From: HawkLogic on
On Feb 9, 12:21 pm, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
wrote:
> HawkLogic wrote:
>
> > Observations:
> > A. There is at least one method (Godel) of generating self-referential
> > statements in first-order logic.
>
> "Traditional" Godelization uses some number theory.  In set theory one
> can use sets to code syntactic objects.  But FOL?  Surely that's too
> restrictive?
>
> > [...]
> > D. There are informal methods of self-reference that can prove any
> > statement (Smullyan, et al).
>
> Eh?
>
Godel defined his own system P from the logic of Principia Mathematica
and the first-order Peano axioms of arithmetic.
Use that.

Set A = {
{ 1. Both statements in this set are false,
2. Godel created a mess. }

If 1 is true then both are false, therefore, 1 is not true.
If 1 is false then at least one statement is true, therefore 2 is true.
From: HawkLogic on
On Feb 9, 12:21 pm, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
wrote:
> HawkLogic wrote:
>
> > Observations:
> > A. There is at least one method (Godel) of generating self-referential
> > statements in first-order logic.
>
> "Traditional" Godelization uses some number theory.  In set theory one
> can use sets to code syntactic objects.  But FOL?  Surely that's too
> restrictive?
>
> > [...]
> > D. There are informal methods of self-reference that can prove any
> > statement (Smullyan, et al).
>
> Eh?
Godel defined his own system P from the logic of Principia Mathematica
and the first-order Peano axioms of arithmetic.
Use that.

Set A =
{ 1. Both statements in this set are false,
2. Godel created a mess. }

If 1 is true then both are false, therefore, 1 is not true.
If 1 is false then at least one statement is true, therefore 2 is true.
From: Frederick Williams on
HawkLogic wrote:
>
> On Feb 9, 12:21 pm, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
> wrote:
> > HawkLogic wrote:
> >
> > > Observations:
> > > A. There is at least one method (Godel) of generating self-referential
> > > statements in first-order logic.
> >
> > "Traditional" Godelization uses some number theory. In set theory one
> > can use sets to code syntactic objects. But FOL? Surely that's too
> > restrictive?
> >
> > > [...]
> > > D. There are informal methods of self-reference that can prove any
> > > statement (Smullyan, et al).
> >
> > Eh?
> Godel defined his own system P from the logic of Principia Mathematica
> and the first-order Peano axioms of arithmetic.
> Use that.
>
> Set A =
> { 1. Both statements in this set are false,
> 2. Godel created a mess. }
>
> If 1 is true then both are false, therefore, 1 is not true.
> If 1 is false then at least one statement is true, therefore 2 is true.

Once is enough :-)

You (or Smullyan or someone) are assuming that 1. is a statement S
subject to

if S is not true then S is false

but some (Russell for example) would maintain that 1. is not well-formed
and has no truth value.

--
.... A lamprophyre containing small phenocrysts of olivine and
augite, and usually also biotite or an amphibole, in a glassy
groundmass containing analcime.
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
HawkLogic <hawklogic(a)gmail.com> writes:

> Is there?

Is there what? Your observations and conclusions are just vague
waffle. In particular, what does the conclusion

2. There are formal methods of self-reference that can prove any
statement.

mean and how is it supposed to be derived from your peculiar
observations?

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Frederick Williams on
HawkLogic wrote:

> 3. There may be false statements in first-order logic which have been
> proven true.

May there? Do you have an example?

--
.... A lamprophyre containing small phenocrysts of olivine and
augite, and usually also biotite or an amphibole, in a glassy
groundmass containing analcime.