*Analytiqúe*: Fail again. Fail better. [Marx and 'Actualism' v.11]
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From: Big Red Jeff Rubard on 16 Feb 2010 22:56 Analysis presented: Marx and Actualism Analytic Marxism is usually disappointing to me on two counts. Firstly, analytic Marxists dont generally seem to have taken the advice about changing the world to heart instead, they write books imagining questions being put to them like 'If Youre an Egalitarian, How Come Youre So Rich?' Its a good question, since all observers are agreed that there are lots of ways to come in contact with the contemporary economy without coming away healthy, wealthy and wise and shouldnt the perils be so much more for someone espousing any variety of Marxism? But I more peculiarly also feel let down by the analytic ambitions of the genre. A lot of works in this vein think that standards of logical stringency and careful linguistic explication of terms will do the trick to be analytic, but this is really the analytic philosophy of forty years ago; granted, the main texts of analytic Marxism were written not so long after that, but history, intellectual and political, has continued apace without there being an effort to keep pace. So, sometimes I wonder what an assessment of Marx using contemporary analytic tools would look like; and here is a very small part of what I imagine such an approach might amount to. In contemporary metaphysics of modality, there is a position called actualism; this is not related to the Actualism of the fascist Giovanni Gentile, but does share some features with an actualist fallacy /Roy Bhaksar/ [! - tact and tempo -] decries in Marx. Modal actualism is the belief that only the actual is real; possible things and states of affairs (in the area of time, the past and the future) can only be constructed out of actual ones (the present). On an actualist view it makes no sense to say that mythical beings like unicorns are possible though not real, because we have ruled them out of our picture of what actually exists: whatever does exist in our world is by definition not a unicorn. As a general explanation of what it means for something to be possible, actualism has its defenders. But I think that it is especially applicable as a principle for interpreting several of Marxs key theses about the social world and its functioning. Marx certainly did not have the tools of contemporary metaphysics available to him, but he was well-acquainted with the philosophy of Aristotle and other ancient thinkers who employed modal reasoning; and although some may suggest that modality plays no important role in the philosophy of Hegel, Marxs chief influence, I think this fails to allow for Marxs own innovations as a thinker. (I have gradually come to the view that Hegels influence on Marx was primarily cultural, Hegel having provided a matrix in 'empirical-republican' Germany within which social critique could take place, rather than primarily theoretical). Ordinary economic thinking, including the marginalism that is supposed to have superseded Marx, relies on a model of agents choosing between possible alternatives in action in some Bayesian models, choosing from what they subjectively perceive to be possible alternatives. And in mainstream political philosophy, we are encouraged to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of certain possible forms of social organization from behind a veil of ignorance. Now, compare Marx. Marx denies that individual preference ranging over possible alternatives is the root of economic activity: rather, the entire structure of capitalism determines the individuals real options, sometimes at variance with their ideological construal of the matter. Furthermore, the proletariat who are less prone to being confused about the real situation have no ideals to realize as a political force, because they simply represent the inherent potentials of modern industrial production. It seems to me that these are actualist positions. In fact, I think that the issue of economism can be partially resolved by so viewing them. Perhaps economics as Marx practices it full of detail about every element of social functioning, certainly a far cry from the airless game theory and econometrics of contemporary orthodoxy is really something like a science of the actual, and historical materialisms dependence on it is equivalent to the principle that only the actual affects the actual; that there are no irruptions from religious ideals or utopian visions into history which cannot be explained as concrete this-worldly realities (the reality that theory becomes when it grips the masses, etc.) If viewed in this way, the difference between Marxist precept and the idealist systems that preceded it becomes especially sharp, and the complaints that widget production could hardly be the determining factor in an eras aesthetic values appear less convincing. ~ by jeffrubard on July 6, 2007.
From: Big Red Jeff Rubard on 16 Feb 2010 23:04
New Style ---- Analysis presented: Marx and Actualism Analytic Marxism is usually disappointing to me on two counts. Firstly, analytic Marxists dont generally seem to have taken the advice about changing the world to heart instead, they write books imagining questions being put to them like 'If Youre an Egalitarian, How Come Youre So Rich?' Its a good question, since all observers are agreed that there are lots of ways to come in contact with the contemporary economy without coming away healthy, wealthy and wise and shouldnt the perils be so much more for someone espousing any variety of Marxism? But I more peculiarly also feel let down by the analytic ambitions of the genre. A lot of works in this vein think that standards of logical stringency and careful linguistic explication of terms will do the trick to be analytic, but this is really the analytic philosophy of forty years ago; granted, the main texts of analytic Marxism were written not so long after that, but history, intellectual and political, has continued apace without there being an effort to keep pace. So, sometimes I wonder what an assessment of Marx using contemporary analytic tools would look like; and here is a very small part of what I imagine such an approach might amount to. In contemporary metaphysics of modality, there is a position called actualism; this is not related to the Actualism of the fascist Giovanni Gentile, but does share some features with an actualist fallacy /Roy Bhaksar/ [! - tact and tempo -] decries in Marx. Modal actualism is the belief that only the actual is real; possible things and states of affairs (in the area of time, the past and the future) can only be constructed out of actual ones (the present). On an actualist view it makes no sense to say that mythical beings like unicorns are possible though not real, because we have ruled them out of our picture of what actually exists: whatever does exist in our world is by definition not a unicorn. As a general explanation of what it means for something to be possible, actualism has its defenders. But I think that it is especially applicable as a principle for interpreting several of Marxs key theses about the social world and its functioning. Marx certainly did not have the tools of contemporary metaphysics available to him, but he was well-acquainted with the philosophy of Aristotle and other ancient thinkers who employed modal reasoning; and although some may suggest that modality plays no important role in the philosophy of Hegel, Marxs chief influence, I think this fails to allow for Marxs own innovations as a thinker. (I have gradually come to the view that Hegels influence on Marx was primarily cultural, Hegel having provided a matrix in 'empirical-republican' Germany within which social critique could take place, rather than primarily theoretical). Ordinary economic thinking, including the marginalism that is supposed to have superseded Marx, relies on a model of agents choosing between possible alternatives in action in some Bayesian models, choosing from what they subjectively perceive to be possible alternatives. And in mainstream political philosophy, we are encouraged to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of certain possible forms of social organization from behind a veil of ignorance. Now, compare Marx. Marx denies that individual preference ranging over possible alternatives is the root of economic activity: rather, the entire structure of capitalism determines the individuals real options, sometimes at variance with their ideological construal of the matter. Furthermore, the proletariat who are less prone to being confused about the real situation have no ideals to realize as a political force, because they simply represent the inherent potentials of modern industrial production. It seems to me that these are actualist positions. In fact, I think that the issue of economism can be partially resolved by so viewing them. Perhaps economics as Marx practices it full of detail about every element of social functioning, certainly a far cry from the airless game theory and econometrics of contemporary orthodoxy is really something like a science of the actual, and historical materialisms dependence on it is equivalent to the principle that only the actual affects the actual; that there are no irruptions from religious ideals or utopian visions into history which cannot be explained as concrete this-worldly realities (the reality that theory becomes when it grips the masses, etc.) If viewed in this way, the difference between Marxist precept and the idealist systems that preceded it becomes especially sharp, and the complaints that widget production could hardly be the determining factor in an eras aesthetic values appear less convincing. ~ by jeffrubard on July 6, 2007. ---- Better said: [!! - Ed.] http://www.amazon.com/After-Finitude-Essay-Necessity-Contingency/dp/1441173838/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1266379450&sr=1-1-spell |