Prev: Universal Non-Differentiable Geometry?
Next: European physicists already begging for next big accelerator
From: Pentcho Valev on 20 Jul 2010 02:14 Karl Popper: "...in science, only observation and experiment may decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, including laws and theories." This is wrong - an INCONSISTENT theory cannot be verified in this way unless a LOGICAL verification takes place first. Einstein's theory started with the principle of constancy of the speed of light - "light is always propagated in empty space with a definite velocity c which is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body". A (rigorously deducible) consequence of this principle is that the speed of light does not vary with the gravitational potential. Therefore Einstein's theory is an inconsistency if it says that the speed of light does not vary with the speed of the emitter but varies with the gravitational potential. But that is exactly what Einstein's theory says and therefore "observation and experiment" (e.g. the Pound-Rebka experiment) confirming the variability contradicts the constancy and vice versa. One is even entitled to say that "only observation and experiment" is totally irrelevant in evaluating an inconsistent theory. Popper seems to somehow feel this when he says: Karl Popper: "From a logical point of view, the testing of a theory depends upon basic statements whose acceptance or rejection, in its turn, depends upon our DECISIONS. Thus it is DECISIONS which settle the fate of theories. To this extent my answer to the question, 'how do we select a theory?' resembles that given by the conventionalist; and like him I say that this choice is in part determined by considerations of utility. But in spite of this, there is a vast difference between my view and his. For I hold that what characterizes the empirical method is just this: that the convention or decision does not immediately determine our acceptance of UNIVERSAL statements but that on the contrary, it enters into our acceptance of the SINGULAR statements - that is, the basic statements." In a world different from Einsteiniana's schizophrenic world one would just verify the validity of the deductive chain connecting Einstein's 1905 light postulate and the outcome of the Pound-Rebka experiment, then would see that the experiment contradicts the postulate, and would finally reject the false postulate. Alternatively, one could perform REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM (no "observation and experiment" is needed): if Einstein's 1905 light postulate is true, then an Einsteinian travelling with the rivet sees the bug squashed while the bug sees itself alive and kicking: http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/Hbase/Relativ/bugrivet.html "The bug-rivet paradox is a variation on the twin paradox and is similar to the pole-barn paradox.....The end of the rivet hits the bottom of the hole before the head of the rivet hits the wall. So it looks like the bug is squashed.....All this is nonsense from the bug's point of view. The rivet head hits the wall when the rivet end is just 0.35 cm down in the hole! The rivet doesn't get close to the bug....The paradox is not resolved." Pentcho Valev pvalev(a)yahoo.com
From: artful on 20 Jul 2010 02:33 On Jul 20, 4:14 pm, Pentcho Valev <pva...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Karl Popper: "...in science, only observation and experiment may > decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, > including laws and theories." That's why SR and GR are so successful > This is wrong - an INCONSISTENT theory cannot be verified in this way > unless a LOGICAL verification takes place first. As one gets for SR and GR. Its a winner all-round > Einstein's theory > started with the principle of constancy of the speed of light - "light > is always propagated in empty space with a definite velocity c which > is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body". A > (rigorously deducible) consequence of this principle is that the speed > of light does not vary with the gravitational potential. Hence GR, where gravitational potential is taken into account. SR only applies at the same gravitational potential. Clearly you're ignorant of the physics. [snip more nonsense]
From: Pentcho Valev on 20 Jul 2010 10:31 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a909857880 Peter Hayes "The Ideology of Relativity: The Case of the Clock Paradox" : Social Epistemology, Volume 23, Issue 1 January 2009, pages 57-78 Peter Hayes: "In the interwar period there was a significant school of thought that repudiated Einstein's theory of relativity on the grounds that it contained elementary inconsistencies. Some of these critics held extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic views, and this has tended to discredit their technical objections to relativity as being scientifically shallow. This paper investigates an alternative possibility: that the critics were right and that the success of Einstein's theory in overcoming them was due to its strengths as an ideology rather than as a science. The clock paradox illustrates how relativity theory does indeed contain inconsistencies that make it scientifically problematic. These same inconsistencies, however, make the theory ideologically powerful. The implications of this argument are examined with respect to Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper's accounts of the philosophy of science. (...) The prediction that clocks will move at different rates is particularly well known, and the problem of explaining how this can be so without violating the principle of relativity is particularly obvious. The clock paradox, however, is only one of a number of simple objections that have been raised to different aspects of Einstein's theory of relativity. (Much of this criticism is quite apart from and often predates the apparent contradiction between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.) It is rare to find any attempt at a detailed rebuttal of these criticisms by professional physicists. However, physicists do sometimes give a general response to criticisms that relativity theory is syncretic by asserting that Einstein is logically consistent, but that to explain why is so difficult that critics lack the capacity to understand the argument. In this way, the handy claim that there are unspecified, highly complex resolutions of simple apparent inconsistencies in the theory can be linked to the charge that antirelativists have only a shallow understanding of the matter, probably gleaned from misleading popular accounts of the theory. (...) The argument for complexity reverses the scientific preference for simplicity. Faced with obvious inconsistencies, the simple response is to conclude that Einstein's claims for the explanatory scope of the special and general theory are overstated. To conclude instead that that relativity theory is right for reasons that are highly complex is to replace Occam's razor with a potato masher. (...) The defence of complexity implies that the novice wishing to enter the profession of theoretical physics must accept relativity on faith. It implicitly concedes that, without an understanding of relativity theory's higher complexities, it appears illogical, which means that popular "explanations" of relativity are necessarily misleading. But given Einstein's fame, physicists do not approach the theory for the first time once they have developed their expertise. Rather, they are exposed to and probably examined on popular explanations of relativity in their early training. How are youngsters new to the discipline meant to respond to these accounts? Are they misled by false explanations and only later inculcated with true ones? What happens to those who are not misled? Are they supposed to accept relativity merely on the grounds of authority? The argument of complexity suggests that to pass the first steps necessary to join the physics profession, students must either be willing to suspend disbelief and go along with a theory that appears illogical; or fail to notice the apparent inconsistencies in the theory; or notice the inconsistencies and maintain a guilty silence in the belief that this merely shows that they are unable to understand the theory. The gatekeepers of professional physics in the universities and research institutes are disinclined to support or employ anyone who raises problems over the elementary inconsistencies of relativity. A winnowing out process has made it very difficult for critics of Einstein to achieve or maintain professional status. Relativists are then able to use the argument of authority to discredit these critics. Were relativists to admit that Einstein may have made a series of elementary logical errors, they would be faced with the embarrassing question of why this had not been noticed earlier. Under these circumstances the marginalisation of antirelativists, unjustified on scientific grounds, is eminently justifiable on grounds of realpolitik. Supporters of relativity theory have protected both the theory and their own reputations by shutting their opponents out of professional discourse. (...) The argument that Einstein fomented an ideological rather than a scientific revolution helps to explain of one of the features of this revolution that puzzled Kuhn: despite the apparent scope of the general theory, very little has come out of it. Viewing relativity theory as an ideology also helps to account for Poppers doubts over whether special theory can be retained, given experimental results in quantum mechanics and Einsteins questionable approach to defining simultaneity. Both Kuhn and Popper have looked to the other branch of the theory - Popper to the general and Kuhn to the special - to try and retain their view of Einstein as a revolutionary scientist. According to the view proposed here, this only indicates how special and general theories function together as an ideology, as when one side of the theory is called into question, the other can be called upon to rescue it. The triumph of relativity theory represents the triumph of ideology not only in the profession of physics bur also in the philosophy of science. These conclusions are of considerable interest to both theoretical physics and to social epistemology. It would, however, be naïve to think that theoretical physicists will take the slightest notice of them." Pentcho Valev pvalev(a)yahoo.com
From: PD on 21 Jul 2010 12:22
On Jul 20, 1:14 am, Pentcho Valev <pva...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Karl Popper: "...in science, only observation and experiment may > decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, > including laws and theories." > > This is wrong - an INCONSISTENT theory cannot be verified in this way > unless a LOGICAL verification takes place first. Einstein's theory > started with the principle of constancy of the speed of light - "light > is always propagated in empty space with a definite velocity c which > is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body". Where that measurement is a *local* one. You keep omitting this crucial qualification. This is the difference between special relativity (flat spacetime) and general relativity (curved spacetime). In flat spacetime, a statement that is true locally is also true globally. In curved space time, this is not so. I'll give you a simple example. "The moon is just above the horizon right now." That statement may be completely valid locally. And if the Earth were flat, it would be true for everyone on Earth. But the Earth is not flat, and though the statement is absolutely correct where I sit, it will not be correct for you. This is why that qualification is so important, and why your insistent ignoring of it will immediately cause problems for you. Of course, since you're intent on seeing problems, then it is convenient for you to ignore it. > A > (rigorously deducible) consequence of this principle is that the speed > of light does not vary with the gravitational potential. Therefore > Einstein's theory is an inconsistency if it says that the speed of > light does not vary with the speed of the emitter but varies with the > gravitational potential. But that is exactly what Einstein's theory > says and therefore "observation and experiment" (e.g. the Pound-Rebka > experiment) confirming the variability contradicts the constancy and > vice versa. One is even entitled to say that "only observation and > experiment" is totally irrelevant in evaluating an inconsistent > theory. Popper seems to somehow feel this when he says: > > Karl Popper: "From a logical point of view, the testing of a theory > depends upon basic statements whose acceptance or rejection, in its > turn, depends upon our DECISIONS. Thus it is DECISIONS which settle > the fate of theories. To this extent my answer to the question, 'how > do we select a theory?' resembles that given by the conventionalist; > and like him I say that this choice is in part determined by > considerations of utility. But in spite of this, there is a vast > difference between my view and his. For I hold that what characterizes > the empirical method is just this: that the convention or decision > does not immediately determine our acceptance of UNIVERSAL statements > but that on the contrary, it enters into our acceptance of the > SINGULAR statements - that is, the basic statements." > > In a world different from Einsteiniana's schizophrenic world one would > just verify the validity of the deductive chain connecting Einstein's > 1905 light postulate and the outcome of the Pound-Rebka experiment, > then would see that the experiment contradicts the postulate, and > would finally reject the false postulate. Alternatively, one could > perform REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM (no "observation and experiment" is > needed): if Einstein's 1905 light postulate is true, then an > Einsteinian travelling with the rivet sees the bug squashed while the > bug sees itself alive and kicking: > > http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/Hbase/Relativ/bugrivet.html > "The bug-rivet paradox is a variation on the twin paradox and is > similar to the pole-barn paradox.....The end of the rivet hits the > bottom of the hole before the head of the rivet hits the wall. So it > looks like the bug is squashed.....All this is nonsense from the bug's > point of view. The rivet head hits the wall when the rivet end is just > 0.35 cm down in the hole! The rivet doesn't get close to the > bug....The paradox is not resolved." > > Pentcho Valev > pva...(a)yahoo.com |