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From: Lester Zick on 2 Sep 2006 13:48 On 1 Sep 2006 16:22:42 -0700, "Randy Poe" <poespam-trap(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >Lester Zick wrote: >> On 1 Sep 2006 12:21:38 -0700, "Randy Poe" <poespam-trap(a)yahoo.com> >> wrote: >> >Consider the example given above. It constitutes a >> >definition of the phrase "John Doe" within the context >> >of some legal process (let's say a trial). Are you prepared >> >to declare that statement as true or false? >> >> I'm not prepared to deal with predicate combinations which are not >> true, false, or ambiguous. > >You mean there are statements which have no truth value? I mean there are statements which are true, false, or ambiguous. >And yet when we say a "definition" is a statement which has >no truth value, you say there's no such thing. Can't tell what you imagine that means. >Strange... Surpassing strange indeed. >One might almost conclude that Zick doesn't have any >clue what he himself is saying from one post to the next... What I'm not saying is that definitions in modern mathspeak are true. Neither are you. ~v~~
From: Lester Zick on 2 Sep 2006 13:51 On Fri, 01 Sep 2006 17:54:13 -0600, Virgil <virgil(a)comcast.net> wrote: >In article <36chf2h05iio4drhfnla6i81agqkn6ns9r(a)4ax.com>, > Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net> wrote: > >> On 1 Sep 2006 12:21:38 -0700, "Randy Poe" <poespam-trap(a)yahoo.com> >> wrote: > >> >> >Consider the example given above. It constitutes a >> >definition of the phrase "John Doe" within the context >> >of some legal process (let's say a trial). Are you prepared >> >to declare that statement as true or false? >> >> I'm not prepared to deal with predicate combinations which are not >> true, false, or ambiguous. > >Which means that Zick is only prepared to deal with declarative >sentences, but not questions, exclamations, commands, requests, and a >whole host of other forms other that declarative sentences. What Zick actually means is that he is fully prepared to deal with statements which are true, false, or ambiguous and that you are not. >> >Compare that to: "The defendant's name is John Doe." >> >Do you agree that the defendant has a name, and that >> >there are only two possibilities, that the name is John Doe >> >or that it is not? >> >> This has exactly what bearing on my observation? > >If Zick declares himself unprepared to deal with questions, as he has >done, what right does he think he has to ask them? And what right do you think you have to deal with statements which are true, false, or ambiguous? >> >Is it really "obvious" to you that "Let's call the defendant >> >John Doe" must be either true or false? >> >> It's really obvious to me that you have no conception what you're >> trying to reply to. > >"What" he is trying to reply to is apparently unqualified to be referred >to as "whom", which makes "Lester Zick" a non-person, perhaps a 'bot, >but of no real consequence. Just of considerably more consequence than yourself fortunately. ~v~~
From: Lester Zick on 2 Sep 2006 13:55 On 1 Sep 2006 19:00:18 -0700, "Randy Poe" <poespam-trap(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >Lester Zick wrote: >> On 1 Sep 2006 12:21:38 -0700, "Randy Poe" <poespam-trap(a)yahoo.com> >> wrote: >> >> > >> >Lester Zick wrote: >> >> On Fri, 01 Sep 2006 09:49:03 +0300, Aatu Koskensilta >> >> <aatu.koskensilta(a)xortec.fi> wrote: >> >> >> >> >Lester Zick wrote: >> >> >> On 31 Aug 2006 10:54:03 -0700, "MoeBlee" <jazzmobe(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> schoenfeld.one(a)gmail.com wrote: >> >> >>>> Definitions can be false too (i.e. "Let x be an even odd"). >> >> >>> That's not a definition. That's just a rendering of an open formula >> >> >>> whose existential closure is not a member of such theories as PA. >> >> >> >> >> >> Which really clears things up for us, Moe. >> >> > >> >> >MoeBlee's answer might be considered somewhat more obfuscated than >> >> >necessary. We can rephrase it without reference to all this formal stuff >> >> >and simply say that "let x be an even odd" is not a definition, it's >> >> >just a shorter version "let x be a natural number and further assume >> >> >that x is both even and odd" which is neither a proposition nor a >> >> >definition. It's probably the beginning of a - relatively boring! - >> >> >proof in which it is established that there is no natural that is both >> >> >even and odd. >> >> > >> >> >Definitions in mathematics often appear in the following forms >> >> > >> >> > "An X such that P will be called a Q" >> >> > "By a X we mean a Y" >> >> > "When P(X,Y) we often say that X glurbles Y" >> >> > ... >> >> > >> >> >One might quibble and say that a definition of that kind might be false >> >> >if in fact no one will call an X such that P a Q; or if, in fact, the >> >> >devious author doesn't really mean a Y by X; or if "we" will not, in >> >> >fact, often say that X glurbles Y when P(X,Y); and so forth. However, >> >> >such objections ignore the role claims such as above have in >> >> >mathematical language, acting as they do essentially as stipulations, >> >> >analogously as one might say "let's call whoever it was who committed >> >> >this heinous crime 'John Doe'". >> >> >> >> Is a stipulation a statement? Is a definition a statement? Is a >> >> theorem a statement? Then my question remains as to what the >> >> difference is between or among statements such that one can be true or >> >> false and others not? Obviously the answer is that there is no such >> >> difference. >> > >> >"Obviously"? >> >> Obviously. >> >> >Consider the example given above. It constitutes a >> >definition of the phrase "John Doe" within the context >> >of some legal process (let's say a trial). Are you prepared >> >to declare that statement as true or false? >> >> I'm not prepared to deal with predicate combinations which are not >> true, false, or ambiguous. >> >> >Compare that to: "The defendant's name is John Doe." >> >Do you agree that the defendant has a name, and that >> >there are only two possibilities, that the name is John Doe >> >or that it is not? >> >> This has exactly what bearing on my observation? > >Let's walk through this again slowly. No, no, let's not even crawl slowly through it again. I didn't ask you to repeat yourself. I asked what your claim had to do with my observation? Can you answer that question or not? >You claim that there is no difference ("obviously") between >definitions and factual propositions which can be either true >or false. > >Then I offer a definition, and a factual proposition. > >And you ask what this has to do with the discussion of the >difference between definitions and factual propositions. > >You know, I'm just going to leave that as an exercise to you... >what could an example of a declaration and a factual proposition >have to do with a discussion of the difference between >declarations and factual propositions? Hmmm, think, think, >think... And once more just as soon as you get out of the repetition mode I ask what any of this has to do with my observation? ~v~~
From: Lester Zick on 2 Sep 2006 13:57 On Fri, 01 Sep 2006 17:06:06 -0600, Virgil <virgil(a)comcast.net> wrote: >In article <eh0hf29bmf3ggmteptu3ofe6mkpq8rsp4e(a)4ax.com>, > Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net> wrote: > >> On Fri, 01 Sep 2006 09:49:03 +0300, Aatu Koskensilta >> <aatu.koskensilta(a)xortec.fi> wrote: >> >> >Lester Zick wrote: >> >> On 31 Aug 2006 10:54:03 -0700, "MoeBlee" <jazzmobe(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >>> schoenfeld.one(a)gmail.com wrote: >> >>>> Definitions can be false too (i.e. "Let x be an even odd"). >> >>> That's not a definition. That's just a rendering of an open formula >> >>> whose existential closure is not a member of such theories as PA. >> >> >> >> Which really clears things up for us, Moe. >> > >> >MoeBlee's answer might be considered somewhat more obfuscated than >> >necessary. We can rephrase it without reference to all this formal stuff >> >and simply say that "let x be an even odd" is not a definition, it's >> >just a shorter version "let x be a natural number and further assume >> >that x is both even and odd" which is neither a proposition nor a >> >definition. It's probably the beginning of a - relatively boring! - >> >proof in which it is established that there is no natural that is both >> >even and odd. >> > >> >Definitions in mathematics often appear in the following forms >> > >> > "An X such that P will be called a Q" >> > "By a X we mean a Y" >> > "When P(X,Y) we often say that X glurbles Y" >> > ... >> > >> >One might quibble and say that a definition of that kind might be false >> >if in fact no one will call an X such that P a Q; or if, in fact, the >> >devious author doesn't really mean a Y by X; or if "we" will not, in >> >fact, often say that X glurbles Y when P(X,Y); and so forth. However, >> >such objections ignore the role claims such as above have in >> >mathematical language, acting as they do essentially as stipulations, >> >analogously as one might say "let's call whoever it was who committed >> >this heinous crime 'John Doe'". >> >> Is a stipulation a statement? Is a definition a statement? Is a >> theorem a statement? Then my question remains as to what the >> difference is between or among statements such that one can be true or >> false and others not? Obviously the answer is that there is no such >> difference. > >And like many simple and obvious answers, it is wrong. > >If it were not wrong, even someone like Zick could come up with ways of >determining whether an excalmation was true or false or whether a >request was, or whether a question was. > >Until Zick can come up with a reasonable set of rules for determining >the truth or falsity of "Ouch!" and "Wake up!" and "Are we there yet?", >he has no case. So your answer is what? That stipulations are not statements or that definitions are not statements or that theorems are not statements or what exactly? ~v~~
From: Lester Zick on 2 Sep 2006 13:58
On Fri, 01 Sep 2006 19:25:11 -0400, "Jesse F. Hughes" <jesse(a)phiwumbda.org> wrote: >Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net> writes: > >> On Fri, 01 Sep 2006 11:53:20 -0400, "Jesse F. Hughes" >> <jesse(a)phiwumbda.org> wrote: >> >>>Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn(a)DTO.TUDelft.NL> writes: >>> >>>> Jesse F. Hughes wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought you "checked this with the axioms of arithmetic". How >>>>> could you do that if you have no idea what the axioms are? >>>> >>>> Oh, come on, Jesse! I checked this with arithmetic. Arithmetic is based >>>> upon axioms. So I checked it with the axioms of arithmetic. No ? >>> >>>No. >> >> So now conclusions of arithmetic are not even not demonstrably >> inconsistent with the axioms of arithmetic? > >Huh? Huh? Yourself. >Well, whatever your point might be, "checked it with the axioms" means >actually, you know, checking it. With the axioms. Han didn't do >that. So the conclusions of arithmetic haven't been checked with the axioms of arithmetic? Curiouser and curioser. ~v~~ |