From: Frederick Williams on
"Jesse F. Hughes" wrote:

> Hence, a model must have non-empty support,

Free logic may have empty models.

--
I can't go on, I'll go on.
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
"Jesse F. Hughes" <jesse(a)phiwumbda.org> writes:

> Strictly speaking, does "empty model" mean anything at all?

Empty models are usually disregarded, for reasons of technical
convenience.

> To be sure, this doesn't negate Daryl's primary point. If we try to
> interpret a language in the trivial "model", we will find that every
> universal statement is true. My point is only that such
> interpretations don't have the property that, if P is provable, then P
> is true under the interpretation.

If we allow empty models obviously we must modify the deductive calculi
accordingly. It's a bit messy but not at all difficult. This sort of
stuff goes under the heading "free logic".

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca> writes:

> For example, if we re-intuit the concept of the naturals as that in
> which G(T) (per GIT) be false, then we'd arrive at the meta theorem
> GIT':
>
> For any consistent T as strong as arithmetic of the naturals [i.e.
> the new "naturals"], there's a formula G(T) which is false and not
> provable!

Now there's an exciting theorem. But I think I'll give up at this point
and thank you for the helpful reminder that it's useless to attempt to
discuss logic with some people.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Jesse F. Hughes on
Frederick Williams <frederick.williams2(a)tesco.net> writes:

> "Jesse F. Hughes" wrote:
>
>> Hence, a model must have non-empty support,
>
> Free logic may have empty models.

Yes, but I believe the context here is classical FOL.

--
Jesse F. Hughes
"Being wrong is easy, knowing when you're right can be hard, but
actually being right and knowing it, is the hardest thing of all."
-- James S. Harris
From: Nam Nguyen on
Aatu Koskensilta wrote:
> Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca> writes:
>
>> For example, if we re-intuit the concept of the naturals as that in
>> which G(T) (per GIT) be false, then we'd arrive at the meta theorem
>> GIT':
>>
>> For any consistent T as strong as arithmetic of the naturals [i.e.
>> the new "naturals"], there's a formula G(T) which is false and not
>> provable!
>
> Now there's an exciting theorem.

Yes, as exciting as GIT, which is as exciting as the contradiction that
we do know the naturals are but that's not intuition!

> But I think I'll give up at this point
> and thank you for the helpful reminder that it's useless to attempt to
> discuss logic with some people.

The feeling is mutual. By now I think I'm well reminded that even in the
modern day, long after the Inquisition, there's a class of people who seem
to "own" mathematical reasoning and what they don't want to hear or discuss
will automatically become crackpot.