From: Joseph M. Newcomer on 13 Dec 2006 17:08 Most processes are created by the user by clicking some icon. Therefore, except in Vista, they they all run with the user's login credentials, and therefore are hookable. I once was at a site where I used a hook to snarf passwords (if it isn't blindingly obvious how to do this, I'm not going to explain it). I snarfed a password from the top-secret database login screen (and the password I snarfed was "topsecret", which he assures me is NOT the password to the top-secret database. And I mean top-secret in the military classification sense!) The database program was launched as an ordinary user program. (I was demonstrating how trivial it was to attack password security; I wrote the password snarfer, which included a server to receive the passwords and used UDP messages to transmit it, over lunch, and still had time to eat a sandwich) In Vista, this would fail because the database program would be run at an elevated security level. joe On Tue, 12 Dec 2006 08:51:12 -0800, "Alexander Grigoriev" <alegr(a)earthlink.net> wrote: >Systemwide (desktop-wide actually) hooks can only be set to processes to >which the hooking process have PROCESS_MEMORY_WRITE access. Thus, it cannot >be set to a process running with different credentials. So the security is >not breached by hooks. > >"Joseph M. Newcomer" <newcomer(a)flounder.com> wrote in message >news:seson21ntvhv7pi2gn2l811sv3it8felod(a)4ax.com... >>I am reasonably convinced that Microsoft is totally clueless with respect >>to hooks and >> security. The pre-Vista security was a joke, and the key APIs needed, >> such as >> EnumerateHooks (I once wrote a specification and sent it to the hook >> group), to allow >> security audits, were omitted "by design". Why shouldn't I be able to >> discover which >> processes have set system-wide hooks, or for that matter, all hooks? >> joe >> >> On Sun, 10 Dec 2006 13:27:44 GMT, Daniel James >> <wastebasket(a)nospam.aaisp.org> wrote: >> >>>In article news:<eBAeh.242$yC5.98(a)newssvr27.news.prodigy.net>, David Ching >>>wrote: >>>> I was told at PDC 2003 (way early, I know) that SetWindowsHookEx would >>>> continue to work as long as the app doing the hooking had at least as >>>> much priviledge as the app being hooked. >>> >>>So it does for many hook types, AIUI, but the WH_JOURNALXXX hooks are >>>essentially system-wide hooks -- they don't just hook the current app, >>>they >>>hook everything -- so unless they are running at as high a privilege as >>>anything in the system they have to have a special privilege. >>> >>>My point was that there is a "Gotcha" here, because a lot of apps that use >>>the journal hooks don't actually look at keystrokes to/from other apps -- >>>they only want to log their own input. Maintainers of these apps may not >>>expect their macro facility to be broken by UAC, and will be in for a >>>nasty >>>surprise. >>> >>>To implement an appropriate degree of security, here, UAC doesn't have to >>>block the SetWindowsHook call, it could just filter the hook callbacks so >>>that the app only saw its own keystrokes unless it had special permission >>>to see them all. IOW: MS *could* have made UAC less intrusive, here, than >>>they have. >>> >>><irony> >>>Thanks a bunch, guys. >>></irony> >>> >>>Cheers, >>> Daniel. >>> >> Joseph M. Newcomer [MVP] >> email: newcomer(a)flounder.com >> Web: http://www.flounder.com >> MVP Tips: http://www.flounder.com/mvp_tips.htm > Joseph M. Newcomer [MVP] email: newcomer(a)flounder.com Web: http://www.flounder.com MVP Tips: http://www.flounder.com/mvp_tips.htm
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