A constant speed of light in all reference frames? Surely you can't be serious.
in [Relativity]
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From: PD on 27 Feb 2010 10:58 On Feb 26, 6:59 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > On 26 Feb, 17:46, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > On Feb 25, 9:42 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > On 25 Feb, 17:15, mpalenik <markpale...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > On Feb 24, 10:22 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > I'm afraid I don't accept that this captures the certainty that many > > > > > people have in various scientific theories. I've just responded to > > > > > Mark who said that a theory with a 95% confidence should be accepted > > > > > universally by all > > > > > I said I'm done with this conversation, but I'm not going to let you > > > > misquote me, you pathetic idiot. > > > > > I said "it should be accepted by all as HAVING A 95% CHANCE OF BEING > > > > TRUE". I did not say it should be accepted as being true. I said it > > > > should be accepted that THERE IS A 95% CHANCE THAT IT IS TRUE BY > > > > EVERYONE. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE. I REPEAT, I DID NOT SAY IT SHOULD > > > > BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE--IT SHOULD ONLY BE ACCEPTED THAT THERE IS A 95% > > > > CHANCE THAT IT IS TRUE. > > > > > If you are so mentally degenerate that you can't understand the > > > > difference, then it makes me wonder how you can make it through your > > > > every day life, you moronic imbicile. > > > > > Once again, I will not discuss anything with you, but I sure as hell > > > > am going to call you on it if you make retarded inferences about > > > > things that I've said and then try to pass that off as my viewpoint.. > > > > Calm down. I see that perhaps I did explicitly misquote you, although > > > I'm not sure the inferences were so wrong. > > > > If people accept that a particular theory has a 95% confidence, then > > > what are you saying they should do as a result? Do you think they > > > should devote just 95% of their time to that theory? 100% of their > > > time? Some other percentage? > > > > And aside from what you think they should do, what do you think they > > > *actually* do? > > > There's a variety of things one can do (and are done). > > 1) Explore other candidates, though at a level that is commensurate > > with risk-benefit analysis of the effort involved. > > 2) Continue to do other tests of this model vs other models to see > > where the 5% might lead (to either opening it up to 40% or closing it > > to 98%, say) > > 3) Let the community by itself determine organically which volunteers > > from the community will plumb the 5% doubt. > > 4) Design a bunch of devices that are based on a 95% assurance that > > the principles of that model are correct, again weighing risk vs > > benefit on the chance this is a mistake. > > That's fair enough in abstract. But the question is still who pursues > which avenue, and what subjective perception they have of the > likelihood of a particular theory being correct. Yes, and that is done by self-selection. In the community of scientists, the presumption is that open questions will be addressed by someone eventually. And there is reward in the community for that adventurism. The assessment of the risk vs benefit of the adventurism is made individually. > > After all, it's alight for scientists to pay lip service to doubt when > questioned strenuously. But what of their day-to-day conduct? Their day-to-day conduct is displayed in their output. That is, published papers, conference presentations, correspondence, and so on. The diversity of effort is much broader than what you believe, I fear. > And what > are their views of scientists who explore other avenues than > themselves? Usually, "go for it". Why?
From: PD on 27 Feb 2010 11:10 On Feb 26, 7:15 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > On 26 Feb, 18:14, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Feb 25, 10:47 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > You have then questioned why you should adopt the scientific metric > > for "working". And the answer is, you don't have to. It's just that > > when you decline, you're no longer doing science. > > But this lends credibility to my assertion in the first place, which > is that science is a religion. No more than the practice of law, medicine, music, architecture, or plumbing, as we've discussed. You've said those are different because the stakes are somehow higher with science. I also disputed that. Science works on what the scientific method is good for producing. Architecture does the same thing. Just because there is an agreed-upon methodology by the collective that practices in the discipline does not warrant that discipline being called a religion, at least as I understand the meaning of "religion". > > > > Indeed, you have utterly failed to point out any contradiction yet, > > > all you have done is constrain the behaviour of gravity tighter than > > > what is otherwise possible in the conceptual understanding that I > > > have, and as such amounts to "added detail" and leads to further > > > accuracy, rather than requiring a fundamental conceptual overhaul. > > > I *have* pointed out the contradiction. Gravity that falls off > > linearly with distance is incompatible with elliptical orbits. What is > > true is that I have not demonstrated this enough to you that your are > > convinced that it is a contradiction. That is different. That is a > > *teaching* task. I don't know that I owe it to you to *convince* you > > of anything, though I may be inclined to point to a fact or two that > > might spur YOUR OWN investigation into why that statement is true. > > I'm afraid I don't accept this Paul. It's not a contradiction, because > my model didn't make any firm statement in the first place as to the > quantity of fall-off. Hedging your bets? There is a difference between saying, "My model says there is a fall-off but isn't certain what the fall-off is" and, "My model is perfectly consistent with a linear fall-off". The former statement is correct but renders the model useless because it provides practically no information other than what could be painted on a comic- strip panel. The latter statement makes a stronger claim but leads immediately to a contradiction. Your choice, then. Either a statement that is so vague that