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From: jigo on 16 Jul 2010 19:43
Daniel T. wrote:
> Immortalista <extropy1(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I see many people try and disguise a value judgment as some sort of
>> fact or just a value free description. How can one tell when someone
>> is explaining some facts or just trying you to get interested in what
>> he or she likes? You know, how some people insist that it is factual
>> that certain kinds of music is better than others.
>>
>> Value judgements include
>> statements about what is
>> good and what people
>> ought to do.
>>
>> They contrast with statements
>> of fact, whose acceptance
>> does not (necessarily)
>> entail action.
>>
>> 'It is raining' is merely factual. 'You ought not to hit that child'
>> implies a value judgement. One way of putting this is that value
>> statements are prescriptive, not purely descriptive (Hare 1963).
>>
>> Another terminology is that;
>>
>> value statements are practical,
>> while purely factual statements
>> are theoretical (Quinton 1973).
>>
>> Programs of the brain.
>> J. Z. Young 1978
>> http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0198575459/
>
> What about "that smells nice" and "that smells bad"?
>
> It turns out that these are not value judgments at all, they are
> statements of fact. (http://www.pnas.org/content/97/20/10712.full)
>
> Who's to say how many more of these so-called value judgements will fall
> to science?

Smelling nice or bad are questions of fact depending on the
characteristics of the smeller. That is subjective but still has a
factual answer; it's different in kind from questions of "should."
From: jigo on 17 Jul 2010 00:54
Daniel T. wrote:
> jigo <retired(a)home.com> wrote:
>> Daniel T. wrote:
>>> Immortalista <extropy1(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I see many people try and disguise a value judgment as some sort
>>>> of fact or just a value free description. How can one tell when
>>>> someone is explaining some facts or just trying you to get
>>>> interested in what he or she likes? You know, how some people
>>>> insist that it is factual that certain kinds of music is better
>>>> than others.
>>>>
>>>> Value judgements include statements about what is good and what
>>>> people ought to do.
>>>>
>>>> They contrast with statements of fact, whose acceptance does not
>>>> (necessarily) entail action.
>>>>
>>>> 'It is raining' is merely factual. 'You ought not to hit that
>>>> child' implies a value judgement. One way of putting this is that
>>>> value statements are prescriptive, not purely descriptive (Hare
>>>> 1963).
>>>>
>>>> Another terminology is that;
>>>>
>>>> value statements are practical, while purely factual statements
>>>> are theoretical (Quinton 1973).
>>>>
>>>> Programs of the brain. J. Z. Young 1978
>>>> http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0198575459/
>>> What about "that smells nice" and "that smells bad"?
>>>
>>> It turns out that these are not value judgments at all, they are
>>> statements of fact. (http://www.pnas.org/content/97/20/10712.full)
>>>
>>> Who's to say how many more of these so-called value judgements will
>>> fall to science?
>> Smelling nice or bad are questions of fact depending on the
>> characteristics of the smeller. That is subjective but still has a
>> factual answer; it's different in kind from questions of "should."
>
> "Should" assumes a goal, given a particular goal, it is generally quite
> objective as to what actions will further that goal and what actions
> will not.

True, but choosing a goal involves a value judgment--why *should* that
particular goal be chosen. Now there are a lot of reasonable goals (like
trying to preserve one's life), but they still can't be established in
the same way that we verify facts.
From: jigo on 17 Jul 2010 11:33
Daniel T. wrote:
> jigo <retired(a)home.com> wrote:
>> Daniel T. wrote:
>>
>>> "Should" assumes a goal, given a particular goal, it is generally quite
>>> objective as to what actions will further that goal and what actions
>>> will not.
>> True, but choosing a goal involves a value judgment--why *should* that
>> particular goal be chosen. Now there are a lot of reasonable goals (like
>> trying to preserve one's life), but they still can't be established in
>> the same way that we verify facts.
>
> Your just adding a level of indirection to the goal seeking. The goal of
> determining which goal should be chosen is also a goal, and as I said it
> is generally quite objective as to what actions will further that goal
> and what actions will not. Of course, because of the extra level of
> indirection, the objectiveness will be correspondingly less direct.

The point is that choosing a goal inherently involves a value
judgment--a "should." If you're claiming that it does not, show how you
could verify the choice of goal as true or false in the way we verify facts.
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