From: Lester Zick on
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:06:40 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com>
wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>> No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
>>>> object.
>>>> Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
>>>> (such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
>>>> and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?
>>>>
>>>> PD
>>>>
>>> The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
>>> be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
>>> that consideration, which are rather limited.
>>>
>>> "blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
>>> context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.
>>
>> I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
>> predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.
>
>No, Lester. I hate to put it this way, but here, you're wrong.

No need for any regret, Tony. I certainly don't mind being called on
errors or even called on non errors when there's something you think
is wrong. But we shall just have to see what we shall see here, Tony.

> "Blue" is
>a descriptor for an object, a physical object as perceived by a human,
>if "blue" is taken to mean the color. It's an attribute that some
>humanly visible object may or may not have. The "truth" of "blue"
>depends entirely on what it is attributed to. Blue(moon) is rarely true.
>Blue(sky) is often true in Arizona, and not so often around here.

So "blue" is not a predicate, Tony, as in "it is blue"? And this
predicate cannot be true or false?

>One can assign an attribute to an object as a function, like I just did.
>One can also use a function to include an object in a set which is
>described by an attribute, like sky(blue) or moon(blue) - "this object
>is a member of that set". The object alone also doesn't constitute an
>entire statement. "Sky" and "moon" do not have truth values. Blue(sky)
>might be true less than 50% of the time, and blue(moon) less than 1%,
>but "blue" and "sky" and "moon" are never true or false, because that
>sentence no verb. There is no "is" there, eh, what? :)

Tony, I think you're confusing the supposed truth or falsity of a
single predicate with the supposed truth or falsity of an abstract
proposition. For that matter we can always make a proposition
out of a single predicate by saying "it is blue (or whatever)".

>> However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
>> cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
>> predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
>> the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
>> "illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
>> not either true or false.
>
>But, it does. In order for there to be a statement with a logical truth
>value,

I'm not sure what the significance of "truth value" is, Tony. I deal
with truth and finite tautological regressions to self contradictory
alternatives as the basis for truth and not merely the assignment and
evaluation of truth values whatever that may mean.

> there must be buried within it a logical implication, "this
>implies that". The only implication for "blue" alone is that such a
>thing as "blue" exists. Does "florange" exist, by virtue of the fact
>that I just used the word?
>
>If "blue" and "fast" are predicates, is "blue fast" a predicate? Does
>that sound wrong? How about "chicken porch"? Is that true or false?

Well all predicates and predicate combinations are what they are,
Tony. And they can range from true to false to self contradictory. I
don't see the problem with that whether we're considering things
literally or even metaphorically for that matter. It's all one system
of predicates and predicate combinations which are either true or
false in combinations. Some predicate combinations appear silly
because we already understand the combinations are false and self
contradictory. But that isn't to say the predicates themselves cannot
be true or false alone or in other combinations in given instances.

>The fast chicken on the blue porch, don't you agree? I see no
>contradiction in that....

Nor do I. Nor do I see any problem in evaluating the truth or falsity
of "it is blue". No special mystery there that I can see.

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:57:05 +0000 (UTC), stephen(a)nomail.com wrote:

>In sci.math Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>> PD wrote:
>>>
>>> No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
>>> object.
>>> Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
>>> (such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
>>> and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?
>>>
>>> PD
>>>
>
>> The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
>> be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
>> that consideration, which are rather limited.
>
>How is it limited Tony? Consider points in a plane, where each
>point is identified by a pair of real numbers. The set of
>points { (x,y) | (x-3)^2+(y+4)^2=10 } describes a geometric object.
>In what way is this description "limited"? Can you provide a
>better description, and explain how it overcomes those limitations?

So in arithmetic, Stephen, what is a plane? Or is your arithmetic
definition of a plane only assumed per say instead of true per se?

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On 21 Mar 2007 02:15:20 -0700, "Mike Kelly"
<mikekellyuk(a)googlemail.com> wrote:

>On 21 Mar, 05:47, Tony Orlow <t...(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>> step...(a)nomail.com wrote:
>> > In sci.math Tony Orlow <t...(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>> >> PD wrote:
>> >>> No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
>> >>> object.
>> >>> Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
>> >>> (such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
>> >>> and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?
>>
>> >>> PD
>>
>> >> The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
>> >> be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
>> >> that consideration, which are rather limited.
>>
>> > How is it limited Tony? Consider points in a plane, where each
>> > point is identified by a pair of real numbers. The set of
>> > points { (x,y) | (x-3)^2+(y+4)^2=10 } describes a geometric object.
>>
>> That's a very nice circle, Stephen, very nice....
>>
>> > In what way is this description "limited"? Can you provide a
>> > better description, and explain how it overcomes those limitations?
>>
>> There is no correlation between length and number of points
>
>Oh. And I suppose there *is* such a correlation in "real" geometry?

