From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Transfer Principle <lwalke3(a)lausd.net> writes:

> Consider the thread in the link above. In this thread, Nguyen used
> mostly symbolic language, which according to criterion III above,
> suggests that he is standard.

You do realize that in passages such as this you come off as extremely
silly?

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Transfer Principle <lwalke3(a)lausd.net> writes:

> I agree with Webb here -- in the end, it's a wash as to which side
> physics really favors, so perhaps it's best just to avoid physics in
> any discussion of set theory. The point that I was making is that
> members of both sides _do_ make physical-based arguments, not that
> such arguments are actually valid.

Setting aside the rather fantastic notion that the axiom of choice, say,
could have any physical consequences, we may note that as regards
logical strength the mathematics used in physics is rather wimpy -- PA,
and even PRA, suffices just fine, with some tedious coding and massaging
of the mathematical machinery. Of course, we can't draw from this purely
logical observation any conclusion about whether it would be humanly
possible to do mathematical physics using only weak mathematical
principles.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Gc on
On 10 helmi, 16:04, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> Transfer Principle <lwal...(a)lausd.net> writes:
> > I agree with Webb here -- in the end, it's a wash as to which side
> > physics really favors, so perhaps it's best just to avoid physics in
> > any discussion of set theory. The point that I was making is that
> > members of both sides _do_ make physical-based arguments, not that
> > such arguments are actually valid.
>
> Setting aside the rather fantastic notion that the axiom of choice, say,
> could have any physical consequences, we may note that as regards
> logical strength the mathematics used in physics is rather wimpy -- PA,
> and even PRA, suffices just fine, with some tedious coding and massaging
> of the mathematical machinery. Of course, we can't draw from this purely
> logical observation any conclusion about whether it would be humanly
> possible to do mathematical physics using only weak mathematical
> principles.

Are you sure about this? I think you need at least borel measure to
define a Hilbert space which is used in Quantum mechanics, but in the
other hand Hilbert space probably contains functions which have no
physical meaning, not differentiable anywhere etc. Anyway you probably
need some axiom of choice like stuff in functional analysis, operator
algebras etc. I agree (if that is what you are saying) that doing
things rigorously as in mathematical physics you probably will need
more stronger mathematics. Implicitly ordinary physicist also us those
notions.
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Gc <gcut667(a)hotmail.com> writes:

> On 10 helmi, 16:04, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
>
>> Setting aside the rather fantastic notion that the axiom of choice,
>> say, could have any physical consequences, we may note that as
>> regards logical strength the mathematics used in physics is rather
>> wimpy -- PA, and even PRA, suffices just fine, with some tedious
>> coding and massaging of the mathematical machinery. Of course, we
>> can't draw from this purely logical observation any conclusion about
>> whether it would be humanly possible to do mathematical physics using
>> only weak mathematical principles.
>
> Are you sure about this?

Well, yes. I've been told so by people who should know! Feferman -- who
often likes to point out that in physics we don't really need anything
beyond predicative mathematics -- is again whom you should turn to if
you're interested in the details.

> I think you need at least borel measure to define a Hilbert space
> which is used in Quantum mechanics, but in the other hand Hilbert
> space probably contains functions which have no physical meaning, not
> differentiable anywhere etc. Anyway you probably need some axiom of
> choice like stuff in functional analysis, operator algebras etc.

This is where the tedious coding and massaging, the chiseling off of
spurious generality, comes in. There's loads of stuff on this in the
literature on reverse mathematics. As to the axiom of choice, its use in
physical predictions and such like is always eliminable.

> I agree (if that is what you are saying) that doing things rigorously
> as in mathematical physics you probably will need more stronger
> mathematics. Implicitly ordinary physicist also us those notions.

