From: Charlie-Boo on
On Jun 28, 9:09 pm, Chris Menzel <cmen...(a)remove-this.tamu.edu> wrote:
> On Mon, 28 Jun 2010 05:02:20 -0700 (PDT), Charlie-Boo
> <shymath...(a)gmail.com> said:
>
> > On Jun 28, 3:39 am, Tim Little <t...(a)little-possums.net> wrote:
> >> On 2010-06-27, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> > PA is not used but ZFC is?  But ZFC invokes the Peano Axioms carte
> >> > blanche to represent N
>
> >> ZFC does not invoke the Peano Axioms at all.  In fact to say that a
> >> formal theory "invokes" anything is at the very least somewhat odd.
>
> > How do you prove Peano's Axioms in ZFC?  A ZFC axiom gives them.
>
> False.  Exactly why it is false has been explained to you numerous
> times, but you have no interest in understanding.  Or, perversely,
like

The best way to show it false is to give what you consider the correct
method by which ZFC proves the Peano Axioms, wouldn't you say?

How else do you prove something in ZFC if not by axioms?

How does one guarantee the set representing N satisfies Peano's
Axioms, if not with a ZFC axiom?

C-B

> a Tea Bagger politician, you are more interested in saying crazy stuff
> for the sake of attention (in this quirky and insignificant little
> corner of the net) than the facts.

From: Charlie-Boo on
On Jun 28, 9:09 pm, Chris Menzel <cmen...(a)remove-this.tamu.edu> wrote:
> On Mon, 28 Jun 2010 05:02:20 -0700 (PDT), Charlie-Boo
> <shymath...(a)gmail.com> said:
>
> > On Jun 28, 3:39 am, Tim Little <t...(a)little-possums.net> wrote:
> >> On 2010-06-27, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> > PA is not used but ZFC is?  But ZFC invokes the Peano Axioms carte
> >> > blanche to represent N
>
> >> ZFC does not invoke the Peano Axioms at all.  In fact to say that a
> >> formal theory "invokes" anything is at the very least somewhat odd.
>
> > How do you prove Peano's Axioms in ZFC?  A ZFC axiom gives them.
>
> False.  Exactly why it is false has been explained to you numerous

The best way to explain that a ZFC axiom is not used is to give the
proof without using any ZFC axioms - good luck!

How would you prove the PA axioms in ZFC, then? You keep saying it
isn't from an axiom but can't say how it is done - so how do you know
it isn't?

C-B

> times, but you have no interest in understanding.  Or, perversely, like
> a Tea Bagger politician, you are more interested in saying crazy stuff
> for the sake of attention (in this quirky and insignificant little
> corner of the net) than the facts.

From: herbzet on


billh04 wrote:
> Frederick Williams wrote:
> > Charlie-Boo wrote:
> >
> > > YOU CANNOT PROVE PA CONSISTENT USING ZFC.
> >
> > Yes, you can: take Gentzen's proof (or Ackermann's etc) and formalize it
> > in ZFC.
>
> Are you saying that it is a theorem of ZFC that PA is consistent?
>
> I thought that the proof of consistency of PA relative to ZFC by
> showing that there is a model of PA in ZFC was a metatheorem, not a
> theorem stated in ZFC and proved using the axioms of ZFC.

I'm not an expert, bill, but I'm gonna guess that the correct
answer will be that the informal argument that there is a model
of PA in ZFC is itself formalizable in ZFC.

ZFC is certainly powerful enough to talk about itself as well
as to talk about PA, so it's not inherently contradictory for
ZFC to provide a formal proof of this or that about itself.

I'm gonna guess that what needs to be assumed for such an
informal proof of PA's consistency relative to ZFC is not
anything especially exotic and does not exceed what is already
assumed axiomatically in ZFC.

Hope to hear a reply to you from someone who actually knows
what he's talking about.

--
hz
From: Chris Menzel on
On Mon, 28 Jun 2010 15:46:25 -0700 (PDT), MoeBlee <jazzmobe(a)hotmail.com>
said:
> One thing I don't know how to do is show the mutual-interpretability
> of PA and Y=ZF-"ax inf"+"~ax inf"
>
> One direction seems not too difficult: interpreting PA in Y.
>
> But how do we interpret Y in PA? Specifically, how do we define 'e' in
> PA and then prove, in PA, all the axioms of Y as interpreted in the
> language of PA?

The best known approach uses a mapping that Ackermann defined from the
hereditarily finite sets into N that takes the empty set to 0 and,
recursively, {s_1,...s_i} to 2^(n_1) + ... + 2^(n_i), where n_i codes
s_i. For numbers n and m, let nEm iff the quotient of m/2^n is odd.
The relation E is obviously definable in PA. Ackermann showed that, by
defining the membership predicate as E, the axioms of Y are all theorems
of PA.

From: Chris Menzel on
On Mon, 28 Jun 2010 08:46:03 -0700 (PDT), billh04 <hale(a)tulane.edu> said:
> On Jun 28, 7:58 am, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
> wrote:
>> Charlie-Boo wrote:
>>
>> > YOU CANNOT PROVE PA CONSISTENT USING ZFC.
>>
>> Yes, you can: take Gentzen's proof (or Ackermann's etc) and formalize
>> it in ZFC.
>
> Are you saying that it is a theorem of ZFC that PA is consistent?

Well, Frederick said it, but so will I.

> I thought that the proof of consistency of PA relative to ZFC by
> showing that there is a model of PA in ZFC was a metatheorem, not a
> theorem stated in ZFC and proved using the axioms of ZFC.

You can formalize the metatheory for the language of PA in ZF and prove
in ZF the existence of a model of PA and, hence, that PA is consistent,
by the soundness theorem.