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From: Pollux on 10 Jun 2010 21:53 (6/10/10 4:56 PM), Barb Knox wrote: > In article > <00537029-ea1e-4c83-a597-998c26607676(a)o30g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>, > Transfer Principle<lwalke3(a)lausd.net> wrote: > [SNIP] > >> And so this gives us another generalization about the difference >> between standard theorists and "cranks" (which maight be viewed as a >> "lie"): standard theorists believe that the provability of >> counterintuitive results is a _good_ thing, since a theory that >> doesn't prove any counterintuitive results can't possibly be that >> "powerful," while "cranks" believe that the provability of >> counterintuitive results is a _bad_ thing, since they want more >> control over what can be proved in their theory. > > Many authors of fiction have noted that characters often seem to take on > a life of their own and push the story in a direction different from > what the author originally planned. > > This happens even more so in mathematics. Starting with intuitively > unobjectionable axioms one comes up with some unintuitive and even > counterintuitive results. This is a Good Thing; it shows where our > intuitions need adjustment. > > I think your characterisation of cranks is reasonable -- they believe > that their personal intuitions should be the measure of all things, > rather than accepting the fact that their intuitions are limited to > familiar experience, and once they journey outside those borders they > will surely encounter strange and wonderful things. > > [snip] > It seems to me that a good part of the history of science is about establishing on more reliable grounds than intuition. I am very skeptical of intuition as a reliable means of acquiring definite knowledge. Pollux --- news://freenews.netfront.net/ - complaints: news(a)netfront.net --- |