There is if you approach the definition of points on a line through
real geometric subdivision instead of trying to glom line segments
together into a straight line ala Frankenstein's monster per say.

~v~~
From: Tony Orlow on
Mike Kelly wrote:
> On 21 Mar, 15:47, Tony Orlow <t...(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>> Mike Kelly wrote:
>>> On 21 Mar, 05:47, Tony Orlow <t...(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>>>> step...(a)nomail.com wrote:
>>>>> In sci.math Tony Orlow <t...(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>>>>>> PD wrote:
>>>>>>> No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
>>>>>>> object.
>>>>>>> Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
>>>>>>> (such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
>>>>>>> and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?
>>>>>>> PD
>>>>>> The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
>>>>>> be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
>>>>>> that consideration, which are rather limited.
>>>>> How is it limited Tony? Consider points in a plane, where each
>>>>> point is identified by a pair of real numbers. The set of
>>>>> points { (x,y) | (x-3)^2+(y+4)^2=10 } describes a geometric object.
>>>> That's a very nice circle, Stephen, very nice....
>>>>> In what way is this description "limited"? Can you provide a
>>>>> better description, and explain how it overcomes those limitations?
>>>> There is no correlation between length and number of points
>>> Oh. And I suppose there *is* such a correlation in "real" geometry?
>>> --
>>> mike.
>> In my geometry |{x in R: 0<x<=1}| = Big'Un (or oo).
>
> What does that have to do with geometry?
>
> --
> mike.
>

It states the specific infinite number of points in the unit interval,
say, on the real line.
From: Tony Orlow on
stephen(a)nomail.com wrote:
> In sci.math Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>> stephen(a)nomail.com wrote:
>>> In sci.math Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>>>> stephen(a)nomail.com wrote:
>>>>> In sci.math Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>>>>>> PD wrote:
>>>>>>> No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
>>>>>>> object.
>>>>>>> Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
>>>>>>> (such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
>>>>>>> and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> PD
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
>>>>>> be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
>>>>>> that consideration, which are rather limited.
>>>>> How is it limited Tony? Consider points in a plane, where each
>>>>> point is identified by a pair of real numbers. The set of
>>>>> points { (x,y) | (x-3)^2+(y+4)^2=10 } describes a geometric object.
>>>> That's a very nice circle, Stephen, very nice....
>>> Yes, it is a circle. You knew exactly what this supposedly
>>> "limited" description was supposed to be.
>>>
>>>>> In what way is this description "limited"? Can you provide a
>>>>> better description, and explain how it overcomes those limitations?
>>>> There is no correlation between length and number of points, because
>>>> there is no workable infinite or infinitesimal units. Allow oo points
>>>> per unit length, oo^2 per square unit area, etc, in line with the
>>>> calculus. Nuthin' big. Jes' give points a size. :)
>>> How is that a limitation? You knew exactly what shape the
>>> set of points described. There is no feature of the circle
>>> that cannot be determined by the above description. There is
>>> no need to correlate length and number of points. Neither
>>> Euclid or Hilbert ever did that.
>
>> Gee, I guess it's a novel idea, then. That might make it good, and not
>> necessarily bad. Hilbert also didn't bother to generalize his axioms to
>> include anything but Euclidean space, which is lazy. He's got too many
>> axioms, and they do too little. :)
>
> Then you should not be complaining about the "set of points" approach
> to geometry and instead should be complaining about all prior approaches
> to geometry. Apparently they are all "limited" to you. Of course
> you cannot identify any actual limitation, but that is par for the course.
>

I wouldn't say geometry is perfected yet.

>> There's no reason the circumference of the unit circle can't be
>> considered to have 2*pi*oo points.
>
> But what is the reason to consider that is does? All you are doing
> is multiplying the length by oo. You are not adding any new information.
> You are not learning anything.
>

You are when you equate infinite numbers of points with finite measures,
and develop an system of infinite set sizes which goes beyond cardinality.

>>> So where is your better description, and where is the explanation
>>> as to why it is better? What more can you say about a circle
>>> centered at (3,-4) with a radius of sqrt(10)?
>
>> It's got 2*pi*sqrt(1)*oo points, as a set, which is greater than the
>> number of points in the unit interval. :)
>
> And what good does that do? You are just giving a new name to "length".
> You have not added anything.
>
> Stephen
>
>

To sets, I have.

Tony