From: William Hughes on
On Jan 20, 8:00 pm, KevinSimonson <kvnsm...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Jan 20, 5:51 am, David C. Ullrich <ullr...(a)math.okstate.edu> wrote:
>
> =Most of the replies so far point out things like for example the
> =definition of "inconsistent" you're using is not right. This is true,
> =but missing the point - if we insert the correct definition we still
> =get something that appears to be a proof that "the formal
> =system" is inconsistent; we should really be considering why
> =the corrected version is wrong.
> =
> =Ok. Say T is "the formal system". Assume that T is not
> =connsistent.
> =
> =(*) Then  T proves "P and not P" for some P.
> =
> =Contradition, so T must be consistent (which then
> =contradicts Godel as you point out).
> =
> =No, (*) is not a contradiction. (*) is not "P and not P",
> =(*) just says that T implies P and not P.
>
> What I have proved is that if T is inconsistent then "P and not P";
> "P and not P" is clearly false, so the assertion that T is inconsis-
> tent must clearly be false as well.  That proves that T is consis-
> tent.  And, what is more, it proves that T is consistent _within_ T,
> since this is a proof by contradiction.
>

The problem is that any proofs _within_
T (call such a proof a derivation)
must work on statements expressible in T.

How do we express

T is inconsistent

_within_ T?

Clearly if T is inconsistent, then there must be
a derivation of "P or not P" for some P
(and indeed, since proof by contradiction
is valid in T, for any P). So

There is a derivation of "P or not P"

is an expression of "T is inconsistent" _within_ T.

However, we cannot go from

There is a derivation of X

to X without knowing that T is consistent
and we would still be arguing outside of T.

We cannot derive "P or not P" from

There is a derivation of "P or not P"

So we cannot prove

There is no derivation of "P or not P"

_within_ T.


(Arguing outside of T we can argue that

There is no derivation of "P or not P"

is true if T is consistent but this gets
us nowhere.)


- William Hughes



From: Aatu Koskensilta on
"Mr. Wymore" <wymore(a)ymail.com> writes:

> Godel showed that there was no way to prove ALL of math was true. Any
> part of it can be proven by this or other methods.

Since "ALL of maths is true" is not a mathematical statement at all we
don't needn't invoke G�del to conclude there can be no question of a
mathematical proof.

> He also showed that math can be made to contradict itself. Here's a
> cool book that explains it:
> http://www.amazon.com/Godel-Escher-Bach-Eternal-Golden/dp/0465026567

I doubt Hofstadter explains how G�del showed that "maths can be made to
contradict itself", although GEB of course often suggests such misguided
ideas to many otherwise quite sensible people.

For a sober and readable (semi)popular exposition of G�del's theorems,
what they say and do not say, what to make of their various purported
implications, uses and abuses, as an antidote to such vague and
wrongheaded musings and reflections as not infrequently inspired by a
half-digested read of GEB, I recommend Torkel Franz�n's excellent
_G�del's Theorem_.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Jesse F. Hughes on
Andrew Usher <k_over_hbarc(a)yahoo.com> writes:

> On Jan 20, 7:30 pm, "Jesse F. Hughes" <je...(a)phiwumbda.org> wrote:
>> Joshua Cranmer <Pidgeo...(a)verizon.invalid> writes:
>> > Ultimately, a proof by contradiction assumes that a contradiction cannot
>> > be proved in said formal system. You assumed that a contradiction exists
>> > in T, which renders invalid a proof by contradiction.
>>
>> This is nonsense.  Proofs by contradiction are perfectly valid,
>> whether the theory is inconsistent or not.
>
> Only in a vacuous sense. Mathematicians do assume 'P xor not P'
> because it is true, that is, true in real, informal logic. The fact
> that Goedel's theorem shows that it is not always so in any formal
> system is just a statement that logic can never be reduced to
> mathematical formulae.

I have no idea what you're going on about, but my point is simple.

Rules of inference are valid or not independently of the theory in
which they are used. The definition of validity does not refer to the
theory.

--
Jesse F. Hughes

'If you're not making mistakes you're not doing extreme mathematics."
-- James S. Harris, extreme mathematician par excellence
From: David C. Ullrich on
On Wed, 20 Jan 2010 18:48:39 -0800 (PST), Andrew Usher
<k_over_hbarc(a)yahoo.com> wrote:

>On Jan 20, 7:30�pm, "Jesse F. Hughes" <je...(a)phiwumbda.org> wrote:
>> Joshua Cranmer <Pidgeo...(a)verizon.invalid> writes:
>> > Ultimately, a proof by contradiction assumes that a contradiction cannot
>> > be proved in said formal system. You assumed that a contradiction exists
>> > in T, which renders invalid a proof by contradiction.
>>
>> This is nonsense. �Proofs by contradiction are perfectly valid,
>> whether the theory is inconsistent or not.
>
>Only in a vacuous sense. Mathematicians do assume 'P xor not P'
>because it is true, that is, true in real, informal logic. The fact
>that Goedel's theorem shows that it is not always so in any formal
>system

For heaven's sake, where did you get the idea that Godel's
theorem says that "P xoe not P" is not always so in any
formal system?

> is just a statement that logic can never be reduced to
>mathematical formulae.
>
>Andrew Usher

From: Don Stockbauer on
On Jan 21, 4:57 am, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> "Mr. Wymore" <wym...(a)ymail.com> writes:
> > Godel showed that there was no way to prove ALL of math was true.  Any
> > part of it can be proven by this or other methods.
>
> Since "ALL of maths is true" is not a mathematical statement at all we
> don't needn't invoke Gödel to conclude there can be no question of a
> mathematical proof.
>
> > He also showed that math can be made to contradict itself.  Here's a
> > cool book that explains it:
> >http://www.amazon.com/Godel-Escher-Bach-Eternal-Golden/dp/0465026567
>
> I doubt Hofstadter explains how Gödel showed that "maths can be made to
> contradict itself", although GEB of course often suggests such misguided
> ideas to many otherwise quite sensible people.
>
> For a sober and readable (semi)popular exposition of Gödel's theorems,
> what they say and do not say, what to make of their various purported
> implications, uses and abuses, as an antidote to such vague and
> wrongheaded musings and reflections as not infrequently inspired by a
> half-digested read of GEB, I recommend Torkel Franzén's excellent
> _Gödel's Theorem_.

And the beat goes on.

And the beat goes on.

Drums keep a poundin' rhythm to the brain....

La di la di la.

La di la di lee.