Integer factorization, etc.
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From: Rotwang on 18 Apr 2008 19:36 a single umbrella the SIGINT organizations of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The UKUSA Agreement's existence has never been officially acknowledged by any country even today. P271: Sharing seats alongside the NSA operators, at least in some areas, are SIGINT specialists from Britain's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). According to a former Menwith Hill official, the two groups work very closely together. P229: David Watters, a telecommunications engineer once attached to the CIA's communications research and development branch, pulls out a microwave routing map of the greater Washington area and jabs his index finger at a small circle with several lines entering it and the letters NSA. "There's your smoking pistol right here." Watters says it is tied into the local telephone company circuits, which are interconnected with the national microwave telephone system owned by AT&T. Other specialists testified to the same thing: purely domestic intercepts. P223: "Technical know-how" for microwave communications intercept was aided by William Baker, head of AT&T's Bell Laboratories and at the same time an important member of the very secret NSA Scientific
From: S.C.Sprong on 18 Apr 2008 19:10 interest and $5000 in * legal fees were the result. * * The government's abrupt assault shocked Paolo Alvarez to his core, * leaving him with powerful feelings of fearful despair and isolation. * * While the fear was obviously justified, the feeling of isolation was * way off the mark. He has lots of company. [snip] * * The federal government seized the home of an elderly couple under the * Drug War's "facilitation" provision. The judge was so embarrassed he * gave the couple half the cash value of their house back. The drugs had * belonged to the teenaged-grandson. "The whole program is a nightmare," * said their lawyer, "If it keeps up, the Justice Department is going to * be the largest property owner in Connecticut." [snip] * * Between 1985 and 1993, as a result of more than 200,000 forfeitures, the * Justice Department Asset Forfeiture Fund took in over $3.2 billion. * * In 1993 alone the department took in $556 million, twenty times more * than it did when the program began in 1985. And what were some of the reasons of the dramatic increase in forfeitures between 1985 and 1993? What caused it to increase by more than a MAGNITUDE? * "Above the Law", by David Burnham, ISBN 0-684-80699-1, 1996 * * In June 1989, the Deputy Attorney General ordered the nation's U.S. * attorneys to "take all possible actions" on forfeitures, even if it meant * dropping other matters. "You will be expected to divert personnel from * other activities." * * One year later, t
From: Pubkeybreaker on 18 Apr 2008 22:57 Even though NSA's specialized supercomputers have enormous storage capacities, the tremendous number of targets forces the Agency to squeeze the watch lists together as tightly as possible. P462-465: Its power to eavesdrop, the NSA had always insisted, came under no earthly laws but rather emanated from some celestial "inherent presidential authority" reposed in the chief executive by the Constitution. Senator Edward M. Kennedy tried year after year to pass legislation to require the NSA to submit to judicial review. Finally, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [FISA] was signed into law by president Carter on October 25, 1978. The key to the legislation could only have been dreamed up by Franz Kafka: the establishment of a supersecret federal court. The legislation established a complex authorization procedure and added a strict "minimization" requirement to prohibit the use and distribution of communications involving Americans inadvertently picked up during the intercept operations. These requirements constitute the most important parts of the FISA law, and were included to prevent the watch-listing of American citizens, which took place during the 1960s and 1970s. The Supreme Court Chief Justice picks which federal judges serve in the Star Chamber. P466-467: The FISA court judge rules that black-bag jobs of "nonresidential premises under the direction or control of a foreign power" need no court approval. The FISA legislation also exempts from judicial review communica- tions of these sites, including embassies. P464: A final judicial review exception authorized the Agency to distribute the communication if it relates to criminal activity. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
From: tchow on 18 Apr 2008 19:45 " ---Woodstock ---- Whew! Cybernetics is VERY heavy-duty stuff. It can yield the ULTIMATE in control. It can be applied to controlling people in a society. Cybernetic control of society. The 'arousal filter' Stafford Beer and his cyberneticians set up was effectively keyword monitoring of traffic. When you use keywords to either select or exclude traffic, each step is a 'filter' step. If you make it past all the filters, a human then reviews the results to see if it calls for action. "arousal filter" Mr. Beer was trying to help the economy by massive real-time monitoring of factories and companies and banks, and thus help the people of Chile. * "Brain of the Firm", Stafford Beer, 1986, ISBN 0 471 27687 1 * * Twenty-four hours a day, messages were flowing in non-stop. This instantly * posed an enormous problem in handling the inundation of information. * * Two of the senior cyberneticians organized a filtration system. The feedback was not simply machine throughput rates, but also---via the central computer---a system 'through which anyone could consult anyone else'. I used keyword monitor
From: Risto Lankinen on 18 Apr 2008 19:32
Steven M. Bellovin[3] Josh Benaloh[4] Matt Blaze[5] Whitfield Diffie[6] John Gilmore[7] Peter G. Neumann[8] Ronald L. Rivest[9] Jeffrey I. Schiller[10] Bruce Schneier[11] Final Report -- 27 May 1997[12] Executive Summary A variety of ``key recovery,'' ``key escrow,'' and ``trusted third-party'' encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environ- ments brought about by new technologies. This report examines the fundamental properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks, costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to encryption keys. The deployment of key-recovery-based encryption infrastructures to meet law enforcement's stated specifications will result in substantial sacrifices in security and greatly increased costs to the end-user. Building the secure computer-communication infrastructures necessary to provide adequate technological und |