How to Hornswoggle Chalmer's Hard Problem
in [Logic]
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From: Immortalist on 24 Jul 2010 00:05 On Jul 23, 8:17 pm, "Daniel T." <danie...(a)earthlink.net> wrote: > Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > What is this "hard problem"? I'm not saying that the Chalmers' "hard > problem" doesn't exist, rather I'm thinking that it is so poorly > defined, we would never know if it was solved. The real hard problem, as > I see it, is in defining what this "hard problem" actually entails. > > http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580363,00.html A zimboe is a philosophical zombie that has apparent "second-order" states -- that is, beliefs about its physiological state. The term zimboe was coined by philosopher Daniel Dennett in arguing that the idea of a philosophical zombie is incoherent. Daniel Dennet argues that being a zimboe is sufficient for a person to be considered "real". All philosophical zombies must, by definition, also be zimboes, and so one cannot view zombies as distinct from persons. However, while zimboes cannot be distinguished from thinking humans by their behavior, certain areas of philosophy, religion, or parapsychology may distinguish them. Religions would not consider a zimboe to possess a soul or to experience an afterlife, and it is possible that a psychic could sense their difference. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
From: dorayme on 24 Jul 2010 02:02 In article <daniel_t-ABF8D0.23174023072010(a)70-3-168-216.pools.spcsdns.net>, "Daniel T." <daniel_t(a)earthlink.net> wrote: > Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > What is this "hard problem"? I'm not saying that the Chalmers' "hard > problem" doesn't exist, rather I'm thinking that it is so poorly > defined, we would never know if it was solved. The real hard problem, as > I see it, is in defining what this "hard problem" actually entails. > > http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580363,00.html "The trouble with this hypothesis is that it declares its own untestability at the outset. There is nothing Steve could do or say under any circumstances that would provide the slightest grounds for either dismissing or confirming the reality of his experience. There could not be an objective test that distinguished a clever robot from a really conscious person." This is trouble of a sort. It is bothersome for those who yen for scientific hope and tractability. But it is not the least bothersome for the person who claims to know for sure that he is conscious and aware and that it is meaningful to suppose that someone who is physically just like him is not. The trouble with all this fantasising is just that there can never be anything behind it that is worth taking seriously. Everything in the fantasy is glib. Mary's room, Chinese rooms, zombies walking about, they all are described with a wave of the hand. If you talk enough, some people will fall for this nonsense (this is how a lot of religious cults happen, someone just talks a lot and a whole mob of gullible people then claim belief and commitment). Let some produce a real Chinese room/zombie/mary here on earth by getting a green field site and let me watch what they are putting into it. I will park myself at a sort of guard gate with a boom. Reality is a sobering judge of men's bullshit fantasies. -- dorayme
From: Daniel T. on 24 Jul 2010 08:50 dorayme <dorayme(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > "Daniel T." <daniel_t(a)earthlink.net> wrote: > > Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > What is this "hard problem"? I'm not saying that the Chalmers' "hard > > problem" doesn't exist, rather I'm thinking that it is so poorly > > defined, we would never know if it was solved. The real hard problem, as > > I see it, is in defining what this "hard problem" actually entails. > > > > http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580363,00.html > > "The trouble with this hypothesis is that it declares its own > untestability at the outset. There is nothing Steve could do or > say under any circumstances that would provide the slightest > grounds for either dismissing or confirming the reality of his > experience. There could not be an objective test that > distinguished a clever robot from a really conscious person." > > This is trouble of a sort. It is bothersome for those who yen for > scientific hope and tractability. It's not just tractability, I recently read about Wittgenstein's Beetle. Once we assume that consciousness can't be examined objectively, we loose the ability to discuss it. Yet, as you point out, some people can't help themselves and they attract mobs of people with faulty imaginations. > But it is not the least bothersome for the person who claims to know > for sure that he is conscious and aware and that it is meaningful to > suppose that someone who is physically just like him is not. How does he "know for sure" that he is conscious and aware? Therein lies the rub.
From: Malrassic Park on 3 Aug 2010 18:24 On Thu, 22 Jul 2010 17:43:31 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have proposed >setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind >as "the most difficult problem." When critically examined, the basis >for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter- >productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine >what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of "I- >cannot-imagine" arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known >about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine a mechanism is a >rather uninteresting psychological fact about us, not an interesting >metaphysical fact about the world. Rather than worrying too much about >the meta-problem of whether or not consciousness is uniquely hard, I >propose we get on with the task of seeing how far we get when we >address neurobiologically the problems of mental phenomena. Chalmers addressed this point in his article on the Hard Problem of Consciousness. You are only attempting to reduce it to an easier problem. Nobody is questioning the validity of neurobiology or the correlation between mental states and physical phenomena in the brain. It is a mere truism that giving a subject drugs affects his conscious state, and that somehow the physical affects the mental. This however does not address the hard problem of consciousness, it only deflects the problem into an arena that is more easily dealt with. Whatever you happen to mean by "mental phenomena," they are not consciousness itself which is the question to be answered. You can answer all the questions you want about phenomena, but it will get you not one step closer to answer the question of consciousness itself.
From: dorayme on 3 Aug 2010 20:23
In article <on5h56tp95742uvfp9ee0mrmji5gfhj1k4(a)4ax.com>, Malrassic Park <malenor(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, 22 Jul 2010 17:43:31 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > >Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have proposed > >setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind > >as "the most difficult problem." When critically examined, the basis > >for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter- > >productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine > >what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of "I- > >cannot-imagine" arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known > >about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine a mechanism is a > >rather uninteresting psychological fact about us, not an interesting > >metaphysical fact about the world. Rather than worrying too much about > >the meta-problem of whether or not consciousness is uniquely hard, I > >propose we get on with the task of seeing how far we get when we > >address neurobiologically the problems of mental phenomena. > > Chalmers addressed this point in his article on the Hard Problem of > Consciousness. But badly. > You are only attempting to reduce it to an easier > problem. > It is *not* an easy problem to know how the brain works. And to think it an *easier* problem presupposes that there is a harder one. What is it? No.... in your own words with a detailed and frank description of what you are wrestling with. Not in reference to what others think. A hurdle too far for a usenet philospher? > Nobody is questioning the validity of neurobiology or the correlation > between mental states and physical phenomena in the brain. It is a > mere truism that giving a subject drugs affects his conscious state, > and that somehow the physical affects the mental. This however does > not address the hard problem of consciousness, it only deflects the > problem into an arena that is more easily dealt with. > > Whatever you happen to mean by "mental phenomena," they are not > consciousness itself which is the question to be answered. How do you know this? Have you made up your mind in advance? Since you do not even know what a future theory of how brains work in organisms will hold, how can you be so sure? Do you know in advance all the general features of a physical theory and have an argument that none of these features begins to touch on some particular problem? Do all physical theories and explanations and understandings have some set of necessary and sufficient features in common which you know about that informs you? Pray tell. In your own words. > You can > answer all the questions you want about phenomena, but it will get you > not one step closer to answer the question of consciousness itself. Said like a true closed-mind qualia brigader! <g> -- dorayme |