From: herbzet on


casey wrote:
> herbzet wrote:
> >
> > I wasn't really following the thread at all until I saw Wolf K's
> > post, which I read because I generally find his posts illuminating.
>
> Well he doesn't seem to suffer from verbal diarrhea,
> a condition suffered by some the other posters.

What are you insinuating, JC?
From: herbzet on


Curt Welch wrote:

> Natural language meaning (all meaning, even non-language) is best
> understood in my view as a huge set of probabilistic associations between
> micro concepts which is implemented in the brain with a neural
> network with billions of associated interconnection weights. The "micro
> concepts" I'm talking about are the smallest level of representation
> implemented in the brain - maybe something as simple as a single neuron
> firing - like a pixel on a computer screen are the "micro concepts" that
> make up the full image. But where as a computer screen might have a
> million or so pixels to make up the full image of the screen, the brain
> might activate some combination of 100 million neurons to represent the
> perceived meaning of some small sentence. The total amount of information
> in the meaning of a small natural language sentence for a single human
> brain might be a terabyte of data about the associations and their
> activation levels the sentence triggers. Whatever the number, it's
> certainly very large.
>
> The logic alone, in my example sentence represents some very small amount
> of information - maybe 5 bits of data about meaning? Only a few bits no
> matter how you count it compared to the billions of bits of total meaning
> we extract when we read it. So the logic is part of the meaning, but a
> trivially small part of the meaning in terms of total information content.
> But it does create a context that the can have large effect on how the
> meaning is selected.

Well, not much to add here, but I did just come across a quote
from Nietzche that might not be entirely inapposite:

"All things are subject to interpretation; whichever interpretation
prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth."

--
hz
From: Curt Welch on
herbzet(a)cox.net wrote:
> Curt Welch wrote:
>
> > Natural language meaning (all meaning, even non-language) is best
> > understood in my view as a huge set of probabilistic associations
> > between micro concepts which is implemented in the brain with a neural
> > network with billions of associated interconnection weights. The
> > "micro concepts" I'm talking about are the smallest level of
> > representation implemented in the brain - maybe something as simple as
> > a single neuron firing - like a pixel on a computer screen are the
> > "micro concepts" that make up the full image. But where as a computer
> > screen might have a million or so pixels to make up the full image of
> > the screen, the brain might activate some combination of 100 million
> > neurons to represent the perceived meaning of some small sentence. The
> > total amount of information in the meaning of a small natural language
> > sentence for a single human brain might be a terabyte of data about the
> > associations and their activation levels the sentence triggers.
> > Whatever the number, it's certainly very large.
> >
> > The logic alone, in my example sentence represents some very small
> > amount of information - maybe 5 bits of data about meaning? Only a few
> > bits no matter how you count it compared to the billions of bits of
> > total meaning we extract when we read it. So the logic is part of the
> > meaning, but a trivially small part of the meaning in terms of total
> > information content. But it does create a context that the can have
> > large effect on how the meaning is selected.
>
> Well, not much to add here, but I did just come across a quote
> from Nietzche that might not be entirely inapposite:
>
> "All things are subject to interpretation; whichever interpretation
> prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth."

:) very true.

--
Curt Welch http://CurtWelch.Com/
curt(a)kcwc.com http://NewsReader.Com/
From: Vesa Monisto on

"herbzet" <herbzet(a)gmail.com> wrote;
> casey wrote:
>> herbzet wrote:
>> >
>> > I wasn't really following the thread at all until I saw Wolf K's
>> > post, which I read because I generally find his posts illuminating.
>>
>> Well he doesn't seem to suffer from verbal diarrhea,
>> a condition suffered by some the other posters.
>
> What are you insinuating, JC?

I should take that sharge, because I've learned a bit English
verbal behavior only as my 4th language.

There are mental diarrheas, too. -- When I played all the 256
possibilities of my syllogistic wigwam-game (or tp = tii-pii ?)
with 4 figures and 4 moods, I found that only 24 are valid
(5 of those with somewhat fuzzy meanings). Should I say
that there is only max 9% 'logic', the rest being mental diarrhea.

Without logic, effectively all behaviour is ... , well, 'output'.

V.M.
('Big' doesn't imply 'ego', which implies attributes like size.
Bottom-up = 'a posteriori'. Top-down = 'a priori'. <Kant.)


From: Vesa Monisto on
V.M. wrote:
> 'Big' doesn't imply 'ego', which implies attributes like size.
> Bottom-up = 'a posteriori'. Top-down = 'a priori'. < Kant.

I found a page of Kant to support those identities. A translation:

'The reason is that we are wholly ignorant of the manner
in which the supreme Architect acts and of His ideas,
in which the principles of the possibility of the natural beings
are supposed to be contained, and so cannot explain nature
from Him by moving from above downwards, that is a priori.
On the other hand, our explanation would be simply tautological
if, relying on the finality found, as we believe, in the forms of
the objects of experience, we should set out from these forms
and move from below upwards, that is a posteriori, and with
a view to explaining such finality should appeal to a cause
acting in accordance with ends.'

The original text is found in Kant's third critique part II:
"Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft" � 78 (17).

"Wenn man uns gleich einraumt: das ein hoechster Architect
die Formen der Natur, so wie sie von je her da sind, unmittelbar
geschaffen, oder die, welche sich in ihrem Laufe kontinuierlich
nach eben demselben Muster bilden, praedeterminiert habe,
so ist doch dadurch unsere Erkenntnis der Natur nicht im
mindesten gefoerdert; weil wir jenes Wesens Handlungsart und
die Ideen desselben, welche die Prinzipien der Moeglichkeit
der Naturwesen enthalten sollen, gar nicht kennen,
und von demselben als von oben herab (a priori) die Natur
nicht erklaeren koennen. Wollen wir aber von den Formen
der Gegenstaende der Erfahrung, also von unten hinauf
(a posteriori), weil wir in diesen Zweckmaessigkeit
anzutreffen glauben, um diese zu erklaeren, uns auf eine nach
Zwecken wirkende Ursache berufen: so wuerden wir ganz
tautologish erklaeren, und die Vernunft mit Worten tauschen, ..."

V.M.