From: adacrypt on 6 Jun 2010 07:43 There are three distinct ciphers to hand in my invention of vector cryptography that are totally secure i.e. theoretically unbreakable according to the definition of what is unbreakable crypto strength in the Handbook of Applied Cryptography. The focus here initially is on the intellectual integrity at the mathematical core of a cipher in the event of the cipher text being intercepted and then being put under strong attack by expert cryptanalysts. These ciphers are impervious to being broken in that event. Additionally, there are individual properties of these ciphers that are of further interest to the managers of crypto schemes who have to consider also attacks of a more insidious nature than the obvious one of interception of the cipher text while it is in transit. These might include the in-house adversary (spy, say) who has access to the mutual databases. It is useful then to be able to apply additional stumbling blocks to slow down such a person and make it extremely difficult to work unobserved in the course of their nefarious work. This vector cryptography is classed in converging order as, 1) Mutual Database. 2) Asymmetric stream cipher. 3) One-Way Trapdoor. 4) Three-dimensional Spatial Vector-Based. Any reader who understands the design theory of this crypto type will realise that all three ciphers use a directed number line that lies in an inclined plane and that plane is defined by a three-dimensional vector called the normal vector N. The plaintext, represented as an integer is assigned to this number line and is defined by the position vector (Pn) of the numbers position on that number line according to the equation of the line. The Pn then becomes the cipher text per se, after some extra protective conditioning. The normal vector and the position vector are related so that the very well known cross product (vector product) method of vector multiplication can be used to decipher the cipher text at Bobs end. The essential shared information that Bob always needs to know so as to decrypt Alices cipher text is comprised of two vectors 1) the position vector that represents the plaintext and 2) the normal of the plane that is used in part, to define the position vector. Secure communication in this crypto scheme is based on exchanging this shared information indexed in the arrays of the mutual databases by the cipher text. The ciphers to hand each differs in the way the latter exchange is done. The point being made here is that while all three ciphers are fundamentally secure in their common basic form there are tertiary benefits in the way the ciphers may be deployed in practice. Vector Cipher 1) This cipher sends both the normal vector N, (3 integers), along with the position vector Pn (another 3 integers) as the cipher text. Given that Bob is able to read the three coefficients (i, j, k) of N from the mutual database already in his possession it would seem superfluous to send N again like this as cipher text. However, when the normal vector N and the position vector Pn are sent together as cipher text this means a string of six integers that may be arranged in 6! (six factorial i.e. 720) different permutations. The upshot of doing this is the creation of some large confusion sufficient to slow down but not stop entirely, an internal adversary who has access to the mutual databases of clients. This property in this cipher is not rated as mind-boggling to any experienced cryptographer but it is an extra string to his bow should he ever need it in some situation. Vector Cipher 2. This is substantially identical to cipher 1 except that only the position vector Pn is sent as cipher text i.e. a single item of cipher text comprises a string of three integers. This is the most likely to be used cipher of the series. Vector Cipher 4. This cipher is very extraordinary in that the same plaintext can be encrypted in millions of different cipher text strings (not merely permutations of a basic string) but a whole new string of fresh integers that all decrypt perfectly into the same message text each time asking for a resend implies a whole new and totally different cipher text string of integers to what was originally sent. There are some great benefits to this cipher. Vector Cipher 3. This is a watered down version of cipher 4. General operation. All of these ciphers are operated by non-specialist keyboard operators who need only to know how to respond to on-screen prompts when asked to enter the names of files for encryption. No mathematical user- assistance whatever is required to be provided by the user. Each cipher type has a batch mode in which files of any size may be prepared in any computer at any place and time for