From: Frederick Williams on
"R. Srinivasan" wrote:
>
> On Jun 26, 1:58 am, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
> wrote:
>
> [...]
> > You may wish to know that ZFC with the axiom of infinity replaced by its
> > negation is a model of PA and vice versa.
> >
> >
> There are two notions of consistency, namely the syntactic and model-
> theoretic notions, which are supposed to be equivalent.
>
> Syntactically the consistency of PA is expressed by the sentence
> Con(PA) which can be encoded in ZF and proven. Similarly ZF also
> proves the model-theoretic consistency of PA ("There exists a model
> for PA") by explicitly constructing a model for PA.
>
> So far so good.
>
> Now consider the theory ZF-Inf+~Inf (here Inf is the axiom of
> infinity). This theory, being equivalent to PA, cannot prove Con(PA)
> by Godel's incompleteness theorem. But does it prove ~Con(PA)? I claim
> that it does.
>
> The theory ZF-Inf+~Inf clearly proves ~Inf ("Infinite sets do not
> exist"). This proof obviously implies that "There does not exist a
> model for PA", for a model of PA must have an infinite set as its
> universe (according to the classical notion of consistency, which I am
> going to dispute shortly).

Not at all. If ZF-Inf+~Inf has models then the "points" (or whatever
you want to call them) in that model aren't infinite sets.

--
I can't go on, I'll go on.
From: R. Srinivasan on
On Jun 26, 7:42 pm, Nam Nguyen <namducngu...(a)shaw.ca> wrote:
> R. Srinivasan wrote:
> > On Jun 26, 1:58 am, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
> > wrote:
>
> > [...]
> >> You may wish to know that ZFC with the axiom of infinity replaced by its
> >> negation is a model of PA and vice versa.
>
> > There are two notions of consistency, namely the syntactic and model-
> > theoretic notions, which are supposed to be equivalent.
> > Syntactically the consistency of PA is expressed by the sentence
> > Con(PA) which can be encoded in ZF and proven.
>
> What does it mean for a formula A of L(T) to _syntactically signify_ the
> (possible) consistency of T?
>
>
By the way I do not agree that a formula of L(T) can express the
consistency of T. As I have stated in my post later on, I strongly
believe that the consistency of T is a metamathematical (or in this
case metatheoretical) notion that cannot be expressed in the language
of T.

However, according the conventional wisdom, which is what I was
stating above, a formula A of L(T) can represent the (code of the)
assertion that "There does not exist a proof of '0=1' in the theory
T", for theories T that can encode a certain amount of arithmetic. At
least this is what Godel claimed.

RS
From: Charlie-Boo on
On Jun 25, 5:14 am, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> writes:
> > Who has proved PA consistent using ZFC?  If it were possible then I
> > assume someone would have done it.  It certainly would be a very
> > educational exercise.
>
> So why not have a try at it? You'll find all the details you need in any
> decent text.

Name one - including page numbers - that includes that proof. Just
one.

C-B

> --
> Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi)
>
> "Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
>  - Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

From: Charlie-Boo on
On Jun 24, 6:02 pm, George Greene <gree...(a)email.unc.edu> wrote:
> On Jun 24, 1:45 pm, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > ZFC includes PA.
>
> I did NOT ASK for your ignorant OPINION, DUMBASS.
>
> I HAVE TWO RELEVANT DEGREES.
>
> You don't.
>
> I TOLD you that that ZFC does not "include" PA,
> SO IT DOESN'T.

Do you know how N is represented in ZFC? By constructing a
representation of numbers, a set that meets Peano's Axioms, and then
defining N to be that set. So they include Peano's Axioms with a
"definition" that N satisifies them. See any text - e.g. Set Theory
for the Working Mathematician, pg. 26-29.

C-B

>
> More to the point, you were complaining that it couldn't prove PA
> consistent.  Well, IT CAN, but that is NOT because it INCLUDES
> PA; rather, it is because it ENCODES PA, or can.
> It ALLOWS things THAT SATISFY THE AXIOMS of PA to be
> constructed by interpretation.
>
> PA has a ZERO.
> ZFC *DOES*NOT*, so it does NOT INCLUDE
> PA.
> ZFC does, however, have AN EMPTY SET, so you may,
> if you like, ENCODE the zero from PA as the empty set from ZFC.
> Or as any other set you like, for that matter.
> There is, however, a "natural" or "von Neumann" encoding in which
> the successor of a set s (which we might write S(s), and which would
> be defined for  ANY set s, not JUST a PA natural number n) is
> s U {S} , and the natural numbers are the successors of the empty
> set, with zero encoded as the empty set.
> You can then define addition via the cardinality of disjoint union and
> multiplication via the cardinality of cross-product, with cardinality
> being
> defined bijectively.  But all that IS A WHOLE LOT OF WORK, and
> was definitely NOT just INCLUDED in ZFC to begin with!

From: MoeBlee on
On Jun 26, 12:56 pm, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:

> Do you know how N is represented in ZFC?  By constructing a
> representation of numbers, a set that meets Peano's Axioms, and then
> defining N to be that set.

Actually, more usually, we establish 0, w, S, +, and * (the empty set,
omega, successor on omega, addition for omega, and multiplication for
omega), and then show that taken as a system this is a model for the
first order PA axioms (I'll just say 'PA' in this context).

And doing THAT provides, in Z set theory, a proof that first order PA
is consistent..

Only a moment's reflection is needed to see that if a theory has a
model then that theory is consistent (and this is easily formalized in
Z). Then we show in Z, that the above named system is a model of first
order PA. Therefore, we've shown in Z that first order PA is
consistent.

So, since you seem to recognize that theory that has a model is a
consistent theory, I don't know why you question that ZFC proves the
consistency of PA.

MoeBlee