From: John Jones on
Scott H wrote:
> I give a concise, formal proof and a short intuitive description of ZFC +
> ~G.
>
> http://www.hoge-essays.com/incompleteness.html
>
> Any constructive feedback is welcome.
>
>


The translation of the proposition P as "P is not provable in ..." is
argued untenable here:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/88248/Wittgenstein-on-Godel
(Putnam and Floyd)

though I could, and have, put my own gloss on it.
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
John Jones <jonescardiff(a)btinternet.com> writes:

> The translation of the proposition P as "P is not provable in ..." is
> argued untenable here:
>
> http://www.scribd.com/doc/88248/Wittgenstein-on-Godel
> (Putnam and Floyd)

Anything at all can be argued. In this instance, Putnam and Floyd don't
argue very convincingly.

> though I could, and have, put my own gloss on it.

Of that I'm sure. Of course, as Kreisel recounts, once the proof was
explained to you in some detail, and you no longer had to rely merely on
G�del's prefatory informal outline of the proof, your confusion was all
cleared up -- but perhaps, having died over fifty years ago, you no
longer recall Kreisel's explanation...

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon mann nicht sprechen kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Scott H on
On Sep 23, 5:46 pm, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> As said, I can't really fathom the exact nature of your confusion --
> taken literally much of what you write is simply nonsense [...]

It isn't nonsense. I've read Goedel's manuscript and the proof I've
given follows his.

I've also been researching Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem for twelve
years, since I first learned about it as a student of advanced
mathematics at age 14.

> That said, there is of course no pressing reason for anyone to take any
> interest in the incompleteness theorems, or this or that technical
> result in logic -- and unless one is willing to put in the effort and
> actually study the mathematical, conceptual and philosophical issues
> involved, in quite some detail, it is pointless to offer general
> reflections and musings as to the significance or interpretation of such
> results.

Your attitude reminds me of something Wittgenstein wrote about the
Liar Paradox: that "it was a useless language game, and why should
anybody be excited?" To date, I don't know why we shouldn't.
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Scott H <zinites_page(a)yahoo.com> writes:

> On Sep 23, 5:46 pm, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
>> As said, I can't really fathom the exact nature of your confusion --
>> taken literally much of what you write is simply nonsense [...]
>
> It isn't nonsense. I've read Goedel's manuscript and the proof I've
> given follows his.

You haven't presented any proof in the usual mathematical sense, at
least in the essay on your site. The incompleteness theorems appeared
very advanced, difficult to follow, at the time they were presented. As
usual with such things, they are now regarded as commonplace, and
various matters that were once obscure have been clarified through
decades of subsequent work in proof theory and recursion theory. G�del's
original paper is not best source for learning this stuff. (And your
quoting G�del's original statement of the incompleteness theorem in your
essay is bafflingly pointless.)

> Your attitude reminds me of something Wittgenstein wrote about the
> Liar Paradox: that "it was a useless language game, and why should
> anybody be excited?" To date, I don't know why we shouldn't.

Anyone is of course free to be excited about anything. As to the liar,
pondering it has led to many important insights, in philosophy and in
logic, including Tarski's theorem on undefinability of truth, Kripke's
theory of grounded truth, etc.

My attitude is not of much general interest, but my suggestion is by no
means that we shouldn't think about various logical conundrums, or
reflect on the possible philosophical significance of this or that
technical result in logic. I only suggest that if one is to contribute
meaningfully to our understanding of these matters, in the sense of
technical philosophy or mathematical logic, it is necessary to take into
account the work that's already been done, relating one's insights and
ideas to the actual intellectual interests of professional philosophers
and logicians. In case of "infinite reference", for example, one would
expect to see some mention of Yablo's paradox and such matters. (Yablo's
paradox, like many other paradoxes, can be made to do actual
mathematical work, e.g. in establishing the closure ordinal for various
kinds of inductive definitions.)

From what you say I presume you're an autodidact when it comes to the
incompleteness theorems. One of the dangers in being an autodidact --
and I say this as a fellow autodidact -- is that it is often very
difficult to assess with any accuracy whether some idea, some line of
thought, that springs to mind, is likely to have any significance or
interest, from the point of view of the professional researcher; without
feedback from those in the know it's very easy to get stuck on some
apparently brilliant but in reality vacuous insight, thinking it the
bee's knees, basking in the warmth of the feeling of having really
gotten to the heart of something. The possibility that this might have
happened to you is something you'd do well to consider.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon mann nicht sprechen kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Nam Nguyen on
Aatu Koskensilta wrote:

> One of the dangers in being an autodidact --
> and I say this as a fellow autodidact -- is that it is often very
> difficult to assess with any accuracy whether some idea, some line of
> thought, that springs to mind, is likely to have any significance or
> interest, from the point of view of the professional researcher; without
> feedback from those in the know it's very easy to get stuck on some
> apparently brilliant but in reality vacuous insight...

Nothing further than the truth. One shouldn't go to the extreme - either way!

Suppose God were so unkind to the world of Mathematics and Godel
had never been born, what would have Hilbert taught us, being the
Professional "know" at the time?

We always should learn from what who have gone before us learnt.
That doesn't necessarily mean they would _always_ be correct, whether
or not they realized that, or whether or not they realized that but
wouldn't want to admit it (perhaps for fear of loosing the "knowledge"?).