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From: Jeff Rubard on 16 Feb 2010 17:16
An "intervalè":

Heidegger’s Temporal Logic

The Heidegger stuff seems to be popular, so I’ll offer some formal
commentary on Being and Time. You might think it would be hard to
develop logical problematics in Heidegger, and you’d be right:
although his work clearly resonates with a deep philosophical need in
people, the ideas are “unclear” in that they do not easily yield to
sharpened formulations — but with time, all things are possible.

Firstly, the “ontological difference”: “the being of beings is not
that of being”. What does this mean? It means that being – the “sense
of reality” involved in our transactions with the world – cannot be a
mereological sum of the entities we count as real. If you think the
“mereological” bit is an illegitimate importation of themes from
analytic philosophy into Heidegger, let me remind you of the third
*Logical Investigation* [!! -trying here-Ed] on whole and part, which
would have been very familiar to Heidegger: he is rejecting an
empiricist “scientific” construal of metaphysics where we look at
things which have been established (or simply taken) to exist and
generalize about them. The question of avoiding mereology becomes
important when we consider Heidegger’s doctrine of temporality, where
Heidegger rejects the common conception of time as a sequence of
“nows” and argues for an ill-defined “originary temporality” on which
it is based.

Is there a logic of time? If you’ve been following along with me (that
may be a pretty big “if”), you know there is: tense logic. Is there a
sense in which “topological” tense logic, the logic of instants in
time, is incomplete or derivative? Yes there is. Hans Kamp showed that
the normal tense operators are unable to express two concepts: the
concept of a proposition holding “since” a point in time, and its
dual, a proposition holding “until” a point in time. By contrast, the
normal tense operators are definable in terms of since/until logic.
Turning to the question of the modal accessibility relation that makes
this possible, since/until logic requires a further condition on the
accessibility relation, continuity (where there are no gaps in the
line of instants in time). Yde Venema illustrates this using the
famous Dedekind cut method for defining the square root of 2, and so
one could say that what is involved is not so much leaving the realm
of the “topological” as working with something resembling the topology
of the real line.

How does this apply to Heidegger’s doctrine of temporality? Well, if
you look at it hard it becomes apparent that the sense in which
Heidegger intends “temporality is the meaning of being” is that
originary temporality is the basic structure of intentionality widely
construed. In Basic Problems of Phenomenology [! - *Eds.*] Heidegger
identifies the horizon of Präsens with “intentional” perception, i.e.
sizing up middle-sized dry goods, but the generalized version of
intentionality employed in analytic philosophy also applies. In Being
and Time Heidegger identifies the horizon of the originary past with
facticity, the horizon of the originary future with projection, and
the “horizon” of the present (more about which later) with falling;
and what is this but a discussion of world-to-word and word-to-world
“directions of fit”?

And if we go back to the discussion of temporality in Being and Time,
the importance of the “ecstatic” character of the temporal horizons
for directions of fit might be glossed as this. If we remain with an
“instant” now, where we just have a collection of ready-made
phenomena, we’re not really being faithful to the lessons of the past
and our plans for the future: insofar as they appear in our construal
of the now, they are themselves constructions out of other discrete
“nows” and nothing meaningful coalesces. But if, similar to since/
until logic (and the duree of Bergson which Heidegger admired), we
have a “moment” where the breadths of the past and future, having a
continuous richness of detail, meet a meaningful “sense of reality” —
a genuine connection to what is — can be.
From: Jeff Rubard on 17 Feb 2010 21:32
On Feb 16, 2:16 pm, Jeff Rubard <jeffrub...(a)gmail.com> wrote:

FURTHERANCE:
Did. Did do so.

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