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From: Tom St Denis on 13 Jun 2010 11:10
On Jun 13, 10:49 am, jmorton123 <jmorton...(a)rock.com> wrote:
> It seems to me that cryptography has reached such a very high level of
> sohphistication that it has become pretty much impossible to
> objectively crack a well thought out modern encryption algorithm.

Simply not true. Quite a few ciphers proposed in the last decade have
been shown to be weak or less than ideal in some fashion or another.
Heck, there are attacks on AES showing that [so far] you REALLY need
10+ rounds to achieve the "ideal" security.

Your problem, like most self-appointed authorities is that you haven't
read, written, or participating in any original research. So you just
base random statements off the echoes bouncing around your cavernous
and vacant head. Try reading a paper or two before coming around with
brilliant ideas.

> So the future of results oriented cryptanalysis is to entirely focus
> on any implementation or security weaknesses or in effect, attacking
> bugs in the code or improper use of program protocols also often
> referred to as human error or failing.

Not true, but more specifically, if you want people to use YOUR crypto
apps you best get used to sharing the source code. That has more to
do with us not trusting you than not trusting your crypto schemes. I
refer for example, to your 1.2MB XOR application.

Tom
From: Pubkeybreaker on 14 Jun 2010 05:44
On Jun 14, 2:13 am, jmorton123 <jmorton...(a)rock.com> wrote:
> Do you think you have increased your standing with your peers in this
> newsgroup with your obvious lack of reasoned thought or your
> impressive debating skills?
>
> Let's see who jumps to your aid on this one.

OK. I will.

Tom is right, and you are ignorant.
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