From: Daniel T. on
BOfL <bigfletch8(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> "Daniel T." <danie...(a)earthlink.net> wrote:
> > Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > I see many people try and disguise a value judgment as some sort
> > > of fact or just a value free description. How can one tell when
> > > someone is explaining some facts or just trying you to get
> > > interested in what he or she likes? You know, how some people
> > > insist that it is factual that certain kinds of music is better
> > > than others.
> >
> > > �Value judgements include �statements about what is �good and what
> > > people �ought to do.
> >
> > > �They contrast with statements �of fact, whose acceptance �does
> > > not (necessarily) �entail action.
> >
> > > 'It is raining' is merely factual. 'You ought not to hit that
> > > child' implies a value judgement. One way of putting this is that
> > > value statements are prescriptive, not purely descriptive (Hare
> > > 1963).
> >
> > > Another terminology is that;
> >
> > > �value statements are practical, �while purely factual statements
> > > �are theoretical (Quinton 1973).
> >
> > > Programs of the brain. J. Z. Young 1978
> > > http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0198575459/
> >
> > What about "that smells nice" and "that smells bad"?
> >
> > It turns out that these are not value judgments at all, they are
> > statements of fact. (http://www.pnas.org/content/97/20/10712.full)
> >
> > Who's to say how many more of these so-called value judgements will
> > fall to science?
>
> Scince can identify a reaction, but never a subjective
> interpretation... ie 'nice'.

You mean reactions such as the subject saying, "that smells nice"?
From: Daniel T. on
jigo <retired(a)home.com> wrote:
> Daniel T. wrote:
>
> > "Should" assumes a goal, given a particular goal, it is generally quite
> > objective as to what actions will further that goal and what actions
> > will not.
>
> True, but choosing a goal involves a value judgment--why *should* that
> particular goal be chosen. Now there are a lot of reasonable goals (like
> trying to preserve one's life), but they still can't be established in
> the same way that we verify facts.

Your just adding a level of indirection to the goal seeking. The goal of
determining which goal should be chosen is also a goal, and as I said it
is generally quite objective as to what actions will further that goal
and what actions will not. Of course, because of the extra level of
indirection, the objectiveness will be correspondingly less direct.
From: Daniel T. on
jigo <retired(a)home.com> wrote:
> Daniel T. wrote:
> > jigo <retired(a)home.com> wrote:
> > > Daniel T. wrote:
> > >
> > > > "Should" assumes a goal, given a particular goal, it is
> > > > generally quite objective as to what actions will further that
> > > > goal and what actions will not.
> > >
> > > True, but choosing a goal involves a value judgment--why *should*
> > > that particular goal be chosen. Now there are a lot of reasonable
> > > goals (like trying to preserve one's life), but they still can't
> > > be established in the same way that we verify facts.
> >
> > Your just adding a level of indirection to the goal seeking. The
> > goal of determining which goal should be chosen is also a goal, and
> > as I said it is generally quite objective as to what actions will
> > further that goal and what actions will not. Of course, because of
> > the extra level of indirection, the objectiveness will be
> > correspondingly less direct.
>
> The point is that choosing a goal inherently involves a value
> judgment--a "should." If you're claiming that it does not, show how
> you could verify the choice of goal as true or false in the way we
> verify facts.

Choosing requires a goal. The "choice of a goal" cannot be made unless
you have a goal (a "meta-goal") in mind. It's goals all the way up, so
to speak.