From: Mok-Kong Shen on
Unruh wrote:
> Mok-Kong Shen writes:
>
>> Tom St Denis wrote:
>>> On Sep 23, 9:23 am, Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.s...(a)t-online.de> wrote:
>>>> Tom St Denis wrote:
>>>>> ..... For example, take a
>>>>> simple cipher
>>>>> C = sbox[P xor K]
>>>>> Where K is random. Even if sbox[] were known [and bijective] the
>>>>> output would still be "random" provided that K is random.
>>>> That seems to be fairly clear. But if the sbox is known, there seems
>>>> to be no purpose to use it at all (for crypto), isn't it?
>>> That's a stupid question, even from you.
>>>
>>> The sbox is a design principle of the cipher, it's ASSUMED to be
>>> public knowledge. I can't say this in any more stressful fashion so
>>> I'll cruise on caps...
>>>
>>> ALL OF MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY'S SECURITY IS [IDEALLY] BASED ON THE
>>> PREMISE THAT THE CIPHER OR ALGORITHM IS PUBLICLY DISCLOSED AND THAT
>>> THE KEY(S) REMAIN SECRET.
>
>> No. I was criticizing your stating that's a cipher. I mean, since the
>> opponent knows the Sbox, he can strip it right away, so the "existence"
>> of the sbox in the cipher serves no purpose (no designer would
>> add an absolutely redundant component). Saying C = P xor K is a an
>> example of a simple cipher is o.k. Do you get it?
>
> No, you cannot strip it away. You maybe could IF it were "bijective" Ie
> a simple permuation, but and Sbox is a non-linear many to one map. You
> cannot undo it. For every output there are many inputs. The cypher as a
> whole is one to one, but the subsets of it are not. Ie, given the
> outputs of the sbox, you do not know what the inputs are.
> Thus you cannot strip it away.

I was answering to St. Denis in the context of his statement. He
explicitly mentioned there that his Sbox is bijective and publically
known. See what is quoted from his post above.

Thanks,

M. K. Shen


From: Maaartin on
On Sep 24, 8:39 pm, Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.s...(a)t-online.de> wrote:
> I am fairly sure that that wouldn't work. In the following,
> I started with a 4*4 identity matrix. I did 3 steps to achieve
> 50% 0 and 50% 1 in the first 3 columns, but then I am stuck.
> There is evidently no way to get the 4-th column to satisfy
> the required condition.
>
>     1000  1000  1000  1000
>     0100  1100  1100  1100
>     0010  0010  0110  0110
>     0001  0001  0001  0011

For a 4x4 matrix, there's no solution at all (prove it).
But for larger matrixes it seems to work (just try it for 6x6).

On Sep 25, 2:16 am, Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.s...(a)t-online.de> wrote:
> I was answering to St. Denis in the context of his statement. He
> explicitly mentioned there that his Sbox is bijective and publically
> known. See what is quoted from his post above.

There're bijective sboxes (as in AES) and there're non-bijective (as
in DES).
But stripping them away makes no sense as they're mixing the key and
the data.
Before you ask again, habe a look at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard
an tell me how to strip them there.
From: Greg Rose on
In article <00ff0a4f-83fe-4bf9-b62a-2dd218e64f4d(a)o41g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
Maaartin <grajcar1(a)seznam.cz> wrote:
>On Sep 24, 8:39�pm, Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.s...(a)t-online.de> wrote:
>> I am fairly sure that that wouldn't work. In the following,
>> I started with a 4*4 identity matrix. I did 3 steps to achieve
>> 50% 0 and 50% 1 in the first 3 columns, but then I am stuck.
>> There is evidently no way to get the 4-th column to satisfy
>> the required condition.
>>
>> � � 1000 �1000 �1000 �1000
>> � � 0100 �1100 �1100 �1100
>> � � 0010 �0010 �0110 �0110
>> � � 0001 �0001 �0001 �0011
>
>For a 4x4 matrix, there's no solution at all (prove it).
>But for larger matrixes it seems to work (just try it for 6x6).

Indeed my algorithm fails for the small case.
But:

1110
1001
0101
0010

seems to work.

I've subsequently concluded that no such exactly
balanced matrix can be invertible though...

Greg.
--
Greg Rose
232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C
From: Mok-Kong Shen on
Maaartin wrote:

> For a 4x4 matrix, there's no solution at all (prove it).

I used a program to show that. But you might not accept that as
equivalent to a math proof and anyway there is no proof of my
program correctness. What could I do?

> But for larger matrixes it seems to work (just try it for 6x6).
>
> On Sep 25, 2:16 am, Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.s...(a)t-online.de> wrote:
>> I was answering to St. Denis in the context of his statement. He
>> explicitly mentioned there that his Sbox is bijective and publically
>> known. See what is quoted from his post above.
>
> There're bijective sboxes (as in AES) and there're non-bijective (as
> in DES).
> But stripping them away makes no sense as they're mixing the key and
> the data.
> Before you ask again, habe a look at
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard
> an tell me how to strip them there.

I suppose there is a misunderstanding here. St. Denis's post
had C = Sbox( P xor K ) as a cipher. Now how is the proper
recipient of the encrypted message to recover P? He has certainly
to strip off Sbox, right? Since Sbox is in public knowledge, as
St. Denis assumed, anybody else could do the same as the proper
recipient. Or is there any logical fault in my reasoning?

M. K. Shen
From: Mok-Kong Shen on
Greg Rose wrote:

> Indeed my algorithm fails for the small case.
> But:
>
> 1110
> 1001
> 0101
> 0010
>
> seems to work.
>
> I've subsequently concluded that no such exactly
> balanced matrix can be invertible though...

Do you mean that for n=4 there is no linear bijective function
satisfying the condition that flipping one input bit always
causes exactly 2 output bits to flip? I have verified that
with a program in order to exclude my hand computation mistakes.
Using another program I found that there is in this case no
bijective function at all (i.e. linear or nonlinear) satisfying
that condition. But that's unfortunately only a 'proof' with
a program, not a proof in the classical mathematical sense.
If you could show that with math, I should be very grateful
to know the details.

M. K. Shen
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