From: terryc on
On Mon, 31 May 2010 12:53:06 -0400, Roy Smith wrote:

> In article <slrni07k41.ecr.news(a)jonsolberg.se>,
> Jon Solberg <news(a)jonsolberg.nospam.se> wrote:
>
>> historically there has existed buggy implementations of SSH susceptible
>> of password sniffing and some of these are still around. Although
>> running against a reasonably modern client-servers pair (SSH v.2)
>> should be safe, keys are still a good thing.
>
> To expand on Jon's statement, note that to find a pre-v.2
> implementation, you need to set the controls on the way-back machine to
> something like 15 years ago.

Blink, less that five years ago. One of the bigger linux distros and all
derivatives had it.
From: Joe Pfeiffer on
terryc <newsninespam-spam(a)woa.com.au> writes:

> On Mon, 31 May 2010 12:53:06 -0400, Roy Smith wrote:
>
>> In article <slrni07k41.ecr.news(a)jonsolberg.se>,
>> Jon Solberg <news(a)jonsolberg.nospam.se> wrote:
>>
>>> historically there has existed buggy implementations of SSH susceptible
>>> of password sniffing and some of these are still around. Although
>>> running against a reasonably modern client-servers pair (SSH v.2)
>>> should be safe, keys are still a good thing.
>>
>> To expand on Jon's statement, note that to find a pre-v.2
>> implementation, you need to set the controls on the way-back machine to
>> something like 15 years ago.
>
> Blink, less that five years ago. One of the bigger linux distros and all
> derivatives had it.

Just in case somebody doesn't know who you're referring to: debian.
--
As we enjoy great advantages from the inventions of others, we should
be glad of an opportunity to serve others by any invention of ours;
and this we should do freely and generously. (Benjamin Franklin)
From: Maxwell Lol on
Joe Pfeiffer <pfeiffer(a)cs.nmsu.edu> writes:

> terryc <newsninespam-spam(a)woa.com.au> writes:
>
>> On Mon, 31 May 2010 12:53:06 -0400, Roy Smith wrote:
>>
>>> In article <slrni07k41.ecr.news(a)jonsolberg.se>,
>>> Jon Solberg <news(a)jonsolberg.nospam.se> wrote:
>>>
>>>> historically there has existed buggy implementations of SSH susceptible
>>>> of password sniffing and some of these are still around. Although
>>>> running against a reasonably modern client-servers pair (SSH v.2)
>>>> should be safe, keys are still a good thing.
>>>
>>> To expand on Jon's statement, note that to find a pre-v.2
>>> implementation, you need to set the controls on the way-back machine to
>>> something like 15 years ago.
>>
>> Blink, less that five years ago. One of the bigger linux distros and all
>> derivatives had it.
>
> Just in case somebody doesn't know who you're referring to: debian.


But that was a case of weak ssh keys, right? It was not vulnerable to
sniffing. Just brute force password cracking, except that the brute
wasn't so brute - but a marshmellow.

i.e. the PROTOCOL wasn't flawed. Just the random number generator used
to generate unique keys.
From: Joe Pfeiffer on
Maxwell Lol <nospam(a)com.invalid> writes:

> Joe Pfeiffer <pfeiffer(a)cs.nmsu.edu> writes:
>
>> terryc <newsninespam-spam(a)woa.com.au> writes:
>>
>>> On Mon, 31 May 2010 12:53:06 -0400, Roy Smith wrote:
>>>
>>>> In article <slrni07k41.ecr.news(a)jonsolberg.se>,
>>>> Jon Solberg <news(a)jonsolberg.nospam.se> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> historically there has existed buggy implementations of SSH susceptible
>>>>> of password sniffing and some of these are still around. Although
>>>>> running against a reasonably modern client-servers pair (SSH v.2)
>>>>> should be safe, keys are still a good thing.
>>>>
>>>> To expand on Jon's statement, note that to find a pre-v.2
>>>> implementation, you need to set the controls on the way-back machine to
>>>> something like 15 years ago.
>>>
>>> Blink, less that five years ago. One of the bigger linux distros and all
>>> derivatives had it.
>>
>> Just in case somebody doesn't know who you're referring to: debian.
>
>
> But that was a case of weak ssh keys, right? It was not vulnerable to
> sniffing. Just brute force password cracking, except that the brute
> wasn't so brute - but a marshmellow.
>
> i.e. the PROTOCOL wasn't flawed. Just the random number generator used
> to generate unique keys.
Correct.
--
As we enjoy great advantages from the inventions of others, we should
be glad of an opportunity to serve others by any invention of ours;
and this we should do freely and generously. (Benjamin Franklin)
From: terryc on
On Tue, 01 Jun 2010 07:46:50 -0600, Joe Pfeiffer wrote:

> Maxwell Lol <nospam(a)com.invalid> writes:
>
>> Joe Pfeiffer <pfeiffer(a)cs.nmsu.edu> writes:
>>
>>> terryc <newsninespam-spam(a)woa.com.au> writes:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, 31 May 2010 12:53:06 -0400, Roy Smith wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> In article <slrni07k41.ecr.news(a)jonsolberg.se>,
>>>>> Jon Solberg <news(a)jonsolberg.nospam.se> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> historically there has existed buggy implementations of SSH
>>>>>> susceptible of password sniffing and some of these are still
>>>>>> around. Although running against a reasonably modern client-servers
>>>>>> pair (SSH v.2) should be safe, keys are still a good thing.
>>>>>
>>>>> To expand on Jon's statement, note that to find a pre-v.2
>>>>> implementation, you need to set the controls on the way-back machine
>>>>> to something like 15 years ago.
>>>>
>>>> Blink, less that five years ago. One of the bigger linux distros and
>>>> all derivatives had it.
>>>
>>> Just in case somebody doesn't know who you're referring to: debian.
>>
>>
>> But that was a case of weak ssh keys, right? It was not vulnerable to
>> sniffing. Just brute force password cracking, except that the brute
>> wasn't so brute - but a marshmellow.
>>
>> i.e. the PROTOCOL wasn't flawed. Just the random number generator used
>> to generate unique keys.
> Correct.

Gee, that is a desperate hair split. The protocol, like many, was weak
and vulnerable, if it was implemented incorrectly. The GFC and S&P anyone?