From: byron on 29 May 2010 07:14 colin leslie dean points out The fundamental problem with Godels theorems are he creates an imprdeicative statement and the theorems apply to themselves ie are impredicative- thus leading to paradox ieie this is godels impredicative statement used in his first theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Meaning_of_the_first_incompleteness_theorem Quote: the corresponding Gödel sentence G asserts: G cannot be proved to be true within the theory T as was pointed out many years ago if you use or create impredicative statements then what you will get is paradox and as dean has shown that is what happens with godels theorems philosophers such as russell mathematicians such as poincare have outlawed these statements from mathematics as they lead to paradox in maths and they lead to paradox in godels theorems why because if godels theorems are true then they apply to godels theorems as well if godels first theorem is true then it applies to it self Quote: it is shown by colin leslie dean that Godels first theorem ends in paradox it is said godel PROVED "there are mathematical true statements which cant be proven" in other words truth does not equate with proof. if that theorem is true then his theorem is false PROOF for if the theorem is true then truth does equate with proof- as he has given proof of a true statement but his theorem says truth does not equate with proof. thus a paradox if godels second theorem is true then it applies to it self Quote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Proof_sketch_for_the_second_theorem The following rephrasing of the second theorem is even more unsettling to the foundations of mathematics: If an axiomatic system can be proven to be consistent and complete from within itself, then it is inconsistent. now this theorem ends in self-contradiction http://gamahucherpress.yellowgum.com/books/philosophy/GODEL5.pdf But here is a contradiction Godel must prove that a system cannot be proven to be consistent based upon the premise that the logic he uses must be consistent . If the logic he uses is not consistent then he cannot make a proof that is consistent. So he must assume that his logic is consistent so he can make a proof of the impossibility of proving a system to be consistent. But if his proof is true then he has proved that the logic he uses to make the proof must be consistent, but his proof proves that this cannot be done as was pointed out many years ago if you use or create impredicative statements then what you will get is paradox and as dean has shown that is what happens with godels theorems
From: Charlie-Boo on 29 May 2010 22:26 On May 29, 7:14 am, byron <spermato...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > http://gamahucherpress.yellowgum.com/books/philosophy/GODEL5.pdf GODELS INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM. ENDS IN ABSURDITY OR MEANINGLESSNESS GODEL IS A COMPLETE FAILURE AS HE ENDS IN UTTER MEANINGLESSNESS CASE STUDY IN THE MEANINGLESSNESS OF ALL VIEWS Does that include your view? It seems that your paper suffers from the same self-referential paradox that doomed Godel's proof. I believe that you have refuted the validity of Mathematics - a great generalization of Godel's results. And so you reaffirm Godel after all (not surprisingly). Then how about this proof [I think this is new - for even me I mean]: Off the top of my head, A = "This is not provable." B = "This is refutable." C = "This is not true." Each of these asserts that it has a rather negative property if we are to believe in it. (It comes as a surprise!) So what is the truth value of each of these? A is TRUE B is FALSE C is NEITHER All subsets of {TRUE,FALSE}! [This suggests a shorter proof.] So A'=B ^ A'=C ^ B'=C A'=B : NOT PROVABLE is not REFUTABLE. Rosser's 1936 Extension to Godel 1931 A'=C : PROVABLE is not TRUE. Godel's 1st Incompleteness Theorem (1931) B'=C : REFUTABLE is not NOT TRUE. Smullyan's Dual Form Theorem (1960's) Example detailed proof of 1 of the above 3: NOT PROVABLE is not REFUTABLE Let PR be provable and DIS be refutable. If CONSISTENT and COMPLETE then DIS => ~PR and ~PR => DIS, so DIS <=> ~PR but the above shows that REFUTABLE is not NOT PROVABLE, so if CONSISTENT then not COMPLETE, which is Rosser's 1936 result. Vote plz: A. Not interested in the subject. B. Doesn't make much sense to me. C. Makes sense - have no idea if it is well-known or not. D. Makes sense - probably well-known. E. Makes sense - but has no value. F. Cool! (Really!) G. Interesting . . . I have a question . . . H. Given the context of all this I believe it is insipid. C-B 1. Proves 3 huge theorems. 2. The proof is tiny. 3. It uses the familiar silly sentences and more. 4. In particular, the Liar is just a simple statement - as we should expect it to be given its own simplicity. 5. The resolution of the Liar fits in exactly with Godel and Rosser's results. It is the other subset of {TRUE,FALSE}. Godel is {TRUE} and Rosser is {FALSE} and Liar is the other subset {}.
|
Pages: 1 Prev: Question about Hugh Woodin's original proof of projective determinacy. Next: Dawkins on Turing |