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From: J.D. on 18 Mar 2010 13:29
@Noob
> bert wrote:
> > adacrypt wrote:
>
> >> All of the well-known ciphers are doing this at present,
> >> AES, RSA, PGP, Discreet Logarithm, the lot.
>
> > And we see that he can't spell, either...
>
> Dude,
>
> The "Discreet Logarithm" is a top secret cipher, used only
> in very confidential circles by the crypto elite.
>
> Regards.

It is also used by shadowy government agencies, paranoid dictators,
and of course James Bond villains. But it won't work for ordinary
people -- you need to have a secret base.
From: David Eather on 18 Mar 2010 16:36
On 19/03/2010 2:26 AM, Tom St Denis wrote:
> On Mar 18, 11:45 am, bert<bert.hutchi...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> On 18 Mar, 15:40, adacrypt<austin.oby...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> All of the well-known ciphers are doing this at present,
>>> AES, RSA, PGP, Discreet Logarithm, the lot.
>>
>> And we see that he can't spell, either...
>> --
>
> I'd be more concerned with him lumping AES, RSA and ... **PGP** into
> the same sentence of algorithms that are "relying on an insufficiency
> of computing power." I mean it's bad enough that AES and RSA are
> different class of algorithms altogether, but PGP isn't even a crypto
> primitive it's a protocol.
>
> Of course that's to be expected from someone who has a fairly
> hollywood grasp of cryptography.

Oh, please.. that's not even close to true. Hollywood always knows
"unbreakable" ciphers can be broken (and hence communicate a need for
caution to the viewer). Adacrypt doesn't even have that clue
From: J.D. on 18 Mar 2010 17:42
On Mar 18, 4:36 pm, David Eather <eat...(a)tpg.com.au> wrote:
> On 19/03/2010 2:26 AM, Tom St Denis wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Mar 18, 11:45 am, bert<bert.hutchi...(a)btinternet.com>  wrote:
> >> On 18 Mar, 15:40, adacrypt<austin.oby...(a)hotmail.com>  wrote:
>
> >>> All of the well-known ciphers are doing this at present,
> >>> AES, RSA, PGP, Discreet Logarithm, the lot.
>
> >> And we see that he can't spell, either...
> >> --
>
> > I'd be more concerned with him lumping AES, RSA and ... **PGP** into
> > the same sentence of algorithms that are "relying on an insufficiency
> > of computing power."  I mean it's bad enough that AES and RSA are
> > different class of algorithms altogether, but PGP isn't even a crypto
> > primitive it's a protocol.
>
> > Of course that's to be expected from someone who has a fairly
> > hollywood grasp of cryptography.
>
> Oh, please.. that's not even close to true. Hollywood always knows
> "unbreakable" ciphers can be broken (and hence communicate a need for
> caution to the viewer). Adacrypt doesn't even have that clue

That has more to do with the nature of dramatic story-telling than any
knowledge about cryptology. It's like Chekhov's Gun -- if an
encrypted message is introduced in the first act, it must be broken
and its secrets revealed by the third act. Secret messages whose
contents are never revealed can only frustrate and distract the
audience, and a movie about some guy trying to break a cipher and then
just failing to do so would lack resolution and be terribly boring.
From: Tom St Denis on 19 Mar 2010 06:41
On Mar 18, 4:36 pm, David Eather <eat...(a)tpg.com.au> wrote:
> > Of course that's to be expected from someone who has a fairly
> > hollywood grasp of cryptography.
>
> Oh, please.. that's not even close to true. Hollywood always knows
> "unbreakable" ciphers can be broken (and hence communicate a need for
> caution to the viewer). Adacrypt doesn't even have that clue

By "hollywood grasp" I mean he throws out terms like he knows what
their meanings are [and/or thinks they're all interchangeable]. It's
very similar to how they wrote Star Trek scripts where they would
quite literally write things like "techno jargon here" in the script
so the later editors could fill it in with canon consistent nonsense.

"adacrypt" has absolutely no functional knowledge of cryptography
whatsoever but that doesn't stop him from writing, at length, about
it. Even when confronted with the evidence that his scheme is similar
to other well known and broken schemes he still pounces around like he
has a clue.

I like the more absolute route where even if his schemes were secure,
it's still totally impractical and since he has yet to show that more
traditional means (e.g. via hybrid schemes with ECC or RSA and a
symmetric cipher) are weak his methods are totally irrelevant.

Tom
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