Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
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From: "Giga" "Giga" on 22 Dec 2009 05:11 "Zinnic" <zeenric2(a)gate.net> wrote in message news:e34f3a51-fd97-4825-a97c-cfe4e73c7dd2(a)z41g2000yqz.googlegroups.com... On Dec 20, 4:26 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 21, 12:34 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 19, 5:18 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > On Dec 20, 2:02 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 18, 5:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Dec 19, 12:49 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > > If a fair coin is flipped, logic cannot demonstrate that it will > > > > > > end > > > > > > up as tails even though if it has ended up as tails in the > > > > > > previous > > > > > > 200 flips. However, in this case I would bet on tails on the > > > > > > basis > > > > > > that the coin may not be fair. That is I would be use induction > > > > > > to > > > > > > make a pragmatic rather than a logical choice. > > > > > > If you had merely said that you would bet on the coin coming up > > > > > tails again if it had always come up tails on countless occasions > > > > > in the past, then no one would dispute your reasonableness. > > > > > But you go on to say you use induction as if this is some sort of > > > > > technique. And it is here where the real disagreements start. > > > > > Induction is either not an argument form, or if it is, > > > > > it is a manifestly inadequate one. > > > > > So let us accept that it is "a manifestly inadequate " argument. > > > > Then > > > > maybe we can go on to decide by which criteria it is assessed as > > > > being > > > > inadequate. > > > > An argument *form* can be seen to be a bad one if one can easily think > > > of fleshing it out with instances that are obviously bad reasoning. > > > The main criterion is as simple as that.- Hide quoted text - > > > An increasing number of pebbles at a location makes a pile. An > > increasing number of identical outcomes makes for inductions > > adequate for reasonable conclusions. > > Essentially, you are espousing the Gambler's Fallacy as *a good form > of argument*, with the vague rider that the more tosses of tails in a > row, the more the likelihood of a heads next...- Hide quoted text - > It is clear from my previous posts that I am well aware of that fallacy. There comes a time, sooner or later, when repetitions become significant not because of influence by past chance outcomes but because of an underlying cause. What I am espousing is the pragmatic consideration of the contingency that more than chance is influencing the outcome. For example, a coin being flipped is possibly, not necessarily, unfair. If this does not explain my position to you, then I can only assume that there is an underlying cause (motivation) for the long repetition of your attempts to belittle others. =May I interject something. I've heard that a fair coin can only come up tails (or heads) 68 times in a row maximum (normally 5 times in row comes up quite often and I would be pretty sure it was unfair the first time it came up 6 in row). But certainly 200 times tails would be an unfair coin. Just for interest.
From: Don Stockbauer on 22 Dec 2009 05:15 On Dec 22, 4:11 am, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) ho...(a)yahoo.co> wrote: > "Zinnic" <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote in message > > news:e34f3a51-fd97-4825-a97c-cfe4e73c7dd2(a)z41g2000yqz.googlegroups.com... > On Dec 20, 4:26 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > On Dec 21, 12:34 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > On Dec 19, 5:18 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > On Dec 20, 2:02 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > On Dec 18, 5:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 19, 12:49 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > > > If a fair coin is flipped, logic cannot demonstrate that it will > > > > > > > end > > > > > > > up as tails even though if it has ended up as tails in the > > > > > > > previous > > > > > > > 200 flips. However, in this case I would bet on tails on the > > > > > > > basis > > > > > > > that the coin may not be fair. That is I would be use induction > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > make a pragmatic rather than a logical choice. > > > > > > > If you had merely said that you would bet on the coin coming up > > > > > > tails again if it had always come up tails on countless occasions > > > > > > in the past, then no one would dispute your reasonableness. > > > > > > But you go on to say you use induction as if this is some sort of > > > > > > technique. And it is here where the real disagreements start. > > > > > > Induction is either not an argument form, or if it is, > > > > > > it is a manifestly inadequate one. > > > > > > So let us accept that it is "a manifestly inadequate " argument. > > > > > Then > > > > > maybe we can go on to decide by which criteria it is assessed as > > > > > being > > > > > inadequate. > > > > > An argument *form* can be seen to be a bad one if one can easily think > > > > of fleshing it out with instances that are obviously bad reasoning. > > > > The main criterion is as simple as that.- Hide quoted text - > > > > An increasing number of pebbles at a location makes a pile. An > > > increasing number of identical outcomes makes for inductions > > > adequate for reasonable conclusions. > > > Essentially, you are espousing the Gambler's Fallacy as *a good form > > of argument*, with the vague rider that the more tosses of tails in a > > row, the more the likelihood of a heads next...- Hide quoted text - > > It is clear from my previous posts that I am well aware of that > fallacy. > There comes a time, sooner or later, when repetitions become > significant not because of influence by past chance outcomes but > because of an underlying cause. > What I am espousing is the pragmatic consideration of the contingency > that more than chance is influencing the outcome. For example, a coin > being flipped is possibly, not necessarily, unfair. > If this does not explain my position to you, then I can only assume > that there is an underlying cause (motivation) for the long repetition > of your attempts to belittle others. > > =May I interject something. I've heard that a fair coin can only come up > tails (or heads) 68 times in a row maximum (normally 5 times in row comes up > quite often and I would be pretty sure it was unfair the first time it came > up 6 in row). But certainly 200 times tails would be an unfair coin. Just > for interest. An unfair coin is one that lodges in your throat and chokes you to death, unless you're suicidal, of course.
