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From: p=np-any+p-entropy on 20 Sep 2009 06:26
> On Sep 20, 12:50 pm, Bappa <adda1...(a)bigpond.com>
> wrote:
> > On Sep 18, 3:42 am, Marko Amnell
> <marko.amn...(a)kolumbus.fi> wrote:
> >
> > > There is an interesting new book out about the
> > > history of Cantor's set theory. It seems to
> > > me that the book lends support to Feyerabend's
> > > philosophy of science in _Against Method_.
> > > Science can progress through *any* method,
> >
> > Sorry, Marko, this is dead wrong.  The only valid
> *method* in science
> > is the *experimental* method - meaning,
> repeatability of results under
> > controlled and same conditions.  The rest is
> analysis and discussion.
>
> I was referring to Paul Feyerabend. He was engaged in
> an argument
> with philosophers of science such as Karl Popper over
> the question
> of whether there is one single correct Scientific
> Method. The argument
> is not over the necessity of experiments in science,
> but other issues.
> Here is one summary of Feyerabend's arguments:
>
> Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise:
> theoretical
> anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to
> encourage progress
> than its law-and-order alternatives.
> This is shown both by an examination of historical
> episodes and by an
> abstract analysis of the relation between idea and
> action. The only
> principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything
> goes.
> For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict
> well-confirmed
> theories and/or well-established experimental
> results. We may advance
> science by proceeding counter-inductively.
> The consistency condition which demands that new
> hypotheses agree with
> accepted theories is unreasonable because it
> preserves the older
> theory, and not the better theory. Hypotheses
> contradicting well-
> confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be
> obtained in any
> other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial
> for science, while
> uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity
> also endangers the
> free development of the individual.
> There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is
> not capable of
> improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought
> is absorbed into
> science and is used for improving every single
> theory. Nor is
> political interference rejected. It may be needed to
> overcome the
> chauvinism of science that resists alternatives to
> the status quo.
> No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its
> domain, yet it is not
> always the theory that is to blame. Facts are
> constituted by older
> ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories
> may be proof of
> progress. It is also a first step in our attempts to
> find the
> principles implicit in familiar observational
> notions.
> As an example of such an attempt I examine the tower
> argument which
> the Aristotelians used to refute the motion of the
> earth. The argument
> involves natural interpretations - ideas so closely
> connected with
> observations that it needs a special effort to
> realise their existence
> and to determine their content. Galileo identifies
> the natural
> interpretations which are inconsistent with
> Copernicus and replaces
> them by others.
> The new natural interpretations constitute a new and
> highly abstract
> observation language. They are introduced and
> concealed so that one
> falls to notice the change that has taken place
> (method of anamnesis).
> They contain the idea of the relativity of all motion
> and the law of
> circular inertia.
> Initial difficulties caused by the change are defused
> by ad hoc
> hypotheses, which thus turn out occasionally to have
> a positive
> function; they give new theories a breathing space,
> and they indicate
> the direction of future research.
> In addition to natural interpretations, Galileo also
> changes
> sensations that seem to endanger Copernicus. He
> admits that there are
> such sensations, he praises Copernicus for having
> disregarded them, he
> claims to have removed them with the help of the
> telescope. However,
> he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope
> should be expected
> to give a true picture of the sky.
> Nor does the initial experience with the telescope
> provide such
> reasons. The first telescopic observations of the sky
> are indistinct,
> indeterminate, contradictory and in conflict with
> what everyone can
> see with his unaided eyes. And, the only theory that
> could have helped
> to separate telescopic illusions from veridical
> phenomena was refuted
> by simple tests.
> On the other hand, there are some telescopic
> phenomena which are
> plainly Copernican. Galileo introduces these
> phenomena as independent
> evidence for Copernicus while the situation is rather
> that one refuted
