How small must the chance of error be before we accept something as true and certain?
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From: livvy on 2 Aug 2010 21:51 On Aug 2, 8:15 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely > justified without all chance of error being excluded. How great a > chance of error is to be allowed? One chance in ten? One chance in a > million? It won't matter. If there is one chance n, whatever number n > may be, we shall be led into contradiction. Imagine we say one chance > in a million is acceptable. Now, suppose we set up a fair lottery with > a million tickets numbered consecutively from 1, and that a ticket has > been drawn but not inspected. Of course, there is only one chance in a > million that the number 1 ticket has been drawn. So by the current > proposal, we would be completely justified in believing that the > number 1 ticket was not picked. There is only one chance in a million > of error. Hence we would be completely justified in claiming to know > that the number 1 ticket was not picked. > > Moreover, people really do speak this way about lotteries; they do say > they know that the ticket they hold was not drawn because there is so > little chance of it. However, a similar claim can be made concerning > the number 2 ticket, for there is equally little chance that it was > picked. So we can say that we know that the number 2 ticket was not > picked. But then the same reasoning applies to each ticket in the > lottery. Of each ticket in the lottery, we would be completely > justified in believing, and, hence, in claiming to know, that the > ticket has not been drawn. But the set of things we would thus claim > to know is inconsistent. > > It is contradictory to claim that each of the tickets in a fair > lottery with one winning ticket is not the winner. For if each is not > the winner, then the lottery with one winning ticket has no winning > ticket. Of course, requiring the chance of error to be less than one > in a million will not help. However small the chance, we can find a > large enough lottery to create the paradox. Since the assumption that > a belief may be completely justified though there is some chance of > error leads to contradiction, we must reject it. To analyze knowledge > in terms of complete jusification that allows for some chance of error > is to render knowledge logically inconsistent... > > Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction > by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappashttp://www.amazon..com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/ it is convoluted....just as it is supposed to be. You are not a believer.....get it. Jeez, don't try so hard, don't hurt yourself. It's not "philosophical", not even close. Don't try so hard... Settle down.....you will, same as the rest of us, die. Pretty much a done deal....You want to go out as being only a tool? You'll do well here. But it's internety-ness. Who can't do that? This is all you got? This is all everyone will see..
From: livvy on 2 Aug 2010 21:58 On Aug 2, 8:15 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely > justified without all chance of error being excluded. How great a > chance of error is to be allowed? One chance in ten? One chance in a > million? It won't matter. If there is one chance n, whatever number n > may be, we shall be led into contradiction. Imagine we say one chance > in a million is acceptable. Now, suppose we set up a fair lottery with > a million tickets numbered consecutively from 1, and that a ticket has > been drawn but not inspected. Of course, there is only one chance in a > million that the number 1 ticket has been drawn. So by the current > proposal, we would be completely justified in believing that the > number 1 ticket was not picked. There is only one chance in a million > of error. Hence we would be completely justified in claiming to know > that the number 1 ticket was not picked. > > Moreover, people really do speak this way about lotteries; they do say > they know that the ticket they hold was not drawn because there is so > little chance of it. However, a similar claim can be made concerning > the number 2 ticket, for there is equally little chance that it was > picked. So we can say that we know that the number 2 ticket was not > picked. But then the same reasoning applies to each ticket in the > lottery. Of each ticket in the lottery, we would be completely > justified in believing, and, hence, in claiming to know, that the > ticket has not been drawn. But the set of things we would thus claim > to know is inconsistent. > > It is contradictory to claim that each of the tickets in a fair > lottery with one winning ticket is not the winner. For if each is not > the winner, then the lottery with one winning ticket has no winning > ticket. Of course, requiring the chance of error to be less than one > in a million will not help. However small the chance, we can find a > large enough lottery to create the paradox. Since the assumption that > a belief may be completely justified though there is some chance of > error leads to contradiction, we must reject it. To analyze knowledge > in terms of complete jusification that allows for some chance of error > is to render knowledge logically inconsistent... > > Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction > by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappashttp://www.amazon..com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/ If you want to live a life of chance, then that is what you should do, If you have a question, ask; otherwise, live your life. Does not matter what others are doing, not a thing to do with you, or your linki-ness. Got a serious question?
From: nuny on 3 Aug 2010 07:41 On Aug 2, 5:15 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely > justified without all chance of error being excluded. That's a self-contradictory sort of justification. It is subject to error, hence it is not *completely* justified. > How great a > chance of error is to be allowed? One chance in ten? One chance in a > million? It won't matter. If there is one chance n, whatever number n > may be, we shall be led into contradiction. Imagine we say one chance > in a million is acceptable. Now, suppose we set up a fair lottery with > a million tickets numbered consecutively from 1, and that a ticket has > been drawn but not inspected. Of course, there is only one chance in a > million that the number 1 ticket has been drawn. So by the current > proposal, we would be completely justified in believing that the > number 1 ticket was not picked. Nonsense. We would be 99.999 percent justified. No paradox at all. Mark L. Fergerson
From: Shrikeback on 3 Aug 2010 16:56 Nothing is true and certain, not even this sentence.
From: Shrikeback on 3 Aug 2010 17:27
On Aug 3, 2:07 pm, Bret Cahill <BretCah...(a)peoplepc.com> wrote: > > Nothing is true and certain, > > It's certain ....that the Big Carbon Conspiracy has yer IP. Run. They're armed with Big Hockey Sticks and Big Dowsing Rods. And you thought Nancy Pelosi's waterboards were painful. |