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From: Immortalist on 2 Aug 2010 20:15
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely
justified without all chance of error being excluded. How great a
chance of error is to be allowed? One chance in ten? One chance in a
million? It won't matter. If there is one chance n, whatever number n
may be, we shall be led into contradiction. Imagine we say one chance
in a million is acceptable. Now, suppose we set up a fair lottery with
a million tickets numbered consecutively from 1, and that a ticket has
been drawn but not inspected. Of course, there is only one chance in a
million that the number 1 ticket has been drawn. So by the current
proposal, we would be completely justified in believing that the
number 1 ticket was not picked. There is only one chance in a million
of error. Hence we would be completely justified in claiming to know
that the number 1 ticket was not picked.

Moreover, people really do speak this way about lotteries; they do say
they know that the ticket they hold was not drawn because there is so
little chance of it. However, a similar claim can be made concerning
the number 2 ticket, for there is equally little chance that it was
picked. So we can say that we know that the number 2 ticket was not
picked. But then the same reasoning applies to each ticket in the
lottery. Of each ticket in the lottery, we would be completely
justified in believing, and, hence, in claiming to know, that the
ticket has not been drawn. But the set of things we would thus claim
to know is inconsistent.

It is contradictory to claim that each of the tickets in a fair
lottery with one winning ticket is not the winner. For if each is not
the winner, then the lottery with one winning ticket has no winning
ticket. Of course, requiring the chance of error to be less than one
in a million will not help. However small the chance, we can find a
large enough lottery to create the paradox. Since the assumption that
a belief may be completely justified though there is some chance of
error leads to contradiction, we must reject it. To analyze knowledge
in terms of complete jusification that allows for some chance of error
is to render knowledge logically inconsistent...

Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
From: Virgil on 2 Aug 2010 21:50
In article
<fbb9b92d-178a-4e4a-9628-9b0a2eb37fb7(a)u38g2000prh.googlegroups.com>,
Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote:

> Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely
> justified without all chance of error being excluded. How great a
> chance of error is to be allowed?

Suppose not!
From: Cwatters on 3 Aug 2010 07:31

"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:fbb9b92d-178a-4e4a-9628-9b0a2eb37fb7(a)u38g2000prh.googlegroups.com...
> Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely
> justified without all chance of error being excluded. How great a
> chance of error is to be allowed? One chance in ten? One chance in a
> million? It won't matter. If there is one chance n, whatever number n
> may be, we shall be led into contradiction. Imagine we say one chance
> in a million is acceptable. Now, suppose we set up a fair lottery with
> a million tickets numbered consecutively from 1, and that a ticket has
> been drawn but not inspected. Of course, there is only one chance in a
> million that the number 1 ticket has been drawn. So by the current
> proposal, we would be completely justified in believing that the
> number 1 ticket was not picked. There is only one chance in a million
> of error. Hence we would be completely justified in claiming to know
> that the number 1 ticket was not picked.
>
> Moreover, people really do speak this way about lotteries; they do say
> they know that the ticket they hold was not drawn because there is so
> little chance of it.

They say that not just because of the odds but also because of superstition
(if I run around claiming to have a winning ticket I'm bound to jinx
myself).

There are also no negative consequences of being wrong, the worse that
happens is they win the lottery. Would they feel so confident in asserting
they didn't have the winning ticket if the consequences of "winning" was
death?


From: Zerkon on 3 Aug 2010 09:43
On Mon, 02 Aug 2010 17:15:56 -0700, Immortalist wrote:

> Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely
> justified without all chance of error being excluded.

This premise is so loaded with mixed innuendo. A coin tossed into the air
might carry a belief but belief and chance becomes irrelevant when the
coin lands.

'Justified' demands one who acts as judge. Odds demand odd makers. What
or who grounds these terms?

Suppose for the sake of more interesting argument, belief is not a
spectator sport. Belief becomes conviction or principle with innate
justification and a basis for action. A believer does things not just
wait for things to be done.
From: John M on 3 Aug 2010 22:55

"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:fbb9b92d-178a-4e4a-9628-9b0a2eb37fb7(a)u38g2000prh.googlegroups.com...
> Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a belief could be completely
> justified without all chance of error being excluded. How great a
> chance of error is to be allowed? One chance in ten? One chance in a
> million? It won't matter. If there is one chance n, whatever number n
> may be, we shall be led into contradiction.


Is it true if I claim you and I are both people?
How can I prove being happy?

So the belief must define it's own margin
of error. Which is the primary problem with
the concept of God, everyone seems to have
their own definition of the word, so how can
that concept be proven or disproved with
sufficient 'accuracy'?

But lets try another way.
On the blackboard any level of precision can
be generated, but in the /real world/ certainty
is as illusive as the wind.

What if I sell apples for a living?
I wish to know, with mathematical precision
(sufficient certainty) which aspect of an apple
is more valuable to my customers, a nice red color
or a nice round shape? Or which mix of the
two, etc?

How do we compare/quantify two entirely different things
such as color and shape?

"Fuzzy Multidimensional Logic"

"No assertion is ever known with certainty...
but that does not stop us making assertions."
Carneades, 214-129 BCE

Conclusion

"The fuzzification of our ideas is not a new thing, our brains
have been doing it for millions of years. What is new is the
discarding of the dualist true/false dogma of traditional
philosophy, which has created a world strewn with artificially
forced boundaries, whether they be logical, scientific, religious
or political - a justification for conflict that has been
enthusiastically embraced by shallow thinkers everywhere."
http://www.calresco.org/lucas/fuzzy.htm






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