From: Marshall on
by this startling
* admission:
*
* We have invested $392 million so far in such a Center, about a four
* hour drive from Washington, D.C., and we hope to have it completed
* and equipped in about two years... We hope all states will be in the
* system by 1998 and will supply information on a continuing basis...
*
* Meanwhile, we will continue to establish the National Identification
* Center for this AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.
*
* It should be noted that, since my revelations in 1994, Congressman Neal
* Smith and his office refuse to answer inquiries about the National
* Identification Center.
*
* However, in a recent article in Federal Computer Week, a Washington, D.C.
* magazine for federal employees, basically admitted the existence of this
* Center and its activities.
*
* In his article, "Federal Agencies Link, Share Databases," John Monroe said:
*
* Law enforcement agencies across the federal government have poured
* money into information technology programs. According to the Government
* Market Se


From: Pubkeybreaker on
purchased with federal funds shall be
: software based on a system of key recovery" and
: "all encrypted networks established with the use
: of federal funds shall use encryption based on a
: system of key recovery." Key recovery, or key
: escrow, technology enables law-enforcement
: officials to obtain copies of the mathematical keys
: needed to decipher messages. In other words,
: someone else keeps a copy of your secret key
: -- and some proposed bills say that the cops
: may not even need a search warrant to seize it.
: [snip]
:
: What about the penalties for "unauthorized
: breaking of another's encryption codes?" That
: would criminalize cryptanalysis, the way to verify
: the security of encryption software you buy. "The
: only way to know the strength of a cipher is
: cryptanalysis," says Marc Briceno, a
: cryptography guru at Community ConneXion.
:
: Then there's Kerrey's statement saying "there
: will be" restrictions on what encryption products
: you're permitted to buy from overseas firms. This
: contradicts Justice Department official Michael
: Vatis, who told me at a conference this year that
: the Clinton administration did not want import
: controls. Though Cabe Franklin, spokesperson
: for Trusted Information Systems, says Kerrey was
: misunderstood. "In the briefing afterwards, I found
: out he didn't mean that at all. He meant import
: controls, but more regulation than restriction. The
: same way they wouldn't let a car with faulty
: steering controls in the country. He meant more
: quality control," Franklin says. (I don't know
: about you, but I'm not convinced.)
[
What a


From: quasi on
and the public
* that the new technologies were already preventing them from conducting
* essential wiretaps, senior FBI officials from cities across the United
* States were telling FBI headquarters in Washington THE EXACT OPPOSITE.
* We know this because...[buy the book! Burnham is an American hero.]


Additionally, the FBI/NSA has briefcase-sized devices that can be attached
to any digital telephone company transmission line, and can monitor many
conversations simultaneously.

# "The FBI's Latest Idea: Make Wiretapping Easier"
# By Anthony Ramirez, The New York Times, April 19, 1992
#
# One telecommunications equipment manufacturer said he was puzzled by the
# FBI proposal. "The FBI already has a lot of technology to wiretap digital
# lines," he said, on the condition of anonymity.
#
# He said four companies, including such major firms as Mitel Corporation,
# a Canadian maker of telecommunications equipment, can design digital
# decoders to convert computer code back into voice.
#
# A portable system about the size of a large briefcase could track and
# decode 36 simultaneous conversations. A larger system, the size of a
# small refrigerator, could follow up to 1,000 conversations.
#
# All could be done without the phone company.
#
# James K. Kallstrom, the FBI's chief of technology, [later made head of the
# FBI's New York office], acknowledged that the agency was one of Mitel's
# largest customers, but denied computers had that capability. [What???]


----


And how many conversations does the government listen to?

For when they took the time to get a court authorization:

*


From: quasi on
What is this?

* Subject: Re: Law Enforcement Aviation
* From: aufsj(a)imap2.asu.edu
* Date: 1996/12/27
* Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
*
* What interests me is how new technologies will be interpreted. I recently
* inquired at the local Law School about the courts views towards the use
* of impulse radar, and they said "Impulse what the heck?"
*
* Basically it is a radar that "sees through" things (like, say, your
* house).
*
* Their capabilities vary widely, but the feds are already using
* them and I know that Hughes corp. is designing a low-cost set up
* specifically for major police departments.
*
* They are driving towards a unit that can be mounted on a police helicopter.
*
* Will the police need a warrant? Who knows. Since they are allowed
* to do airborne infra-red analysis of your house, why not an take an
* airborne "x-ray" equivalent?
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Steven J Forsberg at aufsj(a)imap2.asu.edu Wizard 87-01

Scan into our homes? This should not come as much of a surprise since in the
"War #1: Drugs" section I re-reported that MSNBC SHOW


From: Pubkeybreaker on
do not even begin to explain why this huge spy system
should be maintained. In the early 1980s the Cold War rhetoric was
extreme and global war was seriously discussed and planned for.

In the 1990s, the threat of global war has all but disappeared and
none of the allies faces the remotest serious military threat.


The second point about the ECHELON capabilities is that large parts of the
system, while hiding behind the Cold War for their justification, were
never primarily about the Cold War at all.

The UKUSA alliance did mount massive operations against the Soviet Union
and other 'communists', but other elements of the worldwide system, such
as the interception of Intelsat communications, microwave networks and
many regional satellites, were not aimed primarily at the Russians, the
Iraqis or the North Koreans.

Then, and now, they are targeting groups which do not pose any physical
threat to the UKUSA allies at all.

But they are ideal to use against political opponents, economic competitors,
countries where the allies may want to gain some advantage (especially
access to cheap resources) and administrations (like Nicaragua's Sandinista
government) which do not fit an American-dominated world order.


The third obser