> view - Copernicanism - has a certain similarity with
> phenomena
> emerging from another refuted view - the idea that
> telescopic
> phenomena are faithful images of the sky. Galileo
> prevails because of
> his style and his clever techniques of persuasion,
> because he writes
> in Italian rather than in Latin, and because he
> appeals to people who
> are temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and the
> standards of
> learning connected with them.
> Such 'irrational' methods of support are needed
> because of the 'uneven
> development' (Marx, Lenin) of different parts of
> science.
> Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of
> modern science
> survived only because reason was frequently overruled
> in their past.
> Galileo's method works in other fields as well. For
> example, it can be
> used to eliminate the existing arguments against
> materialism, and to
> put an end to the philosophical mind/body problem
> (the corresponding
> scientific problems remain untouched, however).
> The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the
> distinction between
> a context of discovery and a context of justification
> and disregarding
> the related distinction between observational terms
> and theoretical
> terms. Neither distinction plays a role in scientific
> practice.
> Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous
> consequences.
> Finally, the discussion in Chapters 6-13 shows that
> Popper's version
> of Mill's pluralism is not in agreement with
> scientific practice and
> would destroy science as we know it. Given science,
> reason cannot be
> universal and unreason cannot be excluded. This
> feature of science
> calls for an anarchistic epistemology. The
> realisation that science is
> not sacrosanct, and that the debate between science
> and myth has
> ceased without having been won by either side,
> further strengthens the
> case for anarchism.
> Even the ingenious attempt of Lakatos to construct a
> methodology that
> (a) does not issue orders and yet (b) puts
> restrictions upon our
> knowledge-increasing activities, does not escape this
> conclusion. For
> Lakatos' philosophy appears liberal only because it
> is an anarchism in
> disguise. And his standards which are abstracted from
> modern science
> cannot be regarded as neutral arbiters in the issue
> between modern
> science and Aristotelian science, myth, magic,
> religion, etc.
> Moreover, these standards, which involve a comparison
> of content
> classes, are not always applicable. The content
> classes of certain
> theories are incomparable in the sense that none of
> the usual logical
> relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said
> to hold between
> them. This occurs when we compare myths with science.
> It also occurs
> in the most advanced, most general and therefore most
> mythological
> parts of science itself.
> Thus science is much closer to myth than a scientific
> philosophy is
> prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of
> thought that have
> been developed by man, and not necessarily the best.
> It is
> conspicuous, noisy, and impudent, but it is
> inherently superior only
> for those who have already decided in favour of a
> certain ideology, or
> who have accepted it without having ever examined its
> advantages and
> its limits. And as the accepting and rejecting of
> ideologies should be
> left to the individual it follows that the separation
> of state and
> church must be supplemented by the separation of
> state and science,
> that most recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatic
> religious
> institution. Such a separation may be our only chance
> to achieve a
> humanity we are capable of, but have never fully
> realised.
>
> http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/w
> orks/ge/feyerabe.htm
>
> >
> > This is what I was taught in my engineering
> institute (First Year) by
> > the profs. in the Humanities Dept.  IIT Kharagur
> was the only IIT
> > where there was a firmly established and motivated
> Humanities
> > department.
> >
> > > including the paradoxical fact that the progress
> > > of mathematics was aided by the mysticism
> > > of Russian mathematicians who accepted
> > > Cantor's set theory because it fit their
> > > mystical beliefs.
> >
> > Now what has maths to do with science?  The Queen
> of Arts is
> > Mathematics, and Science pays the most humble
> homage to Her.
>
> Many people would include mathematics as part of
> science.
> There is an element of mathematics that is similar to
> the
> arts but I would not call mathematics an art.
> Aesthetic
> considerations play a role in mathematics, but they
> also
> play a role in theoretical physics. There are no
> experiments
> in mathematics but the use of logical deduction sets
> it
> apart from the arts. The fundamental concepts of
> mathematics
> have a basis in experience, but the concepts have
> been
> abstracted.
>