From: M Purcell on 22 Dec 2009 07:54 On Dec 21, 9:32 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 12:43 pm, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 21, 5:31 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > On Dec 22, 11:14 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 21, 2:33 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > > > > In article > > > > > <16d16b5b-83b8-4523-82fa-9d71f9c90...(a)v25g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > ... > > > > > > > The theories are derived by the process of induction I described > > > > > > earlier. Please see my earlier note about this. > > > > > > I did see them and I commented on them. You are using the word induction > > > > > to wave at roughly *whatever scientists do* and that is not really > > > > > helpful. > > > > > > > From these theories, predictions are *deduced* from the models. > > > > > > > The experimental test involves neither deduction nor induction. It is > > > > > > a simple comparison -- the prediction and the measurement overlap or > > > > > > they don't. Period. > > > > > > No. Deduction is involved. If have the theory that my kettle will always > > > > > boil in under two minutes and I see it does not in certain conditions, > > > > > it is a deductive matter that the generalisation is false. > > > > > > > Note, however, that a favorable bit of experimental evidence does not > > > > > > allow you to *deduce* anything about the truth of the theory. You only > > > > > > have a bit of experimental support. In science, nothing is ever > > > > > > proven. In this sense, nothing is deductively certain, either. > > > > > > It is the nature of this support that I am interested in. The > > > > > traditional philosophical problem of induction in philosophy has been > > > > > the difficulties with the idea that more and more cases consistent with > > > > > a generalization go to more and more confirm that generalisation. I am > > > > > denying this. > > > > > Do you also deny the validity of statistics? > > > > Doesn't everyone! <g> > > > > Seriously, what is a statistical argument? If I say there are 50 red > > > balls in this bag and 50 of other colours, I might conclude that there > > > is a 50% chance of pulling out a red ball if one is blindfolded and > > > all the balls feel exactly the same. Is this a statistical argument? > > > Is this an inductive argument? It seems to me to be a very tightly > > > necessary argument at first sight! How can the conclusion ever be > > > shown to be false on the basis of the premises being true? > > > > Perhaps the red balls have an internal mechanism unknown to us and > > > they subtly cause hands to grab them in favour of other balls? But > > > that is another matter! Without any knowledge of these other things, > > > just on the evidence alone, the above 50% argument is pretty tight. > > > > So, here, I have no reason not to believe in *statistical arguments*. > > > But perhaps you mean something else? > > > The example you gave was a probablistic argument, as is a coin toss or > > the roll of a couple of dice. A statistical argument is based on > > sampling. > > Is this like twenty questions? You say statistical and I write away > trying to give an example, you say no and leave it at that? What is a > statistical argument? I can think of lots of interpretations, but this > is your baby and maybe you should give a clear example of an argument > that is statistical and I will answer your prior question do I believe > it a good one. I am well aware of the difference between probability and statistics and realize you don't know what you are talking about. Look it up for yourself.
From: Zinnic on 22 Dec 2009 09:11 On Dec 21, 5:55 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 1:55 am, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > What I am espousing is the pragmatic consideration of the contingency > > that more than chance is influencing the outcome. For example, a coin > > being flipped is possibly, not necessarily, unfair. > > No one has ever denied this. There is no point in stating the obvious > and repeatedly. > > If this does not explain my position to you, > > I cannot see any *position*? You are no different to anyone else in > suspecting a crook coin in a coin that comes up tails lots and lots of > times in a row... > > > then I can only assume > > that there is an underlying cause (motivation) for the long repetition > > of your attempts to belittle others. > > I did not think it would take long for you to crack and turn to wholly > unjustified *personal* insults. Naturally, you turn to such insults > when you cannot make any headway that suits you in a perfectly non- > personal-vilification discussion so far. Looks like I touched on a sensitive spot.! Your responses to my posts demonstrate that you are not interested in making "any headway". If you were, you would not bother to comment, or would simply agree with my so obvious statements and move on. > If you could succeed in shifting the ground to personal vilification, > no doubt, this will make you more intellectually comfortable because > there does not seem to be a whole lot of intellectual curiosity going > on up there in what is likely to be *a simple extension* of the > backbone in your case. The above is one more example that strengthens my induction that you (and your inseperable muse) have an abiding need to belittle the opinions of others. But there I go again; stating the obvious! Below is one of your own obvious statement that maybe you could chew on with the negativity by which you mock others: "For a set of theories to be known to be true, they must be true, no matter how many observations 'confirm' them. "
From: jbriggs444 on 22 Dec 2009 09:47
On Dec 22, 12:28 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 12:42 pm, tadchem <tadc...(a)comcast.net> wrote:> On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: [snip] > > Those conclusions can only become "knowledge" when they can by > > repeatibly and independently verified, without exceptions, through > > empirical observations, by non-dollaborating observers. > > This is either saying nothing at all or it is almost certainly wrong. > For a set of theories to be > known to be true, they must be true, no matter how many observations > 'confirm' them. Using the word verified kind of gives the game away or > is simply circular. If a theory is true, it is also true no matter how many observations refute it. But scientists don't get to cheat and look for answers in the back of the book. They aren't allowed to check whether a theory is true before deciding whether it's worthwhile to try confirming or refuting it. Or whether they can legitimately call it "known". If we accept your notion of knowledge as incorporating certainty then it follows that the set of physical theories that can ever be "known to be true" is the empty set. Every observation has a possibility of error. (If you think otherwise, how do you _know_?) The things that we might reasonably say are "known to be true" by your lights are things that are: 1. True by definition. (a square has four sides). 2. Tautologies (a or not a) 3. Conditional truths (if you accept these premises, this conclusion follows) These are all what I consider empty truths. Nothing in there will tell you whether it's raining outside or whether both light and radio waves are examples of electromagnetic radiation. Gotta use observation to discover some things. And observation is unreliable. |