From: rossum on 10 Mar 2010 09:06 On Wed, 10 Mar 2010 02:18:20 -0800 (PST), adacrypt <austin.obyrne(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > >Alice writes an encryption program first of all. She then writes a >corresponding decryption program that checks her previous encryption >work. She tweaks these to perfection and then calls this joint >combination of encryption and decryption programs her 'server' Fine. I can follow that. >that she now sends to Bob. How? Alice needs a secure channel to Bob along which to send her server. If the channel is not secure then we can assume that Eve, the attacker, also has a copy of the server. >In future she will communicate with Bob by >sending him markup code as cipher text that will index her server >(functioning now as an interpreter program) and Bob's computer then >becomes his browser that displays the message that Alice wants him to >know. This is a figurative model of what exists already as up-and- >running working ciphers in my computer. > >The arrays of Alice's base interpreter program can be made as large as >she likes so that the number of workable permutations of the order of >the elements is literally out of this world in magnitude. The >particular permutation that she initially sends to any Bob however is >unique to that Bob and is simply one only element of this vast set. >She can periodically refresh her 'interpreter' to this Bob by >occasionally sending him external scrambling and slicing parameters >that he must immediately apply to her particular server that is in his >sole custody. In all her dealings with this Bob it is this same base >that is being scrambled and sliced all the time. A different Bob >would have had a different base interpreter sent to him initially so >that the parameters of different messages (cross-channels) are useless >if the cipher text of different messages are illegally intercepted by >an adversary. How does this differ from an insecure Two-Time-Pad? How does this give us any advantage over a Maurer-style stream cypher that uses a very large public database and hence has no need to maintain two separate databases? rossum
From: rossum on 10 Mar 2010 11:33 On Wed, 10 Mar 2010 07:28:17 -0800 (PST), adacrypt <austin.obyrne(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >This cryptography is so secure that even if the cost of the initial >secure delivery was very great it would still be attractive This cryptography is provably less secure than a One Time Pad and has the same distribution problem. What advantage does it have over the One Time Pad? You also did not answer my point about a Maurer-style stream cypher which gets round the distribution problem albeit at some cost in security. rossum
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