From: jmfbahciv on
Zinnic wrote:
> On Dec 31, 8:30 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote:
>> John Stafford wrote:
>>> In article
>>> <e6657e15-0ffc-4904-a0c8-6c95f8f8b...(a)j19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>,
>>> Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote:
>>>> On Dec 29, 6:00 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> [...]
>>>> You have agreed in earlier posts that the longer a sequence of
>>>> identical outcomes, then the stronger becomes your suspicion that
>>>> there is an underlying causative factor for the repetition ( I am
>>>> aware that the repetition is not itself causative).
>>>> That is, as the repetition continues it is "reasonable" (your word in
>>>> the above quote) for a mere suspicion to become an assumption and,
>>>> eventually, a confident 'assertion' that the repetition will continue
>>>> (despite the fact that certainty is not attained.)
>>> In an inductive argument, the observation of a consistent behavior can
>>> be a premise. The premise need only be strong enough that _if they are
>>> true_, then the conclusion is _likely_ to be true. This is quite unlike
>>> deductive reasoning where a _valid argument and sound conclusion_ are
>>> guaranteed to be true.
>> <snip>
>>
>> So the answer to the title's question is no; however, inductive
>> reasoning can lead to a correct premise.
>>
>> Am I getting this stuff or am I still not understanding what
>> you're saying.
>
> I am interested in how you reason to exclude "correct premise" from
> your definition of knowledge.

It's a hypothesis which hasn't been demonstrated to be "correct"
enough times nor does it have a reasonable explanation other
than a declaration of correctness. If I wasn't hip deep in
philosophers' wordage, I'd provide an example. However, this
tactic doesn't seem to work with those types.

/BAH
From: M Purcell on
On Dec 31 2009, 8:37 pm, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote:
>  M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote:
>
> > Sometimes approximations are good enough and necessary to arrive at
> > timely decisions. Even if our idealized mathematical models were
> > accurate, the measurements used to verify them are imprecise. Science
> > is practiced by imperfect human beings with limited prior knowledge
> > and imagination. And the standard to which both are compared is a
> > nature knowable by virtue of our limited senses, thus the Uncertainty
> > Principle and an Universe expanding beyond our powers of observation.
> > I believe our knowledge is based on comparisons with ourselves and
> > fundamentally anthropomorphic.
>
> The human being navigates life largely by the process we call Inductive,
> and most often at an automatic behavior level.
>
> Induction at the highly focused and critical level (not automatic),  is
> how one builds towards a thesis.
>
> Induction does lead to knowledge in that it is shown to be reasonable
> (to use Patricia's term) or it does not weather scientific methodology.
>
> Regardless, each outcome does lead to knowledge.
>
> It is truly that simple.

I was simply trying to move on to a definition of knowledge although
I'm sure that has also been endlessly debated. Although a critical
compairson of inductive conclusions with observations does determine
thier validity, I doubt the invalidity of an inductive conclusion
would be considered knowledge.
From: M Purcell on
On Jan 1, 6:49 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote:
> On Dec 31 2009, 8:37 pm, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> >  M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote:
>
> > > Sometimes approximations are good enough and necessary to arrive at
> > > timely decisions. Even if our idealized mathematical models were
> > > accurate, the measurements used to verify them are imprecise. Science
> > > is practiced by imperfect human beings with limited prior knowledge
> > > and imagination. And the standard to which both are compared is a
> > > nature knowable by virtue of our limited senses, thus the Uncertainty
> > > Principle and an Universe expanding beyond our powers of observation.
> > > I believe our knowledge is based on comparisons with ourselves and
> > > fundamentally anthropomorphic.
>
> > The human being navigates life largely by the process we call Inductive,
> > and most often at an automatic behavior level.
>
> > Induction at the highly focused and critical level (not automatic),  is
> > how one builds towards a thesis.
>
> > Induction does lead to knowledge in that it is shown to be reasonable
> > (to use Patricia's term) or it does not weather scientific methodology.
>
> > Regardless, each outcome does lead to knowledge.
>
> > It is truly that simple.
>
> I was simply trying to move on to a definition of knowledge although
> I'm sure that has also been endlessly debated. Although a critical
> compairson of inductive conclusions with observations does determine
> thier validity, I doubt the invalidity of an inductive conclusion
> would be considered knowledge.

Correction: . . . I doubt an invalid inductive conclusion would be
considered knowledge.

I would also like to add that the predictive ability of science is due
to the experimental requirement of repeatability, there are no
exceptions.
From: John Stafford on
In article <hhkvd902ahq(a)news5.newsguy.com>, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol>
wrote:

> John Stafford wrote:
> > In article <hhibq82e19(a)news3.newsguy.com>, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> John Stafford wrote:
> >>> In article
> >>> <e6657e15-0ffc-4904-a0c8-6c95f8f8b4cf(a)j19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>,
> >>> Zinnic <zeenric2(a)gate.net> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> On Dec 29, 6:00 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>> [...]
> >>>> You have agreed in earlier posts that the longer a sequence of
> >>>> identical outcomes, then the stronger becomes your suspicion that
> >>>> there is an underlying causative factor for the repetition ( I am
> >>>> aware that the repetition is not itself causative).
> >>>> That is, as the repetition continues it is "reasonable" (your word in
> >>>> the above quote) for a mere suspicion to become an assumption and,
> >>>> eventually, a confident 'assertion' that the repetition will continue
> >>>> (despite the fact that certainty is not attained.)
> >>> In an inductive argument, the observation of a consistent behavior can
> >>> be a premise. The premise need only be strong enough that _if they are
> >>> true_, then the conclusion is _likely_ to be true. This is quite unlike
> >>> deductive reasoning where a _valid argument and sound conclusion_ are
> >>> guaranteed to be true.
> >>>
> >> <snip>
> >>
> >> So the answer to the title's question is no; however, inductive
> >> reasoning can lead to a correct premise.
> >
> > Inductive reasoning can lead to practical and theoretical understanding,
> > which is knowledge.
>
> Yes, I can see that. But it's used as a tool. It cannot be [I don't
> know how to phrase this] the proof.

Inductive reasoning makes no claim whatsoever that a proof is made.
That's the role of deductive reasoning when the argument is valid and
sound. But now we must ask, from where do the premises of deductive
reasoning occur?

> IOW, if I can state that "x
> was produced by using inductive reasoning, then x has to be true.",
> then I'm saying that the only "proof" I need is the fact I used
> inductive reasoning.

Again, inductive reasoning does not lead to proof: a well formed
inductive argument only demonstrates a likelihood.
From: John Stafford on
In article <hhktlb427l2(a)news5.newsguy.com>, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol>
wrote:

> John Stafford wrote:
> > In article <hhian61d4f(a)news3.newsguy.com>, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> John Stafford wrote:
> >
> >>> Shouldn't we keep mathematic's proof by induction separate from
> >>> inductive reasoning?
> >> It's the only thing I know which has been used to lead to knowledge.
> >
> > Knowledge of Natural Numbers, and what else?
>
> It's used as proofs for summations; IIRC, Diff. Eq.
> books use this a lot.
>
> >
> >>> The subject is inductive reasoning which is not
> >>> particularly rigorous except in special cases, IMHO.
> >> So you're saying that inductive reasoning is not the method
> >> used in math. I don't see how the not-math type of thinking
> >> could lead to any knowledge without some form of rigorous
> >> method, especially in science.
> >
> > Inductive reasoning can occur in math, but in math the term 'inductive
> > proof' is most common and entirely different that that used in
> > philosophy which is 'inductive reason' (note - no claim of proof).
>
> I see. You guys are talking about something very different.
> If there is no claim of proof, then the reasoning cannot verify
> the hypothesis nor a theory.

Exactly. That is the role of science.