From: G. Frege on
On 16 Dec 2005 22:52:56 -0800, "sradhakr" <sradhakr(a)in.ibm.com> wrote:

>
> So the outline of an intuitionistic proof of ~(P&~P) would be as follows.
>
> (1) Suppose ... that P&~P, i.e., suppose that [P&~P is] provable".
>
> (2) The said proof of P&~P can be converted into the proof of an
> arbitrary proposition Q.
> :
>
No, o u r proves of ~(P & ~P) don't rely on such a reasoning.

O u r reasoning is:

Assume P & ~P. Hence P and ~P. Contradiction!
Hence ~(P & ~P) (by RAA).

(You might compare that reasoning with the original proof in a system
of natural deduction for intuitionistic logic given by Barb Knox.)


F.


P.S. The general form of the reasoning we adopted is:

Assume A. Derive B and ~B, for some formula B.
Hence ~A (by RAA).

From: H. J. Sander Bruggink on
Charlie-Boo wrote:
> Torkel Franzen wrote:

>> You mistakenly take the argument to be about classical propositional
>>logic.
>
>
> So "~(A<->~A) is a propositional calculus wff" is wrong? (I never used
> the word "classical".)


But you did talk about "truth tables" and "resolution", both
of which are proof methods for classical propositional logic,
and not intuitionistic propositional logic.

groente
-- Sander
From: Charlie-Boo on
H. J. Sander Bruggink wrote:
> Charlie-Boo wrote:
> > Torkel Franzen wrote:
>
> >> You mistakenly take the argument to be about classical propositional
> >>logic.
> >
> >
> > So "~(A<->~A) is a propositional calculus wff" is wrong? (I never used
> > the word "classical".)

> But you did talk about "truth tables" and "resolution", both
> of which are proof methods for classical propositional logic,
> and not intuitionistic propositional logic.

Please give a proof of a propositional calculus proposition that cannot
be done using case analysis (examination of the truth tables.)

C-B

> groente
> -- Sander

From: Charlie-Boo on
David C. Ullrich wrote:
> On 19 Dec 2005 07:31:22 -0800, "Charlie-Boo" wrote:

> I don't know whether you've noticed this, but others have:

Name 2.

> You complain that I'm just quibbling about syntax,
> and at the same time you ignore most of my comments
> about the substance of your Simple yet Profound Metatheorem...

Glad you agree it's profound.

> Oh for heaven's sake. How was I supposed to know that that two
> []'s meant entirely different things?

Sorry, I thought you knew all about Logic.

> >> > Thm. ((|- P) = (|- Q)) => |- (P=Q)
> >
> >> This is obviously false.
> >> If neither P nor Q is provable (so that
> >> ((|- P) = (|- Q)) is true) it certainly
> >> does not follow that P==Q _is_ provable.
> >
> >Let's suppose that P is "1>2" and Q is "2>3". Then P==Q is
> >(1>2)==(2>3) which IS provable.

> Huh?

I said, let's suppose that P is "1>2" and Q is "2>3". Then P==Q is
(1>2)==(2>3) which IS provable.

> I didn't say that it is never the case that P==Q is
> provable. I said that this does not follow from the assumption
> that neither P nor Q is provable.

I was just illustrating my thinking with a specific example. A better
counterexample for you (than meaningless propositional variables) would
be P is any Godel sentence and Q is FALSE.

> David C. Ullrich

From: Torkel Franzen on
"Charlie-Boo" <chvol(a)aol.com> writes:

> Please give a proof of a propositional calculus proposition that cannot
> be done using case analysis (examination of the truth tables.)

There are no truth tables for intuitionistic propositional logic.