The End of an Era - That of The Natural Numbers
in [Math]
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From: Nam Nguyen on 30 May 2010 21:28 William Hughes wrote: > On May 30, 8:28 pm, Nam Nguyen <namducngu...(a)shaw.ca> wrote: > >> My claim here is that model >> theoretically truth _and falsehood_ paradigm (a la Tarski) >> allows us to give a truth value (false) to all formulas >> in a partucular _degenerated_ case. > > > Your claim is that for a model with an empty universe > There is no x such that x is blue > is false. > > No matter how you get to it, the fact remains > that this claim is absurd. I've pointed out and mentioned more than one time already: something about A = B and C. It's absurd to say that that's absurd if you don't objectively give any due analysis to what I said there. Have you given any due analysis of my "A = B and C"? If you haven't, then it's no wonder why we haven't got much progress in our arguments. (Sometimes I have a feeling that, more than anything else, it's the case my opponents are afraid of facing some truths in the foundation, judging from the fact that they almost never give due analysis of some raised concepts because the concepts sound "new" though these concepts are definable in technical terms. It seems to me that if a concept isn't a familiar one then they'd just dismiss it, on the ground they've not heard it before! I could be wrong but so far it's hard for me to believe otherwise.)
From: William Hughes on 30 May 2010 22:09 On May 30, 10:28 pm, Nam Nguyen <namducngu...(a)shaw.ca> wrote: > William Hughes wrote: > > On May 30, 8:28 pm, Nam Nguyen <namducngu...(a)shaw.ca> wrote: > > >> My claim here is that model > >> theoretically truth _and falsehood_ paradigm (a la Tarski) > >> allows us to give a truth value (false) to all formulas > >> in a partucular _degenerated_ case. > > > Your claim is that for a model with an empty universe > > There is no x such that x is blue > > is false. > > > No matter how you get to it, the fact remains > > that this claim is absurd. > <snip discussion about background to the claim> The claim is still absurd.
From: Marshall on 31 May 2010 00:00 On May 30, 6:28 pm, Nam Nguyen <namducngu...(a)shaw.ca> wrote: > > (Sometimes I have a feeling that, more than anything else, it's the > case my opponents are afraid of facing some truths in the foundation, > judging from the fact that they almost never give due analysis of > some raised concepts because the concepts sound "new" though these > concepts are definable in technical terms. It seems to me that if a > concept isn't a familiar one then they'd just dismiss it, on the > ground they've not heard it before! I could be wrong but so far it's > hard for me to believe otherwise.) I believe that's how it appears to you. The way it appears to me is that I point to some simple matter that it's possible to consider entirely in isolation, and that you have wrong, and ask you about it, and what I get back is you talking about a bunch of other, entirely irrelevant stuff, which I don't bother to read at all closely because it's not related to what I was talking about, and doesn't interest me. Marshall
From: Daryl McCullough on 31 May 2010 07:51 Nam Nguyen says... >My claim here is that model theoretically truth _and falsehood_ >paradigm (a la Tarski) allows us to give a truth value (false) >to all formulas in a partucular _degenerated_ case. The usual way of defining truth in a structure does not have a separate definition of being false. A false statement is just a statement whose negation is true. >Well, if we make arguments based on subjective notion "Whatever, >... final conclusion is silly" then there's really nothing for >me to argue. I hope you'll stop, then. -- Daryl McCullough Ithaca, NY
From: Nam Nguyen on 31 May 2010 14:40
Marshall wrote: > On May 30, 7:21 pm, Nam Nguyen <namducngu...(a)shaw.ca> wrote: >> Marshall wrote: >>> On May 30, 4:53 pm, Nam Nguyen <namducngu...(a)shaw.ca> wrote: >>>> Marshall wrote: >>>>> A serious question: >>>>> What advantage(s) do you see to your approach in which false >>>>> statements may be classified as "true" by your logic? >>>> But where did I say or very much allude to that? >>> My mistake. What I should have said was >>> What advantage(s) do you see to your approach in which true >>> statements may be classified as "false" by your logic? >>> We already have such an example in the "~Ex[blue(x)]" case. >>> The statement is true in the empty model. Your logic assigns >>> false to all formulas in the empty model. Thus your >>> approach assigns "false" to a true statement in this case. >>> I am wondering what advantage you see in assigning false >>> to a true statement. >> That's some what a better question but not quite 100% clear: >> "true statement" in what sense? > > True in the sense that it describes things as > they actually are. Let me give you an example. > > You know what a potato chip is, right? And you know > who you are, right? So if I say "Nam Nguyen is not > a potato chip" then that is a true statement. You > are not a thinly sliced, fried section of potato. > Instead you are a person. This is simply a statement > that we all know to be the case. I may not know > exactly what you *are*, but I know, as completely > as anyone can know anything, that you are not a > potato chip. "Marshall Spight is not a potato chip" would also work as well. I may not know exactly what you *are*, but I know, as completely as anyone can know anything, that you are not a potato chip. Which is great, Marshall, because we 2, as well as billions other people, would be _identical_ as far as not being potato chips is concerned, and in that way the there will only peace and not argument or war, because argument or war would only possibly occur between _different_ people! (Honest to the God of reasoning, there got to be something different between Nam Nguyen and Marshall Spight, because they've been arguing since the universe was formed!) Good grief. Don't you have a better analogy? > > Well, actually, I don't really want to know your position > better, because I'm confident that you position is fatally > flawed. One reason that I'm so confident is because > your approach leads you to label as false some true > statements. If you first had a "serious" question for your opponent and now you don't want to hear your opponent's explanation just because you have some kind of "confidence" it's flaw, then how could people take you serious the next time you say you'd be serious about anything? (As if you had any seriousness in making logical arguments here to begin with!). |