From: Immortalist on
Humans have different kinds of access to the mental and the physical
in terms of the differences between the "a realm of appearances" as
distinct from reality. In that context there is a distinct realm of
appearances because the mental, which includes ideas or
representations which have the epistemological status of appearances,
itself constitutes a distinct realm.

Each of us has direct access to our own states of mind in a way that
we do not to the physical. The mental thus involves so-called
privileged access.

If we have direct access only to the mental, then the mental
constitutes in some form the only reality. It is difficult to see how
there could be access of any kind to anything else but the contents of
our minds.

For what principle of inference is there that could take us from the
so-called mental representations to anything else, despite the
seductive suggestions in the notion of representation which may make
us think that there must be something for these mental entities to
represent? We have direct access only to ideas or mental
representations. Since these do not constitute a reality of public and
physical objects they can be thought of as a realm of appearances
only.

Idealism stems from this with the additional thought that, since we do
not have access to anything beyond ideas, the only reality which we
have any justification in assuming is those ideas, the appearances
themselves.

Metaphysics - by D. W. Hamlyn
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521286905/
From: heptangular on
On Jun 27, 7:25 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> If we have direct access only to the mental, then the mental
> constitutes in some form the only reality. It is difficult to see how
> there could be access of any kind to anything else but the contents of
> our minds.
>
> For what principle of inference is there that could take us from the
> so-called mental representations to anything else, despite the
> seductive suggestions in the notion of representation which may make
> us think that there must be something for these mental entities to
> represent? We have direct access only to ideas or mental
> representations. Since these do not constitute a reality of public and
> physical objects they can be thought of as a realm of appearances
> only.

This "mental" virtual reality would then have to be completely
emergent to be so isolated, caused by the physical but not composed of
any physical parts / forces. While "emergence" is perhaps the most
popular view, such an extreme degree of it doesn't seem to hold-up.
The physical body reacts to this epiphenomenal VR that it shouldn't be
influenced by; and if the mental VR did indeed have a return causal
effect upon the physical processes, then it would be detectable in
scientific research (and thus would not really be an isolated realm
unto itself).

> Idealism stems from this with the additional thought that, since we do
> not have access to anything beyond ideas, the only reality which we
> have any justification in assuming is those ideas, the appearances
> themselves.

Berkeley was trying to save the "external" world featured in everyday
perception. In classical materialism, macroscopic objects would
decompose into an elemental substrate of microscopic entites / events,
thereby making the everyday world into an illusion. This goes back to
Democritus: "By convention hot, by convention cold, but in reality
atoms and void, and also in reality we know nothing, since the truth
is at bottom.” But today's philosophers will respond to Berkeley's
worry about materialism collapsing into mereological nihilism by
suggesting that there are metaphysical relationships at our level that
make trees, clouds, and planets as real as the "atoms" (larger forms
supervene over the elemental substrate patterns).
From: Daniel T. on
Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote:

> Humans have different kinds of access to the mental and the physical
> in terms of the differences between the "a realm of appearances" as
> distinct from reality. In that context there is a distinct realm of
> appearances because the mental, which includes ideas or
> representations which have the epistemological status of appearances,
> itself constitutes a distinct realm.
>
> Each of us has direct access to our own states of mind in a way that
> we do not to the physical. The mental thus involves so-called
> privileged access.

When he says that I have direct access to my state of mind, what does
"I" mean in this context? It seems to me that without "state of mind",
"I" looses meaning.

Also, assuming "state of mind" equates to "state of my brain," I don't
see where "I" have any more direct of an access to it than I do anything
else, maybe even less direct.

> Idealism stems from this with the additional thought that, since we do
> not have access to anything beyond ideas, the only reality which we
> have any justification in assuming is those ideas, the appearances
> themselves.

I thought that was nihilism?
From: harald on
On Jun 28, 2:25 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> Humans have different kinds of access to the mental and the physical
> in terms of the differences between the "a realm of appearances" as
> distinct from reality. In that context there is a distinct realm of
> appearances because the mental, which includes ideas or
> representations which have the epistemological status of appearances,
> itself constitutes a distinct realm.
>
> Each of us has direct access to our own states of mind in a way that
> we do not to the physical. The mental thus involves so-called
> privileged access.

Hmm I doubt that -take for example our sensation of "simultaneous",
which depends on different analyses in different parts of the brain
with correction factors of rather mixed reliability.

> If we have direct access only to the mental, then the mental
> constitutes in some form the only reality.

Why would our perception of what happens inside our head be more real
than what is going on elsewhere??
However, the only things that we can be sure of are of course our own
personal perceptions - see Descartes.

Harald

> It is difficult to see how
> there could be access of any kind to anything else but the contents of
> our minds.
>
> For what principle of inference is there that could take us from the
> so-called mental representations to anything else, despite the
> seductive suggestions in the notion of representation which may make
> us think that there must be something for these mental entities to
> represent? We have direct access only to ideas or mental
> representations. Since these do not constitute a reality of public and
> physical objects they can be thought of as a realm of appearances
> only.
>
> Idealism stems from this with the additional thought that, since we do
> not have access to anything beyond ideas, the only reality which we
> have any justification in assuming is those ideas, the appearances
> themselves.
>
> Metaphysics - by D. W. Hamlynhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521286905/

From: John Stafford on
In article
<26831b7c-864f-4c3d-af44-e8e89197f459(a)k39g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
harald <hvan(a)swissonline.ch> wrote:

> On Jun 28, 2:25�am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> > Humans have different kinds of access to the mental and the physical
> > in terms of the differences between the "a realm of appearances" as
> > distinct from reality. In that context there is a distinct realm of
> > appearances because the mental, which includes ideas or
> > representations which have the epistemological status of appearances,
> > itself constitutes a distinct realm.
> >
> > Each of us has direct access to our own states of mind in a way that
> > we do not to the physical. The mental thus involves so-called
> > privileged access.
>
> Hmm I doubt that -take for example our sensation of "simultaneous",
> which depends on different analyses in different parts of the brain
> with correction factors of rather mixed reliability.
>
> > If we have direct access only to the mental, then the mental
> > constitutes in some form the only reality.
>
> Why would our perception of what happens inside our head be more real
> than what is going on elsewhere??
> However, the only things that we can be sure of are of course our own
> personal perceptions - see Descartes.

Decartes put forth a desperate argument in order to seem objective. He
chose to assert that his logic was perfectly rational, without any
hidden motive. But we know that is not true; his assertion (duality)
required divinity, that the human have a soul. He expressed implicit
agreement upon certain contemporary moral requisites without criticism
in order to support his view. IOW, he messed up.