All science is abstraction of reality governed by perception but always the unknown exists and always the truth exists all way sit does not matter if we see it or not it still exists so say the internet exists and if it does then quantum paradox exists then question says variabole relativity I write message to appear sooner here then later there but I post it one time to me. So if it is relative then quantum I am write to future if process governs phsyics and is varifiable and repeatable it would be hard to do.

I believe it possible.

With the Internet or anything since there are no serious consquences for 'playing' type behaviors, like stack blocks, babble like baby, but since it built on one frame everyone 'agree' on http:// .html it all move interchanges as we little baby play and soon little baby write whole page big books and moms say how this baby do that? Adult do that but baby does not do that. Baby does do that but mom and abba not understand how baby do that so they are scare or think baby is bad but baby not bad parent not understand scare baby treat her like adult but she not adult she did just real smart baby.
Some day you will be sharing your tears to cry over me.

--mmm
From: p=np-any+p-entropy on 20 Sep 2009 06:28
> On Sep 20, 11:30 am, "gratis-_+_8_Sum_"
> <scribio_v...(a)mail.org> wrote:
> > Dear Mark Amnell,
> >
> > You are a rock star for finding this! My 31st
> birthday is 9/23 and I
> > gave this title to 1 of the 2 people I know who
> asked me what I wanted
> > for my birthday. Thank you so much for finding
> this. It sounds so
> > neat, such cool rational thought in the face of
> mysticism to discover
> > greater truth!
> >
> > Thank you,
> >
> > Martin Musatov
>
> Glad you liked the book. I ordered it myself
> from Amazon. Only 17 dollars, so the recession
> is good for something.
>

Always something exists anything good for something.--Musatov
From: Marko Amnell on 20 Sep 2009 10:42
On Sep 20, 4:08 pm, John Wilkins <j...(a)wilkins.id.au> wrote:
> In article
> <6bdccf42-3c8c-45cb-b3ab-9cf06736c...(a)p23g2000vbl.googlegroups.com>,
>
>
>
>
>
> Marko Amnell <marko.amn...(a)kolumbus.fi> wrote:
> > On Sep 20, 12:50 pm, Bappa <adda1...(a)bigpond.com> wrote:
> > > On Sep 18, 3:42 am, Marko Amnell <marko.amn...(a)kolumbus.fi> wrote:
>
> > > > There is an interesting new book out about the
> > > > history of Cantor's set theory. It seems to
> > > > me that the book lends support to Feyerabend's
> > > > philosophy of science in _Against Method_.
> > > > Science can progress through *any* method,
>
> > > Sorry, Marko, this is dead wrong.  The only valid *method* in science
> > > is the *experimental* method - meaning, repeatability of results under
> > > controlled and same conditions.  The rest is analysis and discussion.
>
> > I was referring to Paul Feyerabend. He was engaged in an argument
> > with philosophers of science such as Karl Popper over the question
> > of whether there is one single correct Scientific Method. The argument
> > is not over the necessity of experiments in science, but other issues.
> > Here is one summary of Feyerabend's arguments:
>
> > Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical
> > anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress
> > than its law-and-order alternatives.
>
> Feyerabend did not advocate, probably, anarchism. He said that if there
> is supposed to be a single method, it is anarchism. But he did not
> think that; he thought that there were a number of methods in play.
>
> ...
>
> I gave a talk on this at one point:
>
> <http://scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts/2007/10/how_not_to_feyerabend.
> php>

I read the text of your talk. I think you point to
some important dangers in advocating
methodological anarchism, such as politically
motivated distortion of science. Clearly, this
is an ongoing problem, as demonstrated by
Sarah Palin's candidacy, for example.

I am not an advocate of Feyerabend's position.
If I have to declare my position, I am closer
to an "Enlightenment fundamentalist" (a phrase
used by another student of Popper, Ernest Gellner)
or neo-positivist. I think Feyerabend
makes some good points, however.

I think the historical facts recounted in the
book _Naming Infinity_ do, however, pose a
problem, not only for those advocating one
fixed scientific method, but more broadly,
for many modern notions of rationality.

We have the fact that descriptive set theory,
an important part of mathematics, was developed
by Russian mystics who believed that by
repeatedly chanting God's name, they could
achieve fusion with the divine. And this mystical
belief was intimately connected to their
mathematical research. To quote Jim Holt's
review in the August 28 issue of the LRB:

"They carried their Name Worshipping into
mathematics, seeming to believe that the
act of naming could put them in touch with
infinite sets undefinable by ordinary
mathematical means - indeed, that they could
summon into existence new mathematical
entities merely by naming them."

