Is truth just something we have beliefs about or is there such a thing as truth?
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From: Immortalist on 20 May 2010 19:46 If we suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, and whose justification does not depend on that of any further emperical beliefs, since for a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a reason why it is likely to be true and a belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a reason, and a person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true, but allthewhile the premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one empirical premise, whence the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, making it so there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified sceptical beliefs, then is our only recourse to propose an empirical belief which is realatively true if and only if it coheres with a system of other beliefs, which together form a comprehensive account of reality, which in science is similar to how "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent," and depends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning or an inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis which is inductively cogent if and only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all the competing hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true on the basis of the evidence, consequently leading one to believe that whether it is reasonable to accept a hypothesis as true, if the statements of evidence are true, is determined by whether that hypothesis is the most probable, on the evidence, of all those with which it competes or should we just be skeptical about the entire affair? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6IeASZZf1c
From: sarge on 20 May 2010 20:07 On 21 Maj, 01:46, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > If we suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, > emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, and whose > justification does not depend on that of any further emperical > beliefs, since for a belief to be episemically justified requires that > there be a reason why it is likely to be true and a belief is > justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a > reason, and a person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only > if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows > that the belief is likely to be true, but allthewhile the premises of > such a justifying argument must include at least one empirical > premise, whence the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief > depends on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, > contradicting that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, > emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, making it so > there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified > sceptical beliefs, then is our only recourse to propose an empirical > belief which is realatively true if and only if it coheres with a > system of other beliefs, which together form a comprehensive account > of reality, which in science is similar to how "fact" can only mean > "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold > provisional assent," and depends upon the evidential and conceptual > ("context") of reasoning or an inductive argument from evidence to > hypothesis which is inductively cogent if and only if the hypothesis > is that hypothesis which, of all the competing hypothesis, has the > greatest probability of being true on the basis of the evidence, > consequently leading one to believe that whether it is reasonable to > accept a hypothesis as true, if the statements of evidence are true, > is determined by whether that hypothesis is the most probable, on the > evidence, of all those with which it competes or should we just be > skeptical about the entire affair? > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6IeASZZf1c That was actually rather funny. I hope it was at least partially intended to be. The assertion 'truth is just something we have beliefs about' is posing as a truth. Any argument trying to show there is no such thing as truths, will be asserting truths. I don't really see a way of avoiding this.
From: Immortalista on 20 May 2010 21:02 On May 20, 5:07 pm, sarge <greasethew...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > On 21 Maj, 01:46, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > If we suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, > > emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, and whose > > justification does not depend on that of any further emperical > > beliefs, since for a belief to be episemically justified requires that > > there be a reason why it is likely to be true and a belief is > > justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a > > reason, and a person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only > > if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows > > that the belief is likely to be true, but allthewhile the premises of > > such a justifying argument must include at least one empirical > > premise, whence the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief > > depends on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, > > contradicting that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, > > emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, making it so > > there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified > > sceptical beliefs, then is our only recourse to propose an empirical > > belief which is realatively true if and only if it coheres with a > > system of other beliefs, which together form a comprehensive account > > of reality, which in science is similar to how "fact" can only mean > > "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold > > provisional assent," and depends upon the evidential and conceptual > > ("context") of reasoning or an inductive argument from evidence to > > hypothesis which is inductively cogent if and only if the hypothesis > > is that hypothesis which, of all the competing hypothesis, has the > > greatest probability of being true on the basis of the evidence, > > consequently leading one to believe that whether it is reasonable to > > accept a hypothesis as true, if the statements of evidence are true, > > is determined by whether that hypothesis is the most probable, on the > > evidence, of all those with which it competes or should we just be > > skeptical about the entire affair? > > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6IeASZZf1c > > That was actually rather funny. I hope it was at least partially > intended to be. The assertion 'truth is just something we have > beliefs about' is posing as a truth. Any argument trying to show > there is no such thing as truths, will be asserting truths. > > I don't really see a way of avoiding this. Not necessarily since one may assert something with an added clarification that he cannot determine whether he has just asserted any truth or has not asserted any truth. Besides the most we seem to be able to establish is a "mitigated skepticism & mitigated truth"; David