From: Paul E. Black on 23 Nov 2009 13:54 On Sunday 22 November 2009 13:38, David Bernier wrote: > "seL4: Formal verification of an OS kernel" presented at > Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, > Big Sky, MT, USA, October, 2009 > > ... [PEB] > > < http://ertos.nicta.com.au/research/sel4/ > . > > --- > > Having a secure system/environment has many components: > - no tampering > - trusted sys admins > - users that don't use weak passwords > - an operating system with as few bugs as possible. > > So, could seL4 be harnessed in some way to mitigate cyber-attacks? Yes. Using seL4 may reduce the number of bugs that might be exploitable. Also one can build formally verified components, including an operating system, on a formally verified kernel. A secure system has another components: a comprehensive, enforced security policy. Suppose the above four items were the only guarantees. Say I write a payroll program that needs to (and is authorized to) read a file of social security numbers, which should be kept confidential. Suppose every February 29th it shares those numbers with the world. Clearly a security breach. The OS did what it should. The difficulty is that some applications must enforce some security policies. Can anything be done? The OS might track permissions at a finer grain. For instance, if a program reads the social security number file, it is tagged as "tainted" and no longer allowed to broadcast on the internet. This wouldn't prevent all problems, but it might catch more. > So could someday seL4 and its descendants be used to run Linux > programs? Yes it could. I believe that someday they will. -paul- -- Paul E. Black (p.black(a)acm.org)
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