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From: Pentcho Valev on 2 Aug 2010 04:56
In 1824 Sadi Carnot deduced the (prototype of the) second law of
thermodynamics from two axioms; one of them turned out to be false in
the end:

The false axiom: "Heat is an indestructible substance that cannot be
converted into work in the heat engine."

There are texts in Carnot's book showing that in 1824 the false axiom
had already become suspicious to him. So there can be no doubt that
Carnot would have dispensed with it if he had seen the slightest
opportunity. There was no opportunity and any analysis of Carnot's
1824 argument would unequivocally show that. Then how can a FALSE
axiom be INDISPENSABLE for the deduction of a (presumably) true
conclusion? How about the following argument:

Premise: A false axiom CANNOT be indispensable for the deduction of a
true conclusion.

Conclusion: The prototype of the second law of thermodynamics deduced
by Carnot in 1824 is false.

Pentcho Valev
pvalev(a)yahoo.com
From: Sam Wormley on 2 Aug 2010 08:17


There is nothing wrong with the second law of thermodynamics.
empirically correct!
From: Pentcho Valev on 3 Aug 2010 01:36
The prototype of the second law of thermodynamics deduced by Carnot in
1824 was false but on the other hand it was a breathtaking universal
proposition: the infinite set of unlimitedly various heat engines able
to work between the temperatures T1 and T2 had to have EXACTLY the
same efficiency. Generations of grateful professors were to make
career and money by teaching the metastases of the falsehood - their
historic triumph was expressed by Arthur Eddington in the following
way:

http://web.mit.edu/keenansymposium/overview/background/index.html
Arthur Eddington: "The law that entropy always increases, holds, I
think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone
points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in
disagreement with Maxwell's equations - then so much the worse for
Maxwell's equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation
- well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your
theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics, I can
give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest
humiliation."

Later Einstein's "theory" swept up all remnants of rationality in
science so nowadays selected professors are allowed to make career and
money even by saying awful things about the second law of
thermodynamics:

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000313/
Jos Uffink: "Snow stands up for the view that exact science is, in its
own right, an essential part of civilisation, and should not merely be
valued for its technological applications. Anyone who does not know
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and is proud of it too, exposes
oneself as a Philistine. Snow's plea will strike a chord with every
physicist who has ever attended a birthday party. But his call for
cultural recognition creates obligations too. Before one can claim
that acquaintance with the Second Law is as indispensable to a
cultural education as Macbeth or Hamlet, it should obviously be clear
what this law states. This question is surprisingly difficult. The
Second Law made its appearance in physics around 1850, but a half
century later it was already surrounded by so much confusion that the
British Association for the Advancement of Science decided to appoint
a special committee with the task of providing clarity about the
meaning of this law. However, its final report (Bryan 1891) did not
settle the issue. Half a century later, the physicist/philosopher
Bridgman still complained that there are almost as many formulations
of the second law as there have been discussions of it (Bridgman 1941,
p. 116). And even today, the Second Law remains so obscure that it
continues to attract new efforts at clarification. A recent example is
the work of Lieb and Yngvason (1999)......The historian of science and
mathematician Truesdell made a detailed study of the historical
development of thermodynamics in the period 1822-1854. He
characterises the theory, even in its present state, as 'a dismal
swamp of obscurity' (1980, p. 6) and 'a prime example to show that
physicists are not exempt from the madness of crowds' (ibid. p.
8).......Clausius' verbal statement of the second law makes no
sense.... All that remains is a Mosaic prohibition ; a century of
philosophers and journalists have acclaimed this commandment ; a
century of mathematicians have shuddered and averted their eyes from
the unclean.....Seven times in the past thirty years have I tried to
follow the argument Clausius offers....and seven times has it blanked
and gravelled me.... I cannot explain what I cannot
understand.....This summary leads to the question whether it is
fruitful to see irreversibility or time-asymmetry as the essence of
the second law. Is it not more straightforward, in view of the
unargued statements of Kelvin, the bold claims of Clausius and the
strained attempts of Planck, to give up this idea? I believe that
Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa was right in her verdict that the discussion
about the arrow of time as expressed in the second law of the
thermodynamics is actually a RED HERRING."

Pentcho Valev wrote:

In 1824 Sadi Carnot deduced the (prototype of the) second law of
thermodynamics from two axioms; one of them turned out to be false in
the end:

The false axiom: "Heat is an indestructible substance that cannot be
converted into work in the heat engine."

There are texts in Carnot's book showing that in 1824 the false axiom
had already become suspicious to him. So there can be no doubt that
Carnot would have dispensed with it if he had seen the slightest
opportunity. There was no opportunity and any analysis of Carnot's
1824 argument would unequivocally show that. Then how can a FALSE
axiom be INDISPENSABLE for the deduction of a (presumably) true
conclusion? How about the following argument:

Premise: A false axiom CANNOT be indispensable for the deduction of a
true conclusion.

Conclusion: The prototype of the second law of thermodynamics deduced
by Carnot in 1824 is false.

Pentcho Valev
pvalev(a)yahoo.com
From: Sam Wormley on 3 Aug 2010 09:58
Many of Kelper's ideas were just fantasy and they were wrong...
but the led Kepler to this three laws of planetary motion. The
laws are validated by observation.

The second law of thermodynamics -- Background (do have a read)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_law_of_thermodynamics

From: Pentcho Valev on 5 Aug 2010 01:26
Future theoreticians and philosophers of science will have to expose
and somehow put an end to to the postscientific practice of
integrating the absurd consequences of a false axiom (Einstein's 1905
false light postulate in this case) into a powerful ideology that
destroys not only rationality in science but also human rationality as
a whole:

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a909857880
Peter Hayes "The Ideology of Relativity: The Case of the Clock
Paradox" : Social Epistemology, Volume 23, Issue 1 January 2009, pages
57-78
Peter Hayes: "In the interwar period there was a significant school of
thought that repudiated Einstein's theory of relativity on the grounds
that it contained elementary inconsistencies. Some of these critics
held extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic views, and this has tended to
discredit their technical objections to relativity as being
scientifically shallow. This paper investigates an alternative
possibility: that the critics were right and that the success of
Einstein's theory in overcoming them was due to its strengths as an
ideology rather than as a science. The clock paradox illustrates how
relativity theory does indeed contain inconsistencies that make it
scientifically problematic. These same inconsistencies, however, make
the theory ideologically powerful. The implications of this argument
are examined with respect to Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper's accounts of
the philosophy of science. (...) The prediction that clocks will move
at different rates is particularly well known, and the problem of
explaining how this can be so without violating the principle of
relativity is particularly obvious. The clock paradox, however, is
only one of a number of simple objections that have been raised to
different aspects of Einstein's theory of relativity. (Much of this
criticism is quite apart from and often predates the apparent
contradiction between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.) It is
rare to find any attempt at a detailed rebuttal of these criticisms by
professional physicists. However, physicists do sometimes give a
general response to criticisms that relativity theory is syncretic by
asserting that Einstein is logically consistent, but that to explain
why is so difficult that critics lack the capacity to understand the
argument. In this way, the handy claim that there are unspecified,
highly complex resolutions of simple apparent inconsistencies in the
theory can be linked to the charge that antirelativists have only a
shallow understanding of the matter, probably gleaned from misleading
popular accounts of the theory. (...) The argument for complexity
reverses the scientific preference for simplicity. Faced with obvious
inconsistencies, the simple response is to conclude that Einstein's
claims for the explanatory scope of the special and general theory are
overstated. To conclude instead that that relativity theory is right
for reasons that are highly complex is to replace Occam's razor with a
potato masher. (...) The defence of complexity implies that the novice
wishing to enter the profession of theoretical physics must accept
relativity on faith. It implicitly concedes that, without an
understanding of relativity theory's higher complexities, it appears
illogical, which means that popular "explanations" of relativity are
necessarily misleading. But given Einstein's fame, physicists do not
approach the theory for the first time once they have developed their
expertise. Rather, they are exposed to and probably examined on
popular explanations of relativity in their early training. How are
youngsters new to the discipline meant to respond to these accounts?
Are they misled by false explanations and only later inculcated with
true ones? What happens to those who are not misled? Are they supposed
to accept relativity merely on the grounds of authority? The argument
of complexity suggests that to pass the first steps necessary to join
the physics profession, students must either be willing to suspend
disbelief and go along with a theory that appears illogical; or fail
to notice the apparent inconsistencies in the theory; or notice the
inconsistencies and maintain a guilty silence in the belief that this
merely shows that they are unable to understand the theory. The
gatekeepers of professional physics in the universities and research
institutes are disinclined to support or employ anyone who raises
problems over the elementary inconsistencies of relativity. A
winnowing out process has made it very difficult for critics of
Einstein to achieve or maintain professional status. Relativists are
then able to use the argument of authority to discredit these critics.
Were relativists to admit that Einstein may have made a series of
elementary logical errors, they would be faced with the embarrassing
question of why this had not been noticed earlier. Under these
circumstances the marginalisation of antirelativists, unjustified on
scientific grounds, is eminently justifiable on grounds of
realpolitik. Supporters of relativity theory have protected both the
theory and their own reputations by shutting their opponents out of
professional discourse. (...) The argument that Einstein fomented an
ideological rather than a scientific revolution helps to explain of
one of the features of this revolution that puzzled Kuhn: despite the
apparent scope of the general theory, very little has come out of it.
Viewing relativity theory as an ideology also helps to account for
Poppers doubts over whether special theory can be retained, given
experimental results in quantum mechanics and Einsteins questionable
approach to defining simultaneity. Both Kuhn and Popper have looked to
the other branch of the theory - Popper to the general and Kuhn to the
special - to try and retain their view of Einstein as a revolutionary
scientist. According to the view proposed here, this only indicates
how special and general theories function together as an ideology, as
when one side of the theory is called into question, the other can be
called upon to rescue it. The triumph of relativity theory represents
the triumph of ideology not only in the profession of physics bur also
in the philosophy of science. These conclusions are of considerable
interest to both theoretical physics and to social epistemology. It
would, however, be naïve to think that theoretical physicists will
take the slightest notice of them."

The major problem facing future theoreticians and philosophers of
science will be this: getting rid of the false axiom and its absurd
consequences will establish 18th century science as the only
reasonable alternative to Einsteiniana's powerful ideology;
psychologically this is extremely difficult to accept:

http://www.mfo.de/programme/schedule/2006/08c/OWR_2006_10.pdf
Jean Eisenstaedt: "At the end of the 18th century, a natural extension
of Newton's dynamics to light was developed but immediately forgotten.
A body of works completed the Principia with a relativistic optics of
moving bodies, the discovery of the Doppler-Fizeau effect some sixty
years before Doppler, and many other effects and ideas which represent
a fascinating preamble to Einstein relativities. It was simply
supposed that 'a body-light', as Newton named it, was subject to the
whole dynamics of the Principia in much the same way as were material
particles; thus it was subject to the Galilean relativity and its
velocity was supposed to be variable. Of course it was subject to the
short range 'refringent' force of the corpuscular theory of light --
which is part of the Principia-- but also to the long range force of
gravitation which induces Newton's theory of gravitation. The fact
that the 'mass' of a corpuscle of light was not known did not
constitute a problem since it does not appear in the Newtonian (or
Einsteinian) equations of motion. It was precisely what John Michell
(1724-1793), Robert Blair (1748-1828), Johann G. von Soldner
(1776-1833) and François Arago (1786-1853) were to do at the end of
the 18th century and the beginning the 19th century in the context of
Newton's dynamics. Actually this 'completed' Newtonian theory of light
and material corpuscle seems to have been implicitly accepted at the
time. In such a Newtonian context, not only Soldner's calculation of
the deviation of light in a gravitational field was understood, but
also dark bodies (cousins of black holes). A natural (Galilean and
thus relativistic) optics of moving bodies was also developed which
easily explained aberration and implied as well the essence of what we
call today the Doppler effect. Moreover, at the same time the
structure of -- but also the questions raised by-- the Michelson
experiment was understood. Most of this corpus has long been
forgotten. The Michell-Blair-Arago effect, prior to Doppler's effect,
is entirely unknown to physicists and historians. As to the influence
of gravitation on light, the story was very superficially known but
had never been studied in any detail. Moreover, the existence of a
theory dealing with light, relativity and gravitation, embedded in
Newton's Principia was completely ignored by physicists and by
historians as well. But it was a simple and natural way to deal with
the question of light, relativity (and gravitation) in a Newtonian
context."

http://ustl1.univ-lille1.fr/culture/publication/lna/detail/lna40/pgs/4_5.pdf
Jean Eisenstaedt: "Il n'y a alors aucune raison théorique à ce que la
vitesse de la lumière ne dépende pas de la vitesse de sa source ainsi
que de celle de l'observateur terrestre ; plus clairement encore, il
n'y a pas de raison, dans le cadre de la logique des Principia de
Newton, pour que la lumière se comporte autrement - quant à sa
trajectoire - qu'une particule matérielle. Il n'y a pas non plus de
raison pour que la lumière ne soit pas sensible à la gravitation.
Bref, pourquoi ne pas appliquer à la lumière toute la théorie
newtonienne ? C'est en fait ce que font plusieurs astronomes,
opticiens, philosophes de la nature à la fin du XVIIIème siècle. Les
résultats sont étonnants... et aujourd'hui nouveaux. (...) Même s'il
était conscient de l'intérêt de la théorie de l'émission, Einstein n'a
pas pris le chemin, totalement oublié, de Michell, de Blair, des
Principia en somme. Le contexte de découverte de la relativité
ignorera le XVIIIème siècle et ses racines historiques plongent au
coeur du XIXème siècle. Arago, Fresnel, Fizeau, Maxwell, Mascart,
Michelson, Poincaré, Lorentz en furent les principaux acteurs et
l'optique ondulatoire le cadre dans lequel ces questions sont posées.
Pourtant, au plan des structures physiques, l'optique relativiste des
corps en mouvement de cette fin du XVIIIème est infiniment plus
intéressante - et plus utile pédagogiquement - que le long cheminement
qu'a imposé l'éther."

http://www.passiondulivre.com/livre-6446-avant-einstein-relativite-lumiere-gravitation.htm
"Étrangement, personne n'est jamais vraiment allé voir ce que l'on en
pensait «avant», avant Einstein, avant Poincaré, avant Maxwell.
Pourtant, quelques savants austères et ignorés, John Michell, Robert
Blair et d'autres encore, s'y sont intéressés, de très près.
Newtoniens impénitents, ces «philosophes de la nature» ont tout
simplement traité la lumière comme faite de vulgaires particules
matérielles : des «corpuscules lumineux». Mais ce sont gens sérieux et
ils se sont basés sur leurs Classiques, Galilée, Newton et ses
Principia où déjà l'on trouve des idées intéressantes. À la fin du
XVIIIe siècle, au siècle des Lumières (si bien nommé en
l'occurrence !), en Angleterre, en Écosse, en Prusse et même à Paris,
une véritable balistique de la lumière sous-tend silencieusement la
théorie de l'émission, avatar de la théorie corpusculaire de la
lumière de Newton. Lus à la lumière (!) des théories aujourd'hui
acceptées, les résultats ne sont pas minces. (...) Les «relativités»
d'Einstein, cinématique einsteinienne et théorie de la gravitation,
ont la triste réputation d'être difficiles... Ne remettent-elles pas
en cause des notions familières ? Leur «refonte» est d'autant plus
nécessaire. Cette préhistoire en est un nouvel acte qui offre un autre
chemin vers ces théories délicates. Mais ce chemin, aussi long soit-
il, est un raccourci, qu'il est temps, cent ans après «la» relativité
d'Einstein, de découvrir et d'explorer."

http://www.larecherche.fr/content/recherche/article?id=10745
Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond: "Un siècle après son émergence, la théorie de
la relativité est encore bien mal comprise - et pas seulement par les
profanes ! Le vocable même qui la désigne (« relativité ») est fort
inadéquat. Ses énoncés courants abondent en maladresses sémantiques,
et donc en confusions épistémologiques. Paradoxe majeur, cette
théorie, présentée comme un sommet de la modernité scientifique, garde
de nombreux traits primitifs. Or, de récentes recherches montrent
éloquemment qu'un sérieux approfondissement de ses concepts et de ses
formulations peut résulter du retour à ses origines, avant même
Einstein. Déjà le principe de relativité se comprend mieux si on le
détache de la forme nouvelle qu'il prit après Lorentz, Poincaré et
Einstein, pour le ressourcer chez Galilée et Descartes. Mais surtout,
l'examen de nombreux travaux des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, injustement
oubliés, met en évidence une théorie particulaire de la lumière, en
germe dans la physique newtonienne, qui ouvre des voies d'approche
négligées vers la théorie moderne. Ces considérations contrebalancent
utilement le point de vue ondulatoire traditionnel, et allègent ses
difficultés."

http://www.amazon.com/Relativity-Its-Roots-Banesh-Hoffmann/dp/0486406768
"Relativity and Its Roots" By Banesh Hoffmann
"Moreover, if light consists of particles, as Einstein had suggested
in his paper submitted just thirteen weeks before this one, the second
principle seems absurd: A stone thrown from a speeding train can do
far more damage than one thrown from a train at rest; the speed of the
particle is not independent of the motion of the object emitting it.
And if we take light to consist of particles and assume that these
particles obey Newton's laws, they will conform to Newtonian
relativity and thus automatically account for the null result of the
Michelson-Morley experiment without recourse to contracting lengths,
local time, or Lorentz transformations. Yet, as we have seen, Einstein
resisted the temptation to account for the null result in terms of
particles of light and simple, familiar Newtonian ideas, and
introduced as his second postulate something that was more or less
obvious when thought of in terms of waves in an ether."

Pentcho Valev
pvalev(a)yahoo.com
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