simultaneously reading in and encryption at some later time by an operator who may not even know that they are being encrypted. Files can contain any key-able character in the writable subset of ASCII (elements 32 to 126). Real-time email files may be keyed in interactively and encrypted between keystrokes while simultaneously being displayed on-screen. Any file size is possible at any typing speed that is humanly possible by a keyboard operator. This cryptography is wholly transparent and is serviced by long established vector mathematical methods that are backed by proven theorems by historically famous mathematicians. Demanding mathematical proof of something that has already been thoroughly proved as some readers have demanded of me is totally unnecessary. This cryptography is the cryptography of the future make no mistake about it. Drumming up support for all the failed cryptography of the past as in recent posts, eg PRNGs, defunct complexity theoretic ciphers etc in a defiant demonstration of group solidarity at the graveside is simply putting off the awful day when the nettle has to be grasped open up your mind to new cryptography now, do it now and do yourself a favour. Mathematics, unlike politics will never be dumbed down thank God for that. If my vector cryptography doesnt surface in mainstream cryptography in time for me to see it in my lifetime then it certainly will happen in years to come. Finally, vector cryptography owes nothing to Claude Shannon or to the theory of information, much as I admire the man. - adacrypt
From: Gordon Burditt on 7 Jun 2010 00:07 >There are three distinct ciphers to hand in my invention of vector >cryptography that are totally secure i.e. theoretically unbreakable >according to the definition of what is unbreakable crypto strength in >the \x93Handbook of Applied Cryptography\x94. > >The focus here initially is on the intellectual integrity at the >mathematical core of a cipher in the event of the cipher text being Ciphers do not have intellect nor intellectual integrity. >intercepted and then being put under strong attack by expert >cryptanalysts. These ciphers are impervious to being broken in that >event. >Additionally, there are individual properties of these ciphers that >are of further interest to the managers of crypto schemes who have to >consider also attacks of a more insidious nature than the obvious one >of interception of the cipher text while it is in transit. These Yes, there are many, many, many problems in administering ciphers that require so much keying material, such as the databases getting out of sync when messages are received out of order, go missing, are received more than once, or someone sends a fake message. >Files can contain any >key-able character in the writable subset of ASCII (elements 32 to >126). This is unacceptable. My ASCII text files depend heavily on newline and tab. Other text file formats want carriage-return, newline, backspace, tab and occasionally form feed. Note that the USENET message to which I am replying uses characters 0x93 and 0x94 along with newlines, so you couldn't even encrypt that. This also leaves out many other file formats that are commonly used for document exchange: Microsoft Word, Excel, OpenOffice, various compressed files, PDF, and Postscript. >This cryptography is wholly transparent and is serviced by long >established vector mathematical methods that are backed by proven >theorems by historically famous mathematicians. Demanding >mathematical proof of something that has already been thoroughly >proved as some readers have demanded of me is totally unnecessary. If you claim it's theoretically unbreakable, then you need as much keying material as you have message text. If you claim otherwise, don't bother trying, you're just lying, either about the unbreakability or about the amount of keying material required, or most likely both. >This cryptography is the cryptography of the future � make no mistake >about it. The "cryptography of the future" has the attributes of not tolerating messages received out of order, in duplicate, corrupted, or something mistaken as a message being decrypted, which not only fouls things up for that message, but which fouls up all future communication. It also requires an exchange of keying material via a secure channel which is rarely mentioned. This doesn't sound like an improvement for many applications. In fact, it sounds like a huge step backwards. >Finally, vector cryptography owes nothing to Claude Shannon or to the >theory of information, much as I admire the man. - adacrypt His theories still apply, whether you admit it or not. Doesn't that sound a bit like a lack of intellectual integrity on the part of adacrypt?
