From: byron on 11 Nov 2009 03:57 the fault in godels semantic proof is that he constructs a self referential proposition ie Rq(q) states" I am improvable." many mathematicians and philosophers ponicare russell and wittgenstein etc argue self referential propositions only lead to contradiction and thus must not be used Wittgenstein shows just that ie godels self referential propisition leads to contradiction his semantic proof http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/#WitGodUndMatPro To refute or undermine this proof, Wittgenstein says that if you have proved ¬P, you have proved that P is provable (i.e., since you have proved that it is not the case that P is not provable in Russell's system), and you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable (i.e., P is not provable in Russell's system), since the contradiction is only proved if we use or retain this self-referential interpretation (§8). Thus, Wittgenstein's refutation of Gödel's proof consists in showing that no contradiction arises if we do not interpret P as P is not provable in Russell's systemindeed, without this interpretation, a proof of P does not yield a proof of ¬P and a proof of ¬P does not yield a proof of P. In other words, the mistake in the proof is the mistaken assumption that a mathematical proposition P can be so interpreted that it says: P is not provable in Russell's system. As Wittgenstein says at (§11), [t]hat is what comes of making up such sentences. godels semantic prooof is http://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf We will now prove that the theorem Rq(q) is undecidable within PM. We can understand this by simply plugging in the denitions: Rq(q) , S(q) , q 2 K , :provable(Rq(q)), in other words, Rq(q) states \I am improvable." Assuming the theorem Rq(q) were provable, then it would also be true, i.e. because of (1) :provable(Rq(q)) would be true in contradiction to the assumption. If on the other hand :Rq(q) were provable, then we would have q 62 K, i.e. provable(Rq (q)). That means that both Rq(q) and :Rq(q) would be provable, which again is impossible.The analogy of this conclusion with the Richard- antinomy leaps to the eye; there is also a close kinship with the liar-antinomy, because our undecidable theorem Rq(q) states that q is in K, i.e. according to (1) that Rq(q) is not provable. Hence, we have in front of us a theorem that states its own unprovability. From the remark that Rq(q) states its own improvability it immediately follows that Rq(q) is correct, since Rq(q) is in fact unprovable (because it is undecidable).
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