While French rationalists were reluctant to work
with Cantor's hierarchy of infinities, the Russian
mystics embraced Cantor's new theory. While
the French rationalists rejected the Axiom of Choice
because it represented an infinite number of
arbitrary choices, the Russian mystics saw no
problem. The substantive mystical beliefs of the
Russians had a substantive effect on their
mathematical beliefs and practices at many levels.
Luzin, for example, because of his belief in the
mystical importance of naming, made a great effort to
resolve everything into clear, unambiguous
definitions. How could one advocate one fixed
scientific method in the fact of this historical
example? Note that Imre Lakatos's efforts to
develop such a method focused on mathematics
in particular, not the empirical sciences.

The arguments and proofs provided by the Russians
do not diverge from ordinary standards. There are
no cases of some mystic saying "I believe this theorem
because I saw it in a mystical vision." Nevertheless,
the intimate connections between the mystical and
mathematical beliefs and practices of these Russians
makes it difficult to support an empiricist model of
human rationality that excludes non-empirical mystical
beliefs. At the very least, it shows that (to adopt some of
the terminology of the philosophy of science used by
Feyerabend and Popper) the "context of discovery"
indeed has no rules at all, at least in pure mathematics.
Mathematical discovery and creation can be inspired
substantitely by mystical beliefs and practices. The
"context of justification" did not, however, diverge from
ordinary mathematical standards for proof.

I have not read _Naming Infinity_ yet, so I cannot
try to come to any conclusions. But one idea that
occurs to me is that because pure mathematics is
not an empirical science, it is possible for its
practioner to believe, while doing mathematics,
in just about *any* metaphysical notions (including
non-empiricist ones). One might develop a good
mathematical theory while believing that the world
rests on the back of a giant tortoise, which rests
on the backs of an endless tower of tortoises.
When someone else studies this theory, he can just
ignore the tower of tortoises, and focus exclusively
on the formal structure of the new theory. The formal
structure of the mathematical theory can go together,
as it were, with any metaphysical content. That is something
that is not possible with the empirical sciences.
I'm not sure my interpretation is quite valid, however,
as the Russian mystics who developed descriptive
set theory also extended their mystical beliefs into
the very substance of their work. They accepted
the Axiom of Choice because it fit their mystical
beliefs. They accepted Cantor's hierarchy of
infinities because it fit their notion of the divine.
They paid special attention to clear, unambiguous
definitions because of the mystical importance
they attached to the act of naming.

From: Marko Amnell on 20 Sep 2009 11:15
On Sep 20, 4:10 am, That One <david1...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> The general impression I've been getting is that Greater Russia (for
> lack of a better term) was a hotbed of genius until Stalin fucked
> everything up.

Yes, that is the horrible part of this story.
Egorov starved to death in a Stalinist prison
in 1931, and Florensky was tortured and
sent to an Arctic concentration camp, and later
executed in Leningrad in 1937.

From: Patok on 21 Sep 2009 02:42
Marko Amnell wrote:
> On Sep 20, 12:50 pm, Bappa <adda1...(a)bigpond.com> wrote:
>> On Sep 18, 3:42 am, Marko Amnell <marko.amn...(a)kolumbus.fi> wrote:
>>
>>> There is an interesting new book out about the
>>> history of Cantor's set theory. It seems to
>>> me that the book lends support to Feyerabend's
>>> philosophy of science in _Against Method_.
>>> Science can progress through *any* method,
>> Sorry, Marko, this is dead wrong. The only valid *method* in science
>> is the *experimental* method - meaning, repeatability of results under
>> controlled and same conditions. The rest is analysis and discussion.
>
> I was referring to Paul Feyerabend. He was engaged in an argument
> with philosophers of science such as Karl Popper over the question
> of whether there is one single correct Scientific Method. The argument
> is not over the necessity of experiments in science, but other issues.
> Here is one summary of Feyerabend's arguments:

Marko, I admire your patience and level-headedness in dealing with
certified wooden philosophers.
(A "wooden phlosopher" is a term used in some Eastern European
languages to describe pretend-intelligents --educated cretins, in other
words-- like this Arindam Banerjee).

--
You'd be crazy to e-mail me with the crazy. But leave the div alone.
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