What is the difference between a value judgment and a fact (descriptionvs prescription)
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From: jigo on 16 Jul 2010 19:43 Daniel T. wrote: > Immortalista <extropy1(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > >> I see many people try and disguise a value judgment as some sort of >> fact or just a value free description. How can one tell when someone >> is explaining some facts or just trying you to get interested in what >> he or she likes? You know, how some people insist that it is factual >> that certain kinds of music is better than others. >> >> Value judgements include >> statements about what is >> good and what people >> ought to do. >> >> They contrast with statements >> of fact, whose acceptance >> does not (necessarily) >> entail action. >> >> 'It is raining' is merely factual. 'You ought not to hit that child' >> implies a value judgement. One way of putting this is that value >> statements are prescriptive, not purely descriptive (Hare 1963). >> >> Another terminology is that; >> >> value statements are practical, >> while purely factual statements >> are theoretical (Quinton 1973). >> >> Programs of the brain. >> J. Z. Young 1978 >> http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0198575459/ > > What about "that smells nice" and "that smells bad"? > > It turns out that these are not value judgments at all, they are > statements of fact. (http://www.pnas.org/content/97/20/10712.full) > > Who's to say how many more of these so-called value judgements will fall > to science? Smelling nice or bad are questions of fact depending on the characteristics of the smeller. That is subjective but still has a factual answer; it's different in kind from questions of "should."
From: jigo on 17 Jul 2010 00:54 Daniel T. wrote: > jigo <retired(a)home.com> wrote: >> Daniel T. wrote: >>> Immortalista <extropy1(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> I see many people try and disguise a value judgment as some sort >>>> of fact or just a value free description. How can one tell when >>>> someone is explaining some facts or just trying you to get >>>> interested in what he or she likes? You know, how some people >>>> insist that it is factual that certain kinds of music is better >>>> than others. >>>> >>>> Value judgements include statements about what is good and what >>>> people ought to do. >>>> >>>> They contrast with statements of fact, whose acceptance does not >>>> (necessarily) entail action. >>>> >>>> 'It is raining' is merely factual. 'You ought not to hit that >>>> child' implies a value judgement. One way of putting this is that >>>> value statements are prescriptive, not purely descriptive (Hare >>>> 1963). >>>> >>>> Another terminology is that; >>>> >>>> value statements are practical, while purely factual statements >>>> are theoretical (Quinton 1973). >>>> >>>> Programs of the brain. J. Z. Young 1978 >>>> http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0198575459/ >>> What about "that smells nice" and "that smells bad"? >>> >>> It turns out that these are not value judgments at all, they are >>> statements of fact. (http://www.pnas.org/content/97/20/10712.full) >>> >>> Who's to say how many more of these so-called value judgements will >>> fall to science? >> Smelling nice or bad are questions of fact depending on the >> characteristics of the smeller. That is subjective but still has a >> factual answer; it's different in kind from questions of "should." > > "Should" assumes a goal, given a particular goal, it is generally quite > objective as to what actions will further that goal and what actions > will not. True, but choosing a goal involves a value judgment--why *should* that particular goal be chosen. Now there are a lot of reasonable goals (like trying to preserve one's life), but they still can't be established in the same way that we verify facts.
From: jigo on 17 Jul 2010 11:33
Daniel T. wrote: > jigo <retired(a)home.com> wrote: >> Daniel T. wrote: >> >>> "Should" assumes a goal, given a particular goal, it is generally quite >>> objective as to what actions will further that goal and what actions >>> will not. >> True, but choosing a goal involves a value judgment--why *should* that >> particular goal be chosen. Now there are a lot of reasonable goals (like >> trying to preserve one's life), but they still can't be established in >> the same way that we verify facts. > > Your just adding a level of indirection to the goal seeking. The goal of > determining which goal should be chosen is also a goal, and as I said it > is generally quite objective as to what actions will further that goal > and what actions will not. Of course, because of the extra level of > indirection, the objectiveness will be correspondingly less direct. The point is that choosing a goal inherently involves a value judgment--a "should." If you're claiming that it does not, show how you could verify the choice of goal as true or false in the way we verify facts. |