> > Do constructivists have any statements which they accept as true without
> > proof?
> > If not how do they prove anything from nothing?
> > If so, then aren't those things they accept equivalent to axioms.
>
> Constructively valid proof. Intuition precedes axioms.
> A mathematician
> is like an architect who builds his mathematics.

So that those who accuse formalists of building on sand merely build on
a different, less visible, kind of sand.
From: Virgil on
In article <21b4$4520c439$82a1e228$22987(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:

> Virgil wrote:
>
> > In article <51de2$451cc7e9$82a1e228$6256(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
> > Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
> >
> >>Virgil wrote:
> >>
> >>>In article <2e658$451b78ef$82a1e228$7519(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
> >>> Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>Tony Orlow wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>>MoeBlee wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>Tony Orlow wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>Constructivism and Axiomatism are two sides of a coin. They can be
> >>>>>>>reconciled in larger framework, I think.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>I don't know what your definition of 'axiomatism' is, but there are
> >>>>>>axiomatic systems for constructive mathematics.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>I dunno. I was responding to Han's comment. I think he means
> >>>>>constructive concepts vs. axiomatic declarations.
> >>>>
> >>>>It's a priorities issue. Do axioms have to dictate what constructivism
> >>>>should be like? Should constructivism be tailored to the objectives of
> >>>>axiomatics? I think not.
> >>>
> >>>But if you cannot clearly state what you are assuming/accepting as true,
> >>>all you have is a morass of ambiguity.
> >>
> >>Ambiguity does not necessarily comprise a morass.
> >
> > How do constructivists deduce new things if there is nothing that they
> > can say is true to start with?
>
> Constructivism starts with counting. All the rest is architecture.

Then they are assuming things that they do not make explicit.
From: Virgil on
In article <65e14$4520c63d$82a1e228$23833(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:

> Virgil wrote:
>
> > In article <e4ca4$451cd0dd$82a1e228$14108(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
> > Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
> >
> >>Virgil wrote:
> >>
> >>>In article <1159437062.473100.294820(a)k70g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
> >>> mueckenh(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>Virgil schrieb:
> >>>>
> >>>>>Several sets may all have the common property of being pairwise
> >>>>>bijectable, but if any of their members are distinguishable from those
> >>>>>of another set then the sets are equally distinguishable.
> >>>>
> >>>>Each one of the sets expresses, represents, and *is* the same
> >>>>(cardinal) number.
> >>>
> >>>Then one apple and one orange are the same because they have the same
> >>>cardinality.
> >>
> >>In _that_ respect, with respect to counting: definitely, yes!
> >
> > But not necessarily in any other respect whatsoever, so that to say an
> > apple is an orange or an orange is an apple, as some have been saying,
> > is foolishly wrong.
>
> Why? Give me one piece of fruit. I don't care whether it is an orange or
> an apple ..


A bunch of grapes is one piece.
From: Virgil on
In article <bfe8f$4520c878$82a1e228$24731(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:

> Virgil wrote:
>
> > In article <2b79d$451cd38b$82a1e228$17494(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
> > Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
> >
> >>Virgil wrote:
> >>
> >>>In article <76b59$451ba0bd$82a1e228$18077(a)news2.tudelft.nl>,
> >>> Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>mueckenh(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>>Virgil schrieb:
> >>>>
> >>>>>>>>You stated that you needed counting to determine the successor. That
> >>>>>>>>is
> >>>>>>>>false. The successor is defined without any reference to counting.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>The successor function *is* counting (+1).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>Not to those who can't count. Successorship does not require numbers,
> >>>>>>it
> >>>>>>only requires "next".
> >>>>>
> >>>>>How far would those who cannot count be able to find "the next"?
> >>>>
> >>>>And how do you distinguish "the next" from something previous?
> >>>
> >>>By pointing at them separately.
> >>>
> >>>>This is
> >>>>not a joke. Many young children don't find it trivial that you shouldn't
> >>>>count a thing twice.
> >>>
> >>>But they are much less prone to mistaking who has more marbles, or
> >>>whatever, which argues that injection, surjection and bijection are more
> >>>basic than counting.
> >>
> >>Have two bags with say a hundred marbles in it and _make_ the bijection.
> >>I wish you good luck. And, BTW, I would like to have a computer program
> >>which does the job, properly. Video circuit attached.
> >>
> > The age at which children would be able to compare bags of about n
> > marbles successfully ins an increasing function of the age of the
> > children. There is an age in which they could not even compare empty
> > bags.
>
> A long time ago, I was reading a pictures book with one of my children.
> There was a flower on page one, a bear on page two, a fly on page three
> and so on and so forth. And then we turned the last page: what's there?
> After a while I suggested: "nothing". I remained silent for some time ..
> But then, very enthousiastic: nothing, nothing, nothing !!

So before that your child would have been one of them.
From: Han de Bruijn on
Virgil wrote:

> In article <38a22$451cd683$82a1e228$19346(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
> Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
>
>>stephen(a)nomail.com wrote:
>>
>>>Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)dto.tudelft.nl> wrote:
>>>
>>>>Virgil wrote:
>>>
>>>>>In article <d12a9$451b74ad$82a1e228$6053(a)news1.tudelft.nl>,
>>>>>Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>Randy Poe wrote, about the Balls in a Vase problem:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>It definitely empties, since every ball you put in is
>>>>>>>later taken out.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>And _that_ individual calls himself a physicist?
>>>>>
>>>>>Does Han claim that there is any ball put in that is not taken out?
>>>
>>>>Nonsense question. Noon doesn't exist in this problem.
>>>
>>>Yes it is a nonsense question, in the sense
>>>that it is non-physical. You cannot actually perform
>>>the "experiment". Just as choosing a number uniformly
>>>from the set of all naturals is a non-physical nonsense
>>>question. You cannot perform that experiment either.
>>
>>But you _can_ do it at any time _before_ noon. There is no limit
>>of the number of balls before noon which converges at noon.
>>
>>But you _can_ do it with any finite contiguous set of naturals.
>>Then you find floor(n/a)/n and with limit(n -> oo) find 1/a .
>
> But that does not define a uniform distribution of a countably infinite
> set of naturals as that would require that enough 0's will add up to 1.

Due to the mainstream mathematics doctrine that there is a JUMP between
"the" countably infinite set of naturals and all contiguous finite sets
of naturals {1,2,3,4,5 , ... , n}. Resulting in n.1/n becoming n.0 .
But nature does not jump (Leibniz: "Natura non facit saltus").

Han de Bruijn