From: adacrypt on 7 Jun 2010 04:31 On Jun 7, 5:07 am, gordonb.b7...(a)burditt.org (Gordon Burditt) wrote: > >There are three distinct ciphers to hand in my invention of vector > >cryptography that are totally secure i.e. theoretically unbreakable > >according to the definition of what is unbreakable crypto strength in > >the \x93Handbook of Applied Cryptography\x94. > > >The focus here initially is on the intellectual integrity at the > >mathematical core of a cipher in the event of the cipher text being > > Ciphers do not have intellect nor intellectual integrity. > > >intercepted and then being put under strong attack by expert > >cryptanalysts. These ciphers are impervious to being broken in that > >event. > >Additionally, there are individual properties of these ciphers that > >are of further interest to the managers of crypto schemes who have to > >consider also attacks of a more insidious nature than the obvious one > >of interception of the cipher text while it is in transit. These > > Yes, there are many, many, many problems in administering ciphers > that require so much keying material, such as the databases getting > out of sync when messages are received out of order, go missing, > are received more than once, or someone sends a fake message. > > >Files can contain any > >key-able character in the writable subset of ASCII (elements 32 to > >126). > > This is unacceptable. My ASCII text files depend heavily on newline > and tab. Other text file formats want carriage-return, newline, > backspace, tab and occasionally form feed. Note that the USENET > message to which I am replying uses characters 0x93 and 0x94 along > with newlines, so you couldn't even encrypt that. > > This also leaves out many other file formats that are commonly used > for document exchange: Microsoft Word, Excel, OpenOffice, various > compressed files, PDF, and Postscript. > > >This cryptography is wholly transparent and is serviced by long > >established vector mathematical methods that are backed by proven > >theorems by historically famous mathematicians. Demanding > >mathematical proof of something that has already been thoroughly > >proved as some readers have demanded of me is totally unnecessary. > > If you claim it's theoretically unbreakable, then you need as much > keying material as you have message text. If you claim otherwise, > don't bother trying, you're just lying, either about the unbreakability > or about the amount of keying material required, or most likely both. > > >This cryptography is the cryptography of the future make no mistake > >about it. > > The "cryptography of the future" has the attributes of not tolerating > messages received out of order, in duplicate, corrupted, or something > mistaken as a message being decrypted, which not only fouls things > up for that message, but which fouls up all future communication. > It also requires an exchange of keying material via a secure channel > which is rarely mentioned. This doesn't sound like an improvement > for many applications. In fact, it sounds like a huge step backwards. > > >Finally, vector cryptography owes nothing to Claude Shannon or to the > >theory of information, much as I admire the man. - adacrypt > > His theories still apply, whether you admit it or not. Doesn't > that sound a bit like a lack of intellectual integrity on the part > of adacrypt? Hi Gordon, >This is unacceptable. My ASCII text files depend heavily on newline >and tab. Other text file formats want carriage-return, newline, >backspace, tab and occasionally form feed. Note that the USENET >message to which I am replying uses characters 0x93 and 0x94 along >with newlines, so you couldn't even encrypt that. If you work entirely within the Adacrypt compiler - i.e. read in , encrypt , decrypt and file the message text but let the compiler do it all without any involvement of any other computer software then there is no problem - I can demonstarte this on my quite old compiler (gnat 311.p) - update and revised Ada 2005 compilers are probably even more capable in all respects - Ada Core Technologies should testify to this. The "cryptography of the future" has the attributes of not tolerating > messages received out of order, in duplicate, corrupted, or something > mistaken as a message being decrypted, which not only fouls things > up for that message, but which fouls up all future communication. > It also requires an exchange of keying material via a secure channel > which is rarely mentioned. This doesn't sound like an improvement > for many applications. In fact, it sounds like a huge step backwards. Clearly, you do not understand the mathematics or the algorithms of my work - you are using a totally irrelevant yard stick on this vector cryptography that you do not understand - all ciphers to date in the industry that exist in any form (whose core design theory you may or may not understand) can be generally classed as xy cryptography - it all happens exclusively in the xy plane - such coplanar cryptography is prone to cryptanalysis by every means of mathematics that is available to cryptanalysts. - Also, I notice that your are relying on macro generalisations made on other cipher types that again are totally inapplicable - they just don't belong - you must get down to the nitty - gritty of vector mathematics and not just skate over it before going into wrongly perceived, irrelevant management projections that stem from the planar cryptography that you are probably used to using - its a different ball game working in vector space mathematics - Cheers Adacrypt.
From: Fritz Wuehler on 8 Jun 2010 11:10 Please do not quote nor respond to google groups posts! Thank you, The Readership
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