is useless but unfalsifiable, or a statement that is testable and wrong. > The claim it made was that gravity does fall off > with distance, and you have not contradicted this - in fact, you have > spectacularly supported this claim. > > > And the cosmos is made of earth, air, fire, and water, which certainly > > seems to be true, but is hardly useful. Even though it may make > > perfect and plain sense to somebody as a mental picture of the cosmos. > > It may have been useful at the time, as a basic analysis and a > springboard for further investigation. The fact that it is not useful > in retrospect is a function of the degree to which science has > advanced since then. > > > > > And that's a case of constraining the observation to ONE experiment.. > > > > The two models of the nature of the coin would have other > > > > implications, OTHER THAN just continuing the coin-toss experiment, > > > > that would lead to a clearer experimental distinction. The coin-toss > > > > experiment is experiment E1 that does not clearly distinguish between > > > > models B and C. So? Now you have to find the place where they make > > > > clearly distinguishable predictions, and design an experiment E2 that > > > > will make that discrimination. > > > > Sometimes that's just not possible. Particularly if the only way the > > > coin can be tested is by tossing. > > > I'm sorry, but it's the object of science to FIND the other ways to > > test a claim. > > But you've got to accept that sometimes there may be no other > realistic way of testing. WHY? > There's no point just saying "well science > must find a way", because in some cases either theory or material > circumstances may simply rule out any other kind of test. No so far. > > > That is how the progress is made. I simply refuse to > > submit to your hypothetical situation where you say, "How does science > > discern between two theories when the only information it has > > available doesn't discern between the two theories?" It DOESN'T. It > > goes and finds the information that DOES discern the two. > > As above. > > > > > > > > One example is the lip-service paid to doubt and uncertainty, whereas > > > > > I can give you Mark who holds that a theory with 95% confidence should > > > > > not just be accepted by most people, but all people. > > > > > I don't hold the same conviction about this that he does. People > > > > CHOOSE what they believe and they CHOOSE the methods by which they > > > > become convinced of what they should believe. If you CHOOSE NOT to > > > > adopt the scientific method, that's your prerogative, but it just > > > > marks what you DO choose to do instead as something other than > > > > science. Poetry perhaps. > > > > There are many interesting answers in asking what causes a choice. But > > > besides that, I think your definition of the scientific method is > > > completely wrong. As Kuhn puts it (I was just flicking through the > > > book again), the scientific method has only "pedagogic utility" and > > > "abstract plausibility". > > > And now you presume that Kuhn's position is either authoritative, or > > that scientists would endorse it. > > No, I'm simply having to draw on authority to rebut your just-so > statements about the views of physicists collectively, which indeed is > the very argument you invoke again, by implicitly saying "ah, well > physicists reject Kuhn's view of science...". And here we arrive at an impasse, wherein I say that science is what the practitioners of science say it is, and you say that science is what an outside sociologist of scientists says it is. At this point, I see no point in belaboring it. It is a difference in choice of authority, and that is a personal decision just as much as CHOOSING to believe in the value of the scientific method is. Now that we've concluded that portion of the discussion, I'm wondering whether you are interested in learning anything about what *science* says about nature, and in particular how *science* can explain the relativistic aspects of nature, as investigated by science? After all, you came here asking questions about how any of that could make any sense. And it was plain that you came to this group to ask *scientists* that question when you could not find a satisfying answer in the poorly selected materials you had availed yourself of. I see no value in you asking *scientists* for an explanation, when you offer the preamble that, fundamentally, you don't trust what scientists would have to say on the matter. PD
From: bert on 27 Feb 2010 11:50 On Feb 13, 1:32 pm, Sam Wormley <sworml...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On 2/13/10 11:23 AM, bert wrote: > > > > > Photons if ever slowed begs this question What energy brings them back > > to c? > > Photons ONLY exist propagating at c, Herb! Right you are Sam They never change speed or bounce. TreBert
From: Paul Stowe on 27 Feb 2010 14:28 On Feb 26, 11:06 pm, eric gisse <jowr.pi.nos...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > PaulStowewrote: > > [...] > > > > > The very same ones as Lorentz's as Tom Roberts explained... So, given > > that LET and SR have the very same collection of equations and > > consequences, what's the difference between them? > > Lorentz invariance. That phase says it all. It's not the Einstein transform or Einstein invariance is it? One wonders why :) > Why do you still talk about LET as if it were relevant? > > [...] Perhaps because it is... Rude obnoxious comments will not be responded to. Paul Stowe
From: Tom Roberts on 27 Feb 2010 21:30
Paul Stowe wrote: > On Feb 26, 11:06 pm, eric gisse <jowr.pi.nos...(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> PaulStowewrote: >>> LET and SR have the very same collection of equations and >>> consequences, what's the difference between them? >> Lorentz invariance. > > That phase says it all. It's not the Einstein transform or Einstein > invariance is it? One wonders why :) No need to wonder, just study a bit of the history. IMHO "Poincar� invariance" is a better name for this -- Lorentz first published the restricted set of transforms, but Poincar� first published the complete set and proved they form a group (invariance necessarily applies to a group, which is why I call them Lorentz transforms but Poincar� invariance). The irony, of course, is that the theory with Lorentz's name in its title does NOT have Lorentz invariance (it has it only for observables, not the fundamental constituents of the theory). Tom Roberts |