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From: James H. Markowitz on 12 Feb 2010 14:55 On Fri, 12 Feb 2010 11:27:16 -0800, yawnmoth wrote: > <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-5.1.2> discusses the > decryption primitive for PKCS#1 but it doesn't seem to employ any > blinding. Why not? Probably because blinding is optional. Implementations that leak information when carrying out private key operations, which make them amenable to timing attacks, should do blinding. Those that do not leak such information do not need to do blinding. |