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From: Pentcho Valev on 20 Jul 2010 02:20
Karl Popper: "...in science, only observation and experiment may
decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements,
including laws and theories."

This is wrong - an INCONSISTENT theory cannot be verified in this way
unless a LOGICAL verification takes place first. Einstein's theory
started with the principle of constancy of the speed of light - "light
is always propagated in empty space with a definite velocity c which
is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body". A
(rigorously deducible) consequence of this principle is that the speed
of light does not vary with the gravitational potential. Therefore
Einstein's theory is an inconsistency if it says that the speed of
light does not vary with the speed of the emitter but varies with the
gravitational potential. But that is exactly what Einstein's theory
says and therefore "observation and experiment" (e.g. the Pound-Rebka
experiment) confirming the variability contradicts the constancy and
vice versa. One is even entitled to say that "only observation and
experiment" is totally irrelevant in evaluating an inconsistent
theory. Popper seems to somehow feel this when he says:

Karl Popper: "From a logical point of view, the testing of a theory
depends upon basic statements whose acceptance or rejection, in its
turn, depends upon our DECISIONS. Thus it is DECISIONS which settle
the fate of theories. To this extent my answer to the question, 'how
do we select a theory?' resembles that given by the conventionalist;
and like him I say that this choice is in part determined by
considerations of utility. But in spite of this, there is a vast
difference between my view and his. For I hold that what characterizes
the empirical method is just this: that the convention or decision
does not immediately determine our acceptance of UNIVERSAL statements
but that on the contrary, it enters into our acceptance of the
SINGULAR statements - that is, the basic statements."

In a world different from Einsteiniana's schizophrenic world one would
just verify the validity of the deductive chain connecting Einstein's
1905 light postulate and the outcome of the Pound-Rebka experiment,
then would see that the experiment contradicts the postulate, and
would finally reject the false postulate. Alternatively, one could
perform REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM (no "observation and experiment" is
needed): if Einstein's 1905 light postulate is true, then an
Einsteinian travelling with the rivet sees the bug squashed while the
bug sees itself alive and kicking:

http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/Hbase/Relativ/bugrivet.html
"The bug-rivet paradox is a variation on the twin paradox and is
similar to the pole-barn paradox.....The end of the rivet hits the
bottom of the hole before the head of the rivet hits the wall. So it
looks like the bug is squashed.....All this is nonsense from the bug's
point of view. The rivet head hits the wall when the rivet end is just
0.35 cm down in the hole! The rivet doesn't get close to the
bug....The paradox is not resolved."

Pentcho Valev
pvalev(a)yahoo.com
From: Pentcho Valev on 20 Jul 2010 10:40
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a909857880
Peter Hayes "The Ideology of Relativity: The Case of the Clock
Paradox" : Social Epistemology, Volume 23, Issue 1 January 2009, pages
57-78
Peter Hayes: "In the interwar period there was a significant school of
thought that repudiated Einstein's theory of relativity on the grounds
that it contained elementary inconsistencies. Some of these critics
held extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic views, and this has tended to
discredit their technical objections to relativity as being
scientifically shallow. This paper investigates an alternative
possibility: that the critics were right and that the success of
Einstein's theory in overcoming them was due to its strengths as an
ideology rather than as a science. The clock paradox illustrates how
relativity theory does indeed contain inconsistencies that make it
scientifically problematic. These same inconsistencies, however, make
the theory ideologically powerful. The implications of this argument
are examined with respect to Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper's accounts of
the philosophy of science. (...) The prediction that clocks will move
at different rates is particularly well known, and the problem of
explaining how this can be so without violating the principle of
relativity is particularly obvious. The clock paradox, however, is
only one of a number of simple objections that have been raised to
different aspects of Einstein's theory of relativity. (Much of this
criticism is quite apart from and often predates the apparent
contradiction between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.) It is
rare to find any attempt at a detailed rebuttal of these criticisms by
professional physicists. However, physicists do sometimes give a
general response to criticisms that relativity theory is syncretic by
asserting that Einstein is logically consistent, but that to explain
why is so difficult that critics lack the capacity to understand the
argument. In this way, the handy claim that there are unspecified,
highly complex resolutions of simple apparent inconsistencies in the
theory can be linked to the charge that antirelativists have only a
shallow understanding of the matter, probably gleaned from misleading
popular accounts of the theory. (...) The argument for complexity
reverses the scientific preference for simplicity. Faced with obvious
inconsistencies, the simple response is to conclude that Einstein's
claims for the explanatory scope of the special and general theory are
overstated. To conclude instead that that relativity theory is right
for reasons that are highly complex is to replace Occam's razor with a
potato masher. (...) The defence of complexity implies that the novice
wishing to enter the profession of theoretical physics must accept
relativity on faith. It implicitly concedes that, without an
understanding of relativity theory's higher complexities, it appears
illogical, which means that popular "explanations" of relativity are
necessarily misleading. But given Einstein's fame, physicists do not
approach the theory for the first time once they have developed their
expertise. Rather, they are exposed to and probably examined on
popular explanations of relativity in their early training. How are
youngsters new to the discipline meant to respond to these accounts?
Are they misled by false explanations and only later inculcated with
true ones? What happens to those who are not misled? Are they supposed
to accept relativity merely on the grounds of authority? The argument
of complexity suggests that to pass the first steps necessary to join
the physics profession, students must either be willing to suspend
disbelief and go along with a theory that appears illogical; or fail
to notice the apparent inconsistencies in the theory; or notice the
inconsistencies and maintain a guilty silence in the belief that this
merely shows that they are unable to understand the theory. The
gatekeepers of professional physics in the universities and research
institutes are disinclined to support or employ anyone who raises
problems over the elementary inconsistencies of relativity. A
winnowing out process has made it very difficult for critics of
Einstein to achieve or maintain professional status. Relativists are
then able to use the argument of authority to discredit these critics.
Were relativists to admit that Einstein may have made a series of
elementary logical errors, they would be faced with the embarrassing
question of why this had not been noticed earlier. Under these
circumstances the marginalisation of antirelativists, unjustified on
scientific grounds, is eminently justifiable on grounds of
realpolitik. Supporters of relativity theory have protected both the
theory and their own reputations by shutting their opponents out of
professional discourse. (...) The argument that Einstein fomented an
ideological rather than a scientific revolution helps to explain of
one of the features of this revolution that puzzled Kuhn: despite the
apparent scope of the general theory, very little has come out of it.
Viewing relativity theory as an ideology also helps to account for
Poppers doubts over whether special theory can be retained, given
experimental results in quantum mechanics and Einsteins questionable
approach to defining simultaneity. Both Kuhn and Popper have looked to
the other branch of the theory - Popper to the general and Kuhn to the
special - to try and retain their view of Einstein as a revolutionary
scientist. According to the view proposed here, this only indicates
how special and general theories function together as an ideology, as
when one side of the theory is called into question, the other can be
called upon to rescue it. The triumph of relativity theory represents
the triumph of ideology not only in the profession of physics bur also
in the philosophy of science. These conclusions are of considerable
interest to both theoretical physics and to social epistemology. It
would, however, be naïve to think that theoretical physicists will
take the slightest notice of them."

Pentcho Valev
pvalev(a)yahoo.com
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