Physicist as a rule couldn't care less about the logical strength of
their mathematical machinations, and will in blissful logical ignorance
apply any piece of mathematics that strikes their fancy or they find
useful, even if, as some logician may find out, what actual use they
make of the mathematical machinery only requires (in the logical sense)
vastly weaker mathematical principles. Similarly, although number
theorists do have a healthy interest in elementary proofs they won't shy
from analytic methods, stuff from algebraic geometry, and so on, if it
helps them in their work -- this even though probably[1] all known
number theoretic theorems can be proved in very weak fragments of
arithmetic, the proofs of course being possibly utterly beyond human
comprehension.


Footnotes:
[1] "Probably" in the sense that those who make it their business to
know about these things would be rather surprised if this wasn't the case.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Gc on
On 10 helmi, 16:32, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> Gc <gcut...(a)hotmail.com> writes:
> > On 10 helmi, 16:04, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
>
> >> Setting aside the rather fantastic notion that the axiom of choice,
> >> say, could have any physical consequences, we may note that as
> >> regards logical strength the mathematics used in physics is rather
> >> wimpy -- PA, and even PRA, suffices just fine, with some tedious
> >> coding and massaging of the mathematical machinery. Of course, we
> >> can't draw from this purely logical observation any conclusion about
> >> whether it would be humanly possible to do mathematical physics using
> >> only weak mathematical principles.
>
> > Are you sure about this?
>
> Well, yes. I've been told so by people who should know! Feferman -- who
> often likes to point out that in physics we don't really need anything
> beyond predicative mathematics -- is again whom you should turn to if
> you're interested in the details.

Well, I`m not that interested, but isn`t predicativism a lot less
restrictive than PA? Anyway I would like more to read some expert
views which think of nonpredicativist mathematics more highly than
Feferman.

> > I think you need at least borel measure to define a Hilbert space
> > which is used in Quantum mechanics, but in the other hand Hilbert
> > space probably contains functions which have no physical meaning, not
> > differentiable anywhere etc. Anyway you probably need some axiom of
> > choice like stuff in functional analysis, operator algebras etc.
>
> This is where the tedious coding and massaging, the chiseling off of
> spurious generality, comes in. There's loads of stuff on this in the
> literature on reverse mathematics. As to the axiom of choice, its use in
> physical predictions and such like is always eliminable.

You may need to use axiom of Choice in proofs, when you are doing
mathematical physics rigorously.
Actually applicable mathematics use surprisingly advanced mathematics,
and the basics they teach does not of course differ from pure
mathematics. If someone believes that everything could be done some
other way, fine, but if that were nontrivial we would have more of
those using only weaker principles in their work, because there are
always people who don`t like current strong principles.

>
> > I agree (if that is what you are saying) that doing things rigorously
> > as in mathematical physics you probably will need more stronger
> > mathematics. Implicitly ordinary physicist also us those notions.
>
> Physicist as a rule couldn't care less about the logical strength of
> their mathematical machinations, and will in blissful logical ignorance
> apply any piece of mathematics that strikes their fancy or they find
> useful, even if, as some logician may find out, what actual use they
> make of the mathematical machinery only requires (in the logical sense)
> vastly weaker mathematical principles.

In the end it`s is hard to say because the mathematics they use lack
rigour. I have studied physics and very often infinitesimals are
used ,but not in any kind of rigorous way (like in nonstandard
analysis)..

>Similarly, although number
> theorists do have a healthy interest in elementary proofs they won't shy
> from analytic methods, stuff from algebraic geometry, and so on, if it
> helps them in their work -- this even though probably[1] all known
> number theoretic theorems can be proved in very weak fragments of
> arithmetic,

Well ,this is just a guess. Mathematics of physics uses analysis, sets
of real numbers, functional analysis, algebraic geometry, fractal
geometry etc. IMHO It is a real possibility that you need something
more than PA to actually build their mathematics from the ground up.
Anyway it is clear that restrictions would cripple the subject.


>the proofs of course being possibly utterly beyond human
> comprehension.
>
> Footnotes:
> [1]  "Probably" in the sense that those who make it their business to
> know about these things would be rather surprised if this wasn't the case..
>
> --
> Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi)
>
> "Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
>  - Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus