From: S.C.Sprong on
crimes.
*
* The review process to prevent legal and factual errors is virtually
* non-existent.
*
* And the FISA system's courtroom advocacy is monumentally one-sided.
*
* The court has never formally rejected an application. Not once.
*
* For the first time in modern U.S. history, the Congress had
* institutionalized a process for physical searches outside of
* Fourth Amendment standards.
*
* Not even Congress' intelligence oversight committees review these
* special cases on a regular basis.


Mini-recap:

o Congress voted into existence a court that bypasses our normal
Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. Poof they're gone.

o Congressional oversite is weak.

Such a special court should be subject to the
highest standard of continual scrutiny: it is not.

! The New York Times, December 29, 19??, by David Burnham
!
! Because the National Security Agency is actively involved in the
! design [of Key Recovery cryptography], the agency will have the
! technical ability to decipher the messages.
!
! Walter G. Deeley, NSA deputy director for communications security
! said, "Another important safeguard to the privacy of communications
! was the continuous review of NSA's activities by the Senate and House
! intelligence committees."

Congressional oversite in real-time was non-existent.


Remember Ronald "I am a Contra" Reagan?

# U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 13, 1987



From: Pubkeybreaker on
Why I Monitor
--- - -------


Why do I feel companies should monitor their Internet traffic, but the
Government shouldn't monitor me and everyone else?

> Salomon is a "computer-based" firm.
>
> Any connections between Salomon's internal network and the outside world
> exposes Salomon to a potential number of problems.
>
> One of the largest data pipelines in and out of Salomon are its Internet
> connections.
>
> Therefore it is also a large security problem, which must be managed.
>
[snip]
>
> The terminology "email monitoring" has a Big-Brother ring to it.
>
> But monitor it we must - there is no choice.
>
> It connects all of our inside systems to all of outside.
>
> And it is the Internet ("public wire") traffic going in/out of Salomon
> we are checking - not internal email.
>
> The security rule for Internet traffic is "don't send anything you
> wouldn't want to read about in tomorrow's newspaper".

I think it's pretty obvious why company traffic involving company systems
is monitored. After all, companies aren't democracies.

Finally, I should point out that all the people at both sites were told
repeatedly that Internet email was being monitored; this includes all
traffi


From: Pubkeybreaker on
data pipelines in and out of Salomon are its Internet
> connections.
>
> Therefore it is also a large security problem, which must be managed.
>
[snip]
>
> The terminology "email monitoring" has a Big-Brother ring to it.
>
> But monitor it we must - there is no choice.
>
> It connects all of our inside systems to all of outside.
>
> And it is the Internet ("public wire") traffic going in/out of Salomon
> we are checking - not internal email.
>
> The security rule for Internet traffic is "don't send anything you
> wouldn't want to read about in tomorrow's newspaper".

I think it's pretty obvious why company traffic involving company systems
is monitored. After all, companies aren't democracies.

Finally, I should point out that all the people at both sites were told
repeatedly that Internet email was being monitored; this includes all
traffic picked up by my JobTalk analytic:

> Salomon site.
>
> All sites start out with the employment contract stating unequivocally
> that the systems are the company's and are to be used only for work
> purposes. And that they are subject to inspection. You signed it.
>
> Salomon's goes further by stating the firm's computer systems may be
> audited and that they have the right to do so even if you have put
> personal information on the system.
>
> After the first couple of months of security incidents at Salomon,
> they began issuing global email broadcasts saying that a new security
> package "Internet Risk Ma


From: Pubkeybreaker on
that
could be implemented with a social security number.

It's for our best interests...

* "Suffolk Medical Examiner Urges Fingerprinting Law"
* By John T. McQuiston, The New York Times, 8/20/1996
*
* Putting motorists' fingerprints on NY driver's licenses, as is done in
* California, would help identify disaster victims, the Suffolk Medical
* Examiner told a committee of the County Legislature about his work on
* the crash of TWA Flight 800.
*
* "The victims from California were the fastest and easiest to identify,"
* the Medical Examiner, Dr. Charles V. Wetli, said, "because the fingerprint
* of their right thumb was on their driver's license."
*
* "It was a nightmare for the other families to wait for identification."

----

Just how much does the government want to
track us, by issuing tracking devices?

Metrocard is a re-writeable magnetic card. It's new to us New Yorkers.

They are individually serial-numbered.

* "Metrocards to Replace School Transit Passes"
* By John Sullivan, The New York Times, 8/26/1996
*
* About 500,000 students will now have their bus and subway usage tracked by
* Metrocards, in an effort to save money. Unlike current passes, which
* students can use anytime between 6 A.M. and 7 P.M. on weekdays, the
* Metrocard pass can be programmed to restrict the students to a set number
* of trips a day.
*
* Ms. Gonzalez-Light, a spokeswoman for the Board of Education, said they
* would work with the Transit Authority to individualize the number of
* trips per student to adjust for extra-curricular activities.

Then you could track each individual student? Decide if they might be truant
including if they didn't use it, or went the wrong way?

* "Last Clink for Token-Only Turnst


From: Pubkeybreaker on
* The Washington Post
*
* Due to their new 'Mexicanization policy':
* Mexico became the main gateway into the United States for illegal
* narcotics, with the amount of cocaine making the journey climbing to
* an estimated 210 tons last year.
*
* Mexico's drug arrests plunged nearly 65 percent, from 27,369 the year
* before the policy changes to 9,728 last year, according to data that
* the Mexican government supplied to the State Department.
*
* Cocaine seizures in Mexico were cut in half, dropping from more than
* 50 tons in 1993 to slightly more than 24 tons in each of the last two
* years -- the smallest amounts since 1988, Mexican government figures
* show.
*
* The GAO report charges that Mexico's greatest problem is, in
* fact, the "widespread, endemic corruption" throughout its law
* enforcement agencies. Earlier this month, in an indictment of his own
* department, Attorney General Lozano fired 737 members of his federal
* police force -- 17 percent of his entire corps -- saying they did not
* have "the ethical profile" required for the job. In a recent meeting
* with foreign reporters, Lozano said it could take 15 years to clean up
* the force.
*
* In November 1993, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive
* No. 14, shifting U.S. anti-drug efforts away from intercepting cocaine as
* it passed through Mexico and the Caribbean, and, instead, attacking the
* drug supply at its sources in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.

The Presiden