From: Charlie-Boo on
On May 31, 6:32 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Jun 1, 2:58 am, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Excerpt from Turing 1937:
>
> > “11. Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.
>
> > The results of §8 have some important applications. In particular,
> > they can be used to show that the Hilbert Entscheidungsproblem can
> > have no solution. For the present I shall confine myself to proving
> > this particular theorem.
>
> > I propose, therefore, to show that there can be no general process for
> > determining whether a given formula U of the functional calculus Z is
> > provable, i.e. that there can be no machine which, supplied with any
> > one U of these formulae, will eventually say whether U is provable.
>
> > If the negation of what Gödel has shown had been proved, i.e. if, for
> > each U, either U or –U is provable, then we should have an immediate
> > solution of the Entscheidungsproblem. For we can invent a machine K
> > which will prove consecutively all provable formulae. Sooner or later
> > K will reach either U or –U. If it reaches U, then we know that U is
> > provable. If it reaches –U, then, since Z is consistent (Hilbert and
> > Ackermann, p.65), we know that U is not provable.
>
> > Owing to the absence of integers in Z the proofs appear somewhat
> > lengthy. The underlying ideas are quite straightforward.”
>
> > But that only proves that if Godel’s 1st. Theorem were false then the
> > Entscheidungsproblem would be solvable.  The fact that Godel’s 1st.
> > Theorem is true does not infer anything here.  Where does Turing prove
> > that the Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable?
>
> I would imagine he does so in the rest of the paper...
>
> Do you want me to go and have a look for you?- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Yes! Accept the challenge.

C-B
From: Charlie-Boo on
On May 31, 6:32 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Jun 1, 2:58 am, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Excerpt from Turing 1937:
>
> > “11. Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.
>
> > The results of §8 have some important applications. In particular,
> > they can be used to show that the Hilbert Entscheidungsproblem can
> > have no solution. For the present I shall confine myself to proving
> > this particular theorem.
>
> > I propose, therefore, to show that there can be no general process for
> > determining whether a given formula U of the functional calculus Z is
> > provable, i.e. that there can be no machine which, supplied with any
> > one U of these formulae, will eventually say whether U is provable.
>
> > If the negation of what Gödel has shown had been proved, i.e. if, for
> > each U, either U or –U is provable, then we should have an immediate
> > solution of the Entscheidungsproblem. For we can invent a machine K
> > which will prove consecutively all provable formulae. Sooner or later
> > K will reach either U or –U. If it reaches U, then we know that U is
> > provable. If it reaches –U, then, since Z is consistent (Hilbert and
> > Ackermann, p.65), we know that U is not provable.
>
> > Owing to the absence of integers in Z the proofs appear somewhat
> > lengthy. The underlying ideas are quite straightforward.”
>
> > But that only proves that if Godel’s 1st. Theorem were false then the
> > Entscheidungsproblem would be solvable.  The fact that Godel’s 1st.
> > Theorem is true does not infer anything here.  Where does Turing prove
> > that the Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable?
>
> I would imagine he does so in the rest of the paper...
>
> Do you want me to go and have a look for you?- Hide quoted text -

Go for it!

I think he reduces Entscheidungsproblem to HP a few pages later. (I
am sure that I could give a much simpler proof than he does.) Still
looking for Rosser 1936.

C-B

> - Show quoted text -

From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Charlie-Boo <shymathguy(a)gmail.com> writes:

> I thought I saw it years ago. So you see it too?

Just read Section 11.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus