Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
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From: Zinnic on 30 Dec 2009 14:14 On Dec 29, 5:40 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 29, 5:04 pm, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote: > > > Now, let's get back to business. > > Which should be the business of those who claim an inductive form of > argument showing exactly what this form is or at the least explaining > what is inductive about all arguments that are not deductive. Apart > from that they are merely non deductive. I know you did not refer to me in this post, but I feel so left out that I cannot resist commenting! Explain (dear kind philosophy teacher) why conclusions strengthened by experiences of highly repetitive sequences do not arise by force of inductive argument but (perforce) by non-deductive or deductive argument. In this regard, dear sweet dorayme-patsy teacher, tell me how the argument below is correctly characterized. As inductive, deductive, non-deductive, observational, or simply a truism (inherently conditional on the validity of the first premise)? Argument: All steps in sequence A have an identical outcome (Ist premise). Additional steps in sequence A will occur (2nd premise). The outcome of all additional steps in sequence A will be identical to previous outcomes (conclusion). This is such fun, don'tcha think? Have a good New Year! Zinnic (PS. I already stuffed myself over the holiday)
From: John Stafford on 30 Dec 2009 14:18 According to Zinnic, Patricia Aldorez wrote: > "In the search for what might be the "reasonable part" of so called > inductive processes, one can declare that there are forms in the way > that there are forms of deductive arguments or one might simply note > that not all deductive arguments have a form but are simply such that > one cannot reasonably assert the premises and deny the conclusion and > be reasonable in doing so. Either way, the problem of induction is to > identify if there is *any general circumstances* that can be > described > in which one can assert a set of premises and conclude something > where > it would always be unreasonable to deny that at least the premises > give the conclusion some weight of probability." Having read much worse prose of so-called great philosophers, I will not disrespect what is trying to be said above. I would abandon the attempt to rationalize form because it is unnecessary: stick to the nature of induction as contrasted with deduction. But if PA's post it is cleaned up some, it could read as follows. > "In the search for what might be the 'reasonable part' of > inductive processes it would always be unreasonable > to deny that at the premises give the conclusion some > weight of probability." With some potential ambiguities removed as shown above, PA's post is a rational statement of what inductive reasoning is. (Not necessarily inductive proof which is mathematics.) In deductive reasoning there is valid/invalid and sound/unsound. What PA is describing is a similar quality for inductive reasoning she wishes to call 'reasonableness', and that's, ah, reasonable!
From: John Stafford on 30 Dec 2009 14:36 In article <e6657e15-0ffc-4904-a0c8-6c95f8f8b4cf(a)j19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, Zinnic <zeenric2(a)gate.net> wrote: > On Dec 29, 6:00�pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > [...] > You have agreed in earlier posts that the longer a sequence of > identical outcomes, then the stronger becomes your suspicion that > there is an underlying causative factor for the repetition ( I am > aware that the repetition is not itself causative). > That is, as the repetition continues it is "reasonable" (your word in > the above quote) for a mere suspicion to become an assumption and, > eventually, a confident 'assertion' that the repetition will continue > (despite the fact that certainty is not attained.) In an inductive argument, the observation of a consistent behavior can be a premise. The premise need only be strong enough that _if they are true_, then the conclusion is _likely_ to be true. This is quite unlike deductive reasoning where a _valid argument and sound conclusion_ are guaranteed to be true. > Explain how the quote from your post above is not simply your 'dance > on the head of a pin' in a convulated attempt to eliminate induction > as a reasonable means of assuming/asserting premisses used in a > subsequent deduction. Uh oh. Did PA actually write that induction was could not lead to deduction?
From: Michael Gordge on 30 Dec 2009 16:02 On Dec 31, 3:55 am, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Well, for one thing, "axiom" means something very specific. The question is, how does certainty change in meaning by being preceeded with the adjective axiomatic? MG
From: Michael Gordge on 30 Dec 2009 16:03
On Dec 31, 3:57 am, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 30, 1:20 am, Michael Gordge <mikegor...(a)xtra.co.nz> wrote: > > > On Dec 30, 11:31 am, Marshall <marshall.spi...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > In the above-quoted sentence, "axiomatic" functions as > > > an adjective. It changes the meaning of the following > > > noun via the rules of English syntax. > > > Shrug, how does the adjective axiomatic change the meaning of > > certainty. > > > MG > > Observational evidence is distinguished from axiomatic statements, > though both are taken to have some level of certainty. What do you mean by certainty in the above statement and how does it change in meaning when preceeded by the adjective axiomatic? MG |