Hume qualified his own Scepticism by pointing out that to live at all we have perpetually to make choices, decisions, and this forces us to form judgements about the way things are, whether we like it or not. Since certainty is not available to us we have to make the best assessments we can of the realities we face - and this is incompatible with regarding all alternatives with equal scepticism. Our Scepticism therefore needs to be, as he put it, mitigated. It is indeed doubtful whether anyone could live on the basis of complete Scepticism - or, if they could, whether such a life would be worth living. But this refutation of Scepticism, if refutation it is, is not a logical argument. In practical life we must steer a middle course between demanding a degree of certainty that we can never have and treating all possibilities as if they were of equal weight when they are not. Story of Philosophy by Bryan Magee http://www.amazon.com/Story-Philosophy-Bryan-Magee/dp/078947994X According to perspectivalism and relativism, a proposition is only true relative to a particular perspective. Roughly, a proposition is true relative to a perspective if and only if it is accepted, endorsed, or legitimated by that perspective. "a propensity, which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light in which we survey them at any particular instant". (Treatise 1.4.7, 273) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume Here is a sketch of how Hume's "system" works: When I wake up and hear certain familiar sounds, I come to believe that it is raining. My judgment is a representation because there are perceptions of the sight and feel of rain, perceptions that I will have if I go to the window and look, or if I go outside and feel the rain. These perceptions are the "facts" my judgment is about. My judgment is the result of a causal process: given my past associations between a certain kind of soud and the presence of rain, plus a present impression of that certain kind of sound, I expect that if I go to the window I will see it raining on my roses. My expectation is representative, and capable of truth or falsity. So if I go to the window to look at my roses, and see that Charlotte is hosing off the screen on our bedroom window, then my belief misrepresented the facts, and what I believed was false. But the facts that lead me to regard my judgment as true or false, as accurately representing or as misrepresenting those facts, are themelves perceptions impressions, and they are not representative of anything beyond themselves. ....Hume has shown that a system allegedly built on more secure "foundations" "principles" that go beyond perceptions and are somehow supposed to validate them is a metaphysical pipe-dream, not the legitimate basis of a coherent account of human nature, judgment, and belief. But in rejecting the "ultimate principles" of traditonal metaphysics as incoherent, isn't Hume committing himself to an equally questionable picture of the ultimate nature of reality, one that says that there are only impressions, ideas, and the inferences we make from them? No. In choosing to restrict his discussion of questions about the nature of human nature in terms of perceptions, Hume is answering what he takes to be empirical questions in the only coherent way that they can be answered. Metaphysics tempts us to regard these answers as making claims about the ultimate nature of reality. Hume shows us how to resist that temptation. It is in this that the depth and originality of his project for the reform of philosophy consists. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/
From: sarge on 20 May 2010 23:18 On 21 Maj, 03:02, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > On May 20, 5:07 pm, sarge <greasethew...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > On 21 Maj, 01:46, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > If we suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, > > > emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, and whose > > > justification does not depend on that of any further emperical > > > beliefs, since for a belief to be episemically justified requires that > > > there be a reason why it is likely to be true and a belief is > > > justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a > > > reason, and a person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only > > > if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows > > > that the belief is likely to be true, but allthewhile the premises of > > > such a justifying argument must include at least one empirical > > > premise, whence the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief > > > depends on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, > > > contradicting that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, > > > emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, making it so > > > there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified > > > sceptical beliefs, then is our only recourse to propose an empirical > > > belief which is realatively true if and only if it coheres with a > > > system of other beliefs, which together form a comprehensive account > > > of reality, which in science is similar to how "fact" can only mean > > > "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold > > > provisional assent," and depends upon the evidential and conceptual > > > ("context") of reasoning or an inductive argument from evidence to > > > hypothesis which is inductively cogent if and only if the hypothesis > > > is that hypothesis which, of all the competing hypothesis, has the > > > greatest probability of being true on the basis of the evidence, > > > consequently leading one to believe that whether it is reasonable to > > > accept a hypothesis as true, if the statements of evidence are true, > > > is determined by whether that hypothesis is the most probable, on the > > > evidence, of all those with which it competes or should we just be > > > skeptical about the entire affair? > > > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6IeASZZf1c > > > That was actually rather funny. I hope it was at least partially > > intended to be. The assertion 'truth is just something we have > > beliefs about' is posing as a truth. Any argument trying to show > > there is no such thing as truths, will be asserting truths. > > > I don't really see a way of avoiding this. > > Not necessarily since one may assert something with an added > clarification that he cannot determine whether he has just asserted > any truth or has not asserted any truth. To assert that he cannot determine a truth is, nevertheless, an assertion. I do not see how one can avoid making assertions at a meta- level, at the very least. And, after asserting something, then 'clarifying' that he has not asserted a truth, this hypothetical person is making a couple of assertions: 1) their first assertion was not a truth and 2) they were clarifying something. Which it seems to me they were not. Besides the most we seem to > be able to establish is a "mitigated skepticism & mitigated truth"; > > David Hume qualified his own Scepticism by pointing out that to live > at all we have perpetually to make choices, decisions, and this forces > us to form judgements about the way things are, whether we like it or > not. Agreed. >Since certainty is not available to us Are you certain about this, both in your case and in general - iow in all other cases? >we have to make the best > assessments we can of the realities we face Have to? (I mean, I know I may seem petty....) > - and this is incompatible > with regarding all alternatives with equal scepticism. Nicely worded. Thank you. I will remember that formulation. I think, also, that once we make claims for any skepticism, then we are making claims about epistemology. It seems to me many strong skeptics fail to notice that their 'doubt' rest upon claims also, but often at a meta or epistemological level. > Our Scepticism > therefore needs to be, as he put it, mitigated. It is indeed doubtful > whether anyone could live on the basis of complete Scepticism - or, if > they could, whether such a life would be worth living. Complete skepticism cannot be formulated without undermining itself. The best one can do is refuse to believe things in words. But once you start to make a case you are no longer a complete skeptic. >But this > refutation of Scepticism, if refutation it is, is not a logical > argument. > > In practical life we must steer a middle course between demanding a > degree of certainty that we can never have and treating all > possibilities as if they were of equal weight when they are not. > > Story of Philosophy > by Bryan Mageehttp://www.amazon.com/Story-Philosophy-Bryan-Magee/dp/078947994X > > According to perspectivalism and relativism, a proposition is only > true relative to a particular perspective. Roughly, a proposition is > true relative to a perspective if and only if it is accepted, > endorsed, or legitimated by that perspective. > > "a propensity, which inclines us to be positive and certain in > particular points, according to the light in which we survey them at > any particular instant". (Treatise 1.4.7, 273) > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume > > Here is a sketch of how Hume's "system" works: > > When I wake up and hear certain familiar sounds, I come to believe > that it is raining. My judgment is a representation because there are > perceptions of the sight and feel of rain, perceptions that I will > have if I go to the window and look, or if I go outside and feel the > rain. These perceptions are the "facts" my judgment is about. My > judgment is the result of a causal process: given my past associations > between a certain kind of soud and the presence of rain, plus a > present impression of that certain kind of sound, I expect that if I > go to the window I will see it raining on my roses. My expectation is > representative, and capable of truth or falsity. So if I go to the > window to look at my roses, and see that Charlotte is hosing off the > screen on our bedroom window, then my belief misrepresented the facts, > and what I believed was false. But the facts that lead me to regard my > judgment as true or false, as accurately representing or as > misrepresenting those facts, are themelves perceptions impressions, > and they are not representative of anything beyond themselves. > > ...Hume has shown that a system allegedly built on more secure > "foundations" "principles" that go beyond perceptions and are > somehow supposed to validate them is a metaphysical pipe-dream, not > the legitimate basis of a coherent account of human nature, judgment, > and belief. > > But in rejecting the "ultimate principles" of traditonal metaphysics > as incoherent, isn't Hume committing himself to an equally > questionable picture of the ultimate nature of reality, one that says > that there are only impressions, ideas, and the inferences we make > from them? No. In choosing to restrict his discussion of questions > about the nature of human nature in terms of perceptions, Hume is > answering what he takes to be empirical questions in the only coherent > way that they can be answered. Metaphysics tempts us to regard these > answers as making claims about the ultimate nature of reality. Hume > shows us how to resist that temptation. It is in this that the depth > and originality of his project for the reform of philosophy consists. > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/ As far as I can see, even in the portion above, Hume is indeed making claims about the way things are, period. He focuses on humans and perception, but hey, those are portions of reality.
From: sarge on 20 May 2010 23:26
On 21 Maj, 03:02, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > Here is a sketch of how Hume's "system" works: > > When I wake up and hear certain familiar sounds, I come to believe > that it is raining. My judgment is a representation because there are > perceptions of the sight and feel of rain, perceptions that I will > have if I go to the window and look, or if I go outside and feel the > rain. These perceptions are the "facts" my judgment is about. My > judgment is the result of a causal process: given my past associations > between a certain kind of soud and the presence of rain, plus a > present impression of that certain kind of sound, I expect that if I > go to the window I will see it raining on my roses. My expectation is > representative, and capable of truth or falsity. So if I go to the > window to look at my roses, and see that Charlotte is hosing off the > screen on our bedroom window, then my belief misrepresented the facts, > and what I believed was false. But the facts that lead me to regard my > judgment as true or false, as accurately representing or as > misrepresenting those facts, are themelves perceptions impressions, > and they are not representative of anything beyond themselves. > > ...Hume has shown that a system allegedly built on more secure > "foundations" "principles" that go beyond perceptions and are > somehow supposed to validate them is a metaphysical pipe-dream, not > the legitimate basis of a coherent account of human nature, judgment, > and belief. > > But in rejecting the "ultimate principles" of traditonal metaphysics > as incoherent, isn't Hume committing himself to an equally > questionable picture of the ultimate nature of reality, one that says > that there are only impressions, ideas, and the inferences we make > from them? No. In choosing to restrict his discussion of questions > about the nature of human nature in terms of perceptions, Hume is > answering what he takes to be empirical questions in the only coherent > way that they can be answered. Metaphysics tempts us to regard these > answers as making claims about the ultimate nature of reality. Hume > shows us how to resist that temptation. It is in this that the depth > and originality of his project for the reform of philosophy consists. > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/ I realized a second problem with Hume's argument - in terms of it somehow not asserting the ways things are with certainty - is what is implicit. It is implicit that we are like Hume, that one can generalize, that no one has direct access, that he can know this, etc. He starts with an assumed ontology, which he does not want to grant is a metaphysics. |