From: Frederick Williams on
Charlie-Boo wrote:
>
> On Jun 30, 5:23 am, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
> wrote:
> > Charlie-Boo wrote:
> > > The best way to explain that a ZFC axiom is not used is to give the
> > > proof without using any ZFC axioms - good luck!
> >
> > > How would you prove the PA axioms in ZFC, then? You keep saying it
> > > isn't from an axiom but can't say how it is done - so how do you know
> > > it isn't?
> >
> > As Tim Little says elsewhere in the thread, you define S, +, and * in
> > the language of ZFC and then prove the counterparts of PA's axioms as
> > theorems. It's done in Suppes (probably without C).
>
> Which requires the ZFC equivalent of Peano's Axioms (the axiom of
> infinity.)

You seem to be saying that the axiom of infinity, suitably translated,
is a PA axiom, or maybe even all of the PA axioms collectively.

--
I can't go on, I'll go on.
From: R. Srinivasan on
On Jul 1, 3:15 am, "K_h" <KHol...(a)SX729.com> wrote:
> "R. Srinivasan" <sradh...(a)in.ibm.com> wrote in message
>
> news:46d58d89-34b1-40a9-a5a8-1ee250ba57e3(a)e5g2000yqn.googlegroups.com...
> On Jun 29, 8:33 pm, MoeBlee <jazzm...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Jun 29, 2:09 am, "R. Srinivasan" <sradh...(a)in.ibm.com>
> > wrote:
>
> > > ZF-"Inf'+"~Inf"
>
> > > That theory entails that every object is finite. And
> > > there is no
> > > definition of any infinite object possible in that
> > > theory.
>
> > OK. Here I want ~Inf to be stated in the form that you
> > mentioned, that is, every set is hereditarily finite.
>
> Why do you think the axiom of infinity is false?  What is
> the basis for your belief in  ~Inf?  To me it is
> self-evident that all the naturals exist.
>
First of all I happen to work in a logic (NAFL) where I have a *proof*
of ~Inf. Essentially, if you define truth (as provability) such that
all vestiges of Platonism are thrown out, infinite sets will not
survive. However, there can and do exist infinite classes, like N, the
class of all natural numbers. But quantification over classes is not
allowed and classes can only be defined by construction -- there is no
"arbitrary" infinite class in NAFL theories. Despite these seemingly
severe restrictions, I show that it is possible to define a method for
real analysis in NAFL based on translating Euclidean geometry into a
theory of finite sets with classes. I also show that the paradoxes of
classical real analysis, like Zeno's paradox, Banach-Tarski paradox,
etc. will be eliminated in such a system of real analysis.

On a more intuitive level, how can we fault the existence of the
infinite set N? If you consider the statement "All natural numbers are
not upper bounds for N" and ask "how many natural numbers are exceeded
by some element of N?", the answer has to be "infinitely many". Yet if
infinitely many natural numbers are exceeded *within* N, it seems that
the only way out is that N must contain an infinitely large number.
This is precisely the intuition that leads to nonstandard models of
arithmetic, where there are nonstandard integers that exceed every
"standard" natural. To call such numbers "finite" is grotesque, to say
the least. Yet that is the only way to save the consistency of
classical Peano Arithmetic. We have to sacrifice our well-known and
well-accepted intuition of what "finite" means, which is something I
am not willing to do.

If the above considerations do not already leave a bad taste in the
mouth, consider the definition of N as a set. It is an essentially
impredicative definition. Here I am talking about the simple basic
definition of N, which uses universal quantifiers in an essential way.
These quantifiers quantify over an universe that already contain N.
That such a definition is "harmless" is a commonly stated assertion.
If you think carefully, such a defense of circularity is based on
Platonism, namely, that N "really" exists, and our attempted
definition only tries to access something that is already "out there"
in the universe of sets. Note that we do not have this problem with
finite sets, even if these are defined using quantifiers. Because we
can always define them predicatively by listing their elements.

Here is a post (by Brian Hart) in the FOM newsgroup that says
Platonism is essential to defend the impredicative methods used in
modern logic, physics, mathematics:

http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2010-May/014713.html

\begin{quote}
If one axiomatizes the logical universe (the one containing strictly
logical objects such as proper and hyper-classes) impredicativity is a
requirement as these objects cannot be defined non-circularly.
\end{quote}

This post seemed to be the first sensible one in an FOM thread where
dozens of badly-off-the-mark posts had appeared earlier. Guess what?
Precisely after this post appeared, the "moderator" of FOM, Martin
Davis, decided to call off the discussion:

http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2010-May/014716.html

\begin{quote}
This discussion has long since reached the point of diminishing
returns. Hereafter only messages on this topic judged to be of very
special interest will be posted.
\end{quote}

FOM is supposed to be the newsgroup where all the elite logicians and
philosophers ponder the foundations of mathematics and logic. And you
can see the narrow-minded intolerance that prevails at that level just
by looking at this thread and the manner in which it was closed,
without allowing any reply to the post of Brian Hart I quoted above.

Regds, RS
From: Frederick Williams on
"R. Srinivasan" wrote:

> On a more intuitive level, how can we fault the existence of the
> infinite set N? If you consider the statement "All natural numbers are
> not upper bounds for N" and ask "how many natural numbers are exceeded
> by some element of N?", the answer has to be "infinitely many".

The answer is finitely many. Let's suppose N starts with 0 (if you take
it as starting with 1 my comment need only a slight adjustment). Let's
take the "some" element to be n. How many natural numbers are exceeded
by n? Answer n. E.g. take n = 4:

0, 1, 2, 3, *4*, 5, 6, ...

and count the numbers exceeded by 4: 0 < 4, 1 < 4, 2 < 4, 3 < 4, and
nothing else is exceeded by 4, so that makes 4.

Btw, your "All natural numbers are not upper bounds for N" is more
idiomatically expressed as "No natural numbers are upper bounds for N",
which I agree with.

> Yet if
> infinitely many natural numbers are exceeded *within* N, it seems that
> the only way out is that N must contain an infinitely large number.

--
I can't go on, I'll go on.
From: Charlie-Boo on
On Jul 1, 2:04 am, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> writes:
> > To see it means to have actually created it, and its actual creation
> > would answer the very interesting question of whether ZFC can prove
> > that PA is consistent even though PA can't.
>
> We already know the answer. The axioms used in the proof are a
> restricted form of comprehension, infinity, union and pairing.

Why do we need each of these? Of course infinity = PA = arithmetic.
But why are the others needed?

> Spelling
> out the formalization of "PA is consistent" in the language of set
> theory would be a tedious, trivial

Tedious AND trivial? Wow! So easy we need not do it. And so hard
why should we spend so much time on THAT!?

Like Goldilocks who only wanted a bed "just right" and got eaten by
the bears because of it*. Another word of wisdom for children of all
ages.

> and pointless undertaking, of no
> apparent mathematical interest whatsoever.

Proving PA consistent in ZFC has no mathematical interest at all?
Wow!!

> > It would substantiate your assertions.  Is that of value?
>
> Well, no. I can't think of any pressing reason I should want to convince
> you of anything.

Me? What do I have to do with it? We're talking about Mathematics,
here. Have we degraded to the point of arguing against the merits of
the substantiation of mathematical assertions?

(The new Conservative Atta accustoms himself to the worn-out,
discredited tactics of the past - refighting old battles.)

C-B

*I may be mixing up fairy tales.

> --
> Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi)
>
> "Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
>  - Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

From: Charlie-Boo on
On Jul 1, 2:18 am, billh04 <h...(a)tulane.edu> wrote:
> On Jul 1, 1:03 am, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jul 1, 1:20 am, billh04 <h...(a)tulane.edu> wrote:
>
> > > On Jun 30, 11:34 pm, Charlie-Boo <shymath...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jun 30, 5:23 am, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco..net>
> > > > wrote:
>
> > > > > Charlie-Boo wrote:
> > > > > > The best way to explain that a ZFC axiom is not used is to give the
> > > > > > proof without using any ZFC axioms - good luck!
>
> > > > > > How would you prove the PA axioms in ZFC, then?  You keep saying it
> > > > > > isn't from an axiom but can't say how it is done - so how do you know
> > > > > > it isn't?
>
> > > > > As Tim Little says elsewhere in the thread, you define S, +, and * in
> > > > > the language of ZFC and then prove the counterparts of PA's axioms as
> > > > > theorems.  It's done in Suppes (probably without C).
>
> > > > Which requires the ZFC equivalent of Peano's Axioms (the axiom of
> > > > infinity.)
>
> > > I'm not sure that I understand what you are saying.
>
> > > Let me expand what you are saying a little bit:
>
> > > === Your statement ========
> > > To prove the counterparts of PA's axioms as theorems requires the ZFC
> > > equivalent of Peano's Axioms (the axiom of infinity.)
> > > =======================
>
> > > Assuming this is correct, let me expand it a little bit more:
>
> > > === Your statement ========
> > > To prove the counterparts of PA's axioms as theorems requires a ZFC
> > > axiom (or seveal ZFC axioms) equivalent to  Peano's Axioms (the axiom
> > > of infinity.)
> > > =======================
>
> > > If this is what you mean, then why do you think so?
>
> > > Here is our statement, similar to yours, but not as strong:
>
> > > === Our statement ========
> > > To prove the counterparts of PA's axioms as theorems requires a ZFC
> > > axiom (or seveal ZFC axioms) that imply  Peano's Axioms.
> > > =======================
>
> > > For example, we need to prove the following theorem in ZFC:
>
> > > Theorem. (all x in N)(all y in N)(if S x = S y then x = y)
>
> > > Here N is a set (defined as mentioned before).
> > > Here x and y are sets since everything in ZFC is a set.
> > > Here S is a set (the successor function).
> > > Thus, the theorem is a statement about sets.
> > > ZFC can proves statements about sets using the ZFC axioms.
>
> > > Why do you think this theorem cannot be proved using the ZFC axioms?
>
> > If it could be done without the axiom of infinity, then the axiom of
> > infinity wouldn't be needed in ZFC.  Maybe it is, but I doubt that.
>
> But the axiom of infinity is a ZFC axiom. So, I am allowed to use it
> in proving a theorem in ZFC.
>
> It seems that you are just saying that we are cheating when we say
> that we can prove statements in ZFC that correspond to the statements
> of the axioms of PA

No no no. This whole thing got started when I said that ZFC just
consists of PA plus some dinky little axioms about what sets exist,
and that the latter does not contribute to the proof so ZFC can't
prove PA consistent any more than PA can.

Then those who like to carpet bomb attacked the question of how ZFC
manages to include PA, whether it actually "includes" PA, the
definition of "includes", etc. etc.

My mistake was to respond. It is of no consequence.

C-B

> because the axioms of ZFC imply the statements of
> the axioms of PA. Whether we are cheating or not, we don't deny that,
> and in fact that is pretty much what we are saying. We are not trying
> to hide that the axioms of ZFC imply the statements of the axioms of
> PA. That is what we are claiming.
>
>
>
>
>
> > C-B
>
> > - Hide quoted